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THE VICTORY OF

5 m* VENIZELOS

I VINCENT J. SELIGMAN

Presented to the

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

by the

ONTARIO LEGISLATIVE
LIBRARY

1980

THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE SALONICA SIDE-SHOW
MACEDONIAN MUSINGS
Etc

n

THE VICTORY OF
VENIZELOS

A STUDY OF GREEK POLITICS, 1910-1918

BY

VINCENT J. SELIGMAN

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN &

RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM SfTKEET, W.C. I

$*+& -4 ' '""* "
I t W

First published in 1920

(All rights reserved)

THIS BOOK
IS DEDICATED, WITH HIS KIND PERMISSION, TO

HIS EXCELLENCY M. ELEUTHERIOS VENIZELOS,

AS A SMALL TRIBUTE OP THE AUTHOR'S
RESPECT AND ADMIRATION.

FOREWORD

DURING the last few months it has become
apparent that a skilfully conducted cam-
paign, emanating from Headquarters in
Switzerland, is being carried out, with London and
New York as its chief objectives, to capture them and
to persuade them that Greece's only hope of salvation
lies in recovering her beloved Constantine. Not
only have we been informed in countless interviews
that Constantine was always devoted to the Entente,
and that he has been cruelly misrepresented by his
enemies, but it is also asserted that the Greek
people, almost to a man, have grown tired of M.
Venizelos, and are pining for the return of their
former King.

A certain remote semblance of truth has been lent
to these statements by a slight reaction in Greece
itself, which has set in during the past months. But
this reaction is not due to any unrequited long-
ings of the people for Constantine ; it is rather
owing to that vague feeling of dissatisfaction and
vexation which is the normal aftermath of war

8 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

and which even England has not escaped. Greece
has her profiteers, Bolsheviks, and other nuisances,
just as we have. But whereas England is beginning
to settle down, Greece cannot do so ; for, owing to
a variety of circumstances, peace has not yet been
signed with Turkey. To-day, more than a year after
the Armistice, she is still in a state of war, her Army
is still mobilized, and not a single one of the national
questions which concern her has been settled. It
is hardly surprising in these circumstances that a
certain reaction has set in. But when, last month, a
dastardly attempt was made to murder M. Venizelos,
the wave of horror which swept over the whole
nation, and the universal thanksgivings that the
plot had failed, indicated beyond a doubt what were
Greece's real feelings.

I am well aware that anyone who gets mixed up
in Greek politics does so at his peril. It is only
because, after very careful study of both sides of
the question, and after hearing the views not only
of leading ' Venizelists ' and ' Constantinians,' but
also of Englishmen and English women, who were
in Athens during the War, and who have an intimate
knowledge of Greek politics; it is only because I
have become convinced that the return of Constan-
tine would constitute a national disaster for Greece,

FOREWORD 9

that I have embarked on this perilous adventure.
If I can contribute by this book, even in a small
way, to the enlightenment of the public, I shall be
fully rewarded.

VINCENT J. SELIGMAN.

LONDON,
January, 1920.

CONTENTS

FAGB

FOREWORD . 7

PART I
POLITICAL HISTORY OF GREECE, 1910-1918

CHAPTER

I. VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS . . 15

(1910-1914)

II. THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR . . 27

(July 23, 19U-March 5, 1916)

III. THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR . . 47

(March 5-August 23, 1915)

IV. THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR » .55

(August 23-November 6, 1915)

V. THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR .
(November 6, 1915-November 11, 1918)
11

12 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

PART II
CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTEB PAGE

I. THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN

ATHENS AND BERLIN . » . .87

II. CONSTANTINE'S VIOLATION OP THE CONSTI-
TUTION . . . i • . 102

III. THE VALIDITY OP THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY 117

IV. Two ROYALIST PAMPHLETS , « , 128

V. CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS . • . 141

VI. THE GREEK PEOPLE . . , ,157

VII. THE STATESMANSHIP OP VENIZELOS . 171

PAKT I

CHAPTER I

VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS

(1910 — 1914)

A GREAT deal of nonsense has been talked
about Greece's ' duty ' to intervene at the
beginning of the War on the side of the
Entente, as though Greece were bound by past
favours received from the Protecting Powers to rush
to their assistance, regardless of her own interests.
Examples of such altruistic policy are unfortunately
rare in history ; and if we begin by assuming that
Venizelos' policy was primarily pro-Entente, we shall
start with a fundamental misconception of the whole
trend of Greek politics. Similarly many, but not
all, of those who have been labelled ' pro-German -
with a facile stroke of the pen, were not pro-German
at all. Both Venizelos and the majority of his
opponents were primarily pro-Greek ; and inci-
dentally, according as they believed the true interests
of Greece would be best served, they favoured
either intervention on the side of the Entente or
a neutrality beneficent to German interests. But
it is absurd to talk of treachery to the Entente.
Greece, as an independent Power, was entitled to
act as she chose. It is true that treachery came

15

16 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

later ; but the country betrayed was Serbia. Finally
Greece herself was betrayed by her own rulers, who
abandoned a national for a purely Germanic policy.
With that I will deal later : for the present I only
wish to emphasize that at the beginning every
Greek politician, with the possible exception of
M. Streit, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was
neither pro-Entente nor pro-German, but pro-
Greek.

It is impossible to understand the policy of Venizelos
at the beginning of the War, unless we have some
knowledge of the part he played during the previous
years. In a broader sense it may be said that the
Great European War was not an isolated event
in the Balkans, but rather a consummation of the
two Balkan Wars which preceded it. To study the
first without a knowledge of the second would be to
witness the last act of a drama without witnessing
the first. The alliances and enmities formed in
1912 and 1913 had a profound influence on the alli-
ances and enmities which were formed in 1914 and
1915 : the one gives us the key to the other. I
propose, therefore, to give a slight sketch 'of the
two Balkan Wars, with special reference to the
policy followed by Venizelos.

With the regeneration of Greece in 1910 the idea,
long conceived but hitherto rendered impossible
by mutual jealousies, of forming a Pan-Balkan
Alliance against Turkey, definitely began to take
shape. It was in that same year, 1910, that

VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS 17

Venizelos, after his successful revolution in Crete,
came to Athens and became leader of the Liberal
party and President of the Council of Ministers, or,
as it will be more convenient in the future to call
him, Prime Minister. That he was the founder of
the Balkan League is universally admitted even by
his enemies. But although he succeeded in uniting
the conflicting claims, and in killing the mutual
suspicions of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, he was
by no means in a hurry to use the weapon he had
forged. His enemies have represented him almost
in the same breath as a Bernhardi and as a pacifist :
the truth is that he was neither the one nor the other.
He hoped that the intolerable grievances under
which the Balkan States were labouring might be
set right by the very threat of combined action on
the part of the three kingdoms. But if the threat
did not suffice, he was quite prepared to resort to
extreme measures.

As far as Greece was concerned the threat was
sufficient. In 1912 Greece might have arrived at an
actual settlement of the most burning question of all
which was at issue between herself and Turkey — that
of Crete. But her other Allies, Bulgaria and Serbia,
had decided on war ; and in the circumstances Greece
could not possibly remain a passive spectator. The
War ended in a victory for the Balkan States ; and
Turkey was compelled to surrender a large slice of
territory to the three combatants. But the Great
Powers stepped in and prevented the march on

18 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Constantinople, which from a military point of view
was doomed.

At this point it is necessary to say something about
the attitude of the Great Powers during the First
War. Broadly speaking we may say that England,
France, and Russia supported the just claims of the
Balkan Allies, though they were not prepared to see
Turkey altogether dismembered. Russia in particular
was more directly interested in Balkan affairs than
either England or France. The last two countries
were naturally in favour of the emancipation from the
Turkish yoke of the Christian Greeks and Slavs, and
were, moreover, further prejudiced in their favour
by the apparent inequality of the contest, and ex-
tended the traditional support to David against
Goliath. Russia, whose propinquity to the scene
of action gave her a more vivid and less academic
interest in the War, was bound to the Balkan Allies
by two further bonds. Firstly, two of the Allies,
Serbia and Bulgaria, were Slav races, and she was
united to them by ties of blood : or, if we wish to
put it from the utilitarian point of view, it was in her
interests to support the Slav against the Teuton.
The second reason was that this coalition of Balkan
States, independently of little moment, formed
when united a very important factor in the European
situation. The probability of Austro-German aggres-
sion in the near future became more and more apparent
to Russia ; and the knowledge that an army of nearly
a million men would almost certainly come to her

VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS 19

assistance from the Balkan States in the event of
war naturally led her to support them in their struggle
for independence. She made only one reserve : on
no account must the Balkan States lay a finger on
Constantinople. For more than a century Russia
had coveted this outlet : and she was not prepared
to see it fall into the hands of the Greeks or the Bulgars.
In a word, the policy of the Entente during the
First Balkan War was to assist the Allies whilst at
the same time trying to moderate their claims ;
and, above all, to keep them united.

The policy of Austria and Germany was diametri-
cally opposed to that of the Entente. Austria
detested the Slav races : for Serbia in particular,
ever since she herself had annexed Bosnia and
Herzegovina, she felt that particular hatred and
fear which always inspire Robber-States to attack
those they have robbed. Austria knew well that
hers was a ramshackle Empire, built up by success-
ful royal marriages and by a ruthless policy of
Divide et impera : and she feared that a coalition
of her Balkan enemies might well destroy the
unstable edifice. Moreover, she had for many years
gazed with covetous eyes on Macedonia with its
great port of Salonica : and she could not tolerate
the idea that the spoil which she coveted should
fall into the hands of her enemies.

Germany supported Austria in everything, and
in addition had been drawing closer and closer
to Turkey in the last few years. The Kaiser had

20 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

paid his famous visit, had become a Mohammedan
for the time being, and had made his absurd entry
into Jerusalem. Under cover of this empty and
spectacular show, she had been carrying on the
serious work of the Germanization of the Turk.
Turkey's Army had been reorganized by German
officers : and everything conceivable had been done
to prepare an efficient and friendly Turkey for ' the
day ' when the World-War should begin. Conse-
quently, when the Turkish Army was badly defeated,
the Kaiser, owing to his natural sympathy for
Austria, was doubly mortified at his failure to secure
the efficiency of his future Ally.

We get a clear idea of German relations with
Greece from the correspondence which passed between
the two countries after the First, and before the
Second, Balkan War. At the suggestion of Venizelos,
who, however, made it clear that in return for the
temporary support of Germany he had no intention of
abandoning the Entente and adopting a Germanophile
policy, Constantine (who had just come to the throne
on March 18, 1913, after the tragic assassination
of his father) sounded his brother-in-law on his
disposition towards Greece. At that time the
question of the Turkish Islands was still pending,
the question of Epirus was unsettled, as was also
the difference with Bulgaria, which later led to war.
Was Germany prepared to support Greek claims V
The reply of the Kaiser was outspoken. Regarding
the question of the boundaries of Epirus he referred

VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS 21

the King to his Allies, Austria and Italy ! (It was
on account of the interference of these very two
countries that Greek claims had been opposed.) As
to the Bulgarian frontier, he clearly and categorically
stated that he was quite unable to accept any respon-
sibility in matters which might lead to war with
Bulgaria, a war in which he had not the slightest
inclination of taking part for the sake of Greece ; and
as to the islands, Greece was brutally and bluntly
told that she had no cause to intermeddle with the
question, as they belonged to those who were masters
of Asia Minor — that is, to the Turks. Such, then,
was the enlightenment supplied by Berlin : that
Greece might expect no support from Germany
either as against Bulgaria, or Turkey, or Austria.
We turn now to the Second Balkan War and the
causes which led up to it. After the defeat of Turkey,
Bulgaria, who had had a large but not overwhelming
share in the joint victory, suddenly assumed an
overweening attitude, and informed her Allies that
as she had practically won the War by her own
efforts, she was entitled to a far greater portion of
territory than she had hitherto claimed. Bulgarian
arrogance is a byword in the Balkans : and on this
occasion there can be no possible doubt that Germany
and Austria, who wished at all costs to dissolve tjie
Balkan coalition, were deliberately encouraging her
to put forward extravagant claims. The situation
for Greece particularly was extremely menacing.
Thanks to the stupidity of Constantine, some

22 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Bulgarians had been admitted into Salonica a few
days after its capture by the Greeks on October
26, 1912. Having obtained admission for a few
men on the pretext that the heir to the Bulgarian
throne had passed all night under some bridge outside
the town in the rain, the Bulgars had gradually in
the last few months brought a whole division into
the town. Moreover, throughout Macedonia, where-
ever they were encamped side by side with the Greeks,
the Bulgars were becoming more and more threaten-
ing and small skirmishes between the two ' Allies '
were of daily occurrence.

In view of the danger Venizelos took immediate
steps to secure the help of Serbia, in case of Bulgarian
aggression. Negotiations were opened on May 5th,
and on June 1, 1913, the famous Greco-Serb Treaty
of Alliance was signed. I shall have more to
say about it later ; for the present it is sufficient
to state that Greece and Serbia promised each
other mutual assistance in the event of either being
attacked by a third Power.

But although he took the necessary precautions,
Venizelos never wished for the Second War. Indeed,
his opponents in the House actually attacked him
for wishing to avoid it. In this respect he was in
agreement with Constantine and the Greek General
Staff, who considered that the chances of victory,
even with Serbian co-operation, were little more than
half. It must be borne in mind that the Bulgarian
Army was far superior numerically to that of either

VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS 23

Greece or Serbia, and would, moreover, enjoy the

advantage of fighting on interior lines. Clearly no
responsible Minister would hurry into a war with
so small a margin of prospective success in his favour,
unless the provocation were indeed intolerable.
Moreover, there was also the danger (a very real
one, as subsequent disclosures in the Italian Chamber
proved) of Austrian intervention on Bulgaria's side.

But all attempts at conciliation proved fruitless.
Even before the signing of the defensive treaty,
Bulgaria had commenced hostilities in a small way
against the Greek troops near Mount Pangaeus ; and
on June 29th she fell on Serbia and Greece with
all her forces, without having even declared war.
Thus began the Second Balkan War, which resulted
in the complete defeat of Bulgaria.

This war need not detain us long, though its results
are important, as the future alliances and enmities in
the Balkans, which were later destined to have an
enormous influence on the course of events, began
to crystallize. Just before the end, Roumania, who
had hitherto held aloof from the fighting, invaded
Bulgaria and seized part of the Dobrudja. King
Carol immediately proposed an armistice, which
Venizelos, in spite of the advice of the Greek General
Staff, wishing to make certain of victory by the
capture of Sofia, hastened to accept. In this he was
justified both from a military and a diplomatic
point of view. For the capture of Sofia would have
been an extraordinarily difficult operation, and would

24 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

have entailed very heavy losses ; and on the other
hand the readiness with which Greece agreed to
stop further bloodshed won her golden opinions for
her moderation among the Great Powers, besides
securing her the goodwill of Roumania.

On the 10th of August the Treaty of Bucharest was
signed. Bulgaria lost nearly all she had won from
Turkey ; while Greece and Serbia both made con-
siderable further gains of territory. Roumania
retained the ' captured ' Dobrudja, and Turkey
regained a slice of Thrace, including the important
town of Adrian ople, which she had quietly seized
while her neighbour's gaze was fixed elsewhere. I
do not propose to discuss here the fairness or the
unfairness of the treaty ; it is sufficient to note the
consequences. Greece and Serbia were won over
more securely than ever to the Entente, who had
supported their claims throughout ; and, moreover,
by the mutual assistance they had rendered to each
other, they were bound more closely together than
ever. Bulgaria was furious with every one :
with the Entente for supporting her enemies ; with
Austria and Germany, with Turkey, Roumania,
Greece, and Serbia (but more particularly the latter),
for having thwarted her " national aspirations."
There is no hatred so deadly as fratricidal hatred :
and it was morally certain that if the opportunity
ever came for revenging herself on Serbia, she would
take it, no matter with what " strange bedfellow "
it proved necessary for her to ally herself. Roumania

VENIZELOS AND THE BALKAN WARS 25

resumed her sphinx-like impassivity, though flirt-
ing now with the Entente, now with the Central
Empires. Turkey, satisfied to have regained some-
thing from the unexpected turn of the wheel, drifted
on helplessly, relying more and more on Germany.

It is incontestable that Greece owed an enormous
debt to Venizelos. She had almost doubled her
territory, and now looked forward to a long period
of peace in which to secure and consolidate what she
had won. Venizelos once again showed that spirit
of conciliation which with him goes hand in hand
with a firm determination never to sacrifice any
vital interests, by inserting in the first paragraph
of the King's Speech the sentence that " Greece
considers that she has realized her national pro-
gramme almost in its entirety." Although, as he
himself has stated, he had the widest views of the
future of Hellenism, he was firmly of the opinion
tkat the national interest required him to secure a
long period of peace. The solution of other national
questions he wished to postpone for a whole generation. (

There is just one other incident which needs record-
ing before concluding this chapter. On June 12,
1914, Venizelos, confronted with the persistent
persecution of the Greek population in Asia Minor,
consulted Serbia with a view to concerted action.
Serbia replied that " she considered it her first duty
to fulfil all the obligations of an Ally, resulting from
the Treaty of Alliance," but begged Greece to avoid
war if possible, as her Army had not yet recovered

26 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

from the two wars from which it had just emerged.
At the same time she addressed a strong Note to
Turkey concerning the disgraceful treatment of the
Greeks in the Turkish Empire. Upon Turkey asking
her what concern it was of hers, she replied, " What
concerns my Ally, Greece, concerns me." This
joint threat was sufficient to ensure, at any rate,
a temporary amelioration of the situation ; and on
the 22nd of June, Greece expressed to the Serbian
Government " her warm thanks for the steps which
it has taken at Constantinople in regard to the
persecution carried out in Turkey — a step which
has once more proved the strength of our Alliance
and the friendly bonds which unite the two peoples."
A month later the Great European War broke
out.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR

(July 23, 1914— March 5, 1915)

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TILL THE
FIRST RESIGNATION OF VENIZELOS

^nr^HE outbreak of war came as a terrible blow
to Greece, but it found her united. Venizelos
JL was in Munich, waiting there for the arrival
of the Turkish Minister in Brussels, with whom he
was to negotiate concerning certain outstanding
problems, when the news of Austria's ultimatum to
Serbia (July 23rd) reached him. On the next day
he received a request from the Serbian Government
as to what would be Greece's attitude in the event
of war. Venizelos replied immediately that in the
event of war between Serbia and Austria it would
be necessary for the Greek Government to have fuller
information before she could determine what answer
should be given. " But," the telegram continues,1
" in the event of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria,
I am resolved to propose to His Majesty the King
and the Royal Government that we oppose Bulgaria
with all our forces, in order to relieve Serbia of any

' See Greek White Book No. 15.

27

28 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

fear of the Bulgarian danger, and to assure the
maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest."

The attitude of Greece was perfectly correct.
Before she could intervene against Austria she had
first to satisfy herself that Austria was the assailant,
and then to decide in concert with Serbia on the best
way of carrying out the treaty. There were three
alternatives : either for Greece to declare war
immediately on Austria and to move her Army
up from Salonica on to the Danube : or to declare
war on Austria, and keep her Army mobilized on
the Bulgarian frontier : or, finally, to maintain her
neutrality, to watch Bulgaria and to attack her at
once should she move against Serbia, and to render
Serbia every assistance by expediting supplies and
munitions from Salonica. Of these the first would
have been madness ; for it would have given the
Bulgarians the heaven-sent opportunity of crossing
the undefended frontier and of cutting the Greek
and Serb communications with the sea. The second
would have almost certainly precipitated Bulgaria's
entry into the war against them. The third alternative
was then the only possible one. Accordingly Greece,
with the full approval of her Ally, Serbia, announced
that she would remain neutral for the present ; but
that in the event of Bulgaria attacking her Ally
she would come at once to her assistance. It is
most important to note that Greece had consulted
her Ally and received her approval as to the course
to be pursued by her, in view of the subsequent

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 29

allegations of the Royalists, with which I will
deal later, that Venizelos himself had broken the
treaty.

Whilst the Prime Minister, with the approval of
the country and also the apparent approval of the
King, was carrying out his treaty obligations, the
King, without consulting his Prime Minister, sent
the following message (August 7th) to the Kaiser:

" The Emperor knows that my personal sym-
pathies and my political opinions draw me to his
side. . . . After deep reflection it is, however, im-
possible for me to see how I could be of service to
him by mobilizing at once my Army. ... I am
forced to think that neutrality is imposed on us,
which may be useful to him, and I assure him
that I will not touch any of my neighbours who
are his friends, as long as they do not touch our
local Balkan interests.

" CONSTANTINE." x

This message needs little comment : but we may
note that it is the reply to a Note from the Kaiser ; »
asking Constantine to join hands with him against
Slavism ; assuring him that Bulgaria, Turkey,
and Roumania were coming in too ; warning him
that if Greece did not join Germany, Germany
would break with her ; and concluding with the
remark that " What I ask for to-day is to put into
execution that which we have so often discussed

'White Book No. 21. » White Book No. 19.

30 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

together." It would be interesting to know the
exact nature of these discussions !

But the firm attitude of Venizelos and of the
Greek people was sufficient, in spite of Constantine's
assurances of neutrality, to restrain Bulgaria : and
a few days later the Bulgarian Government
dropped their bellicose attitude and returned to
the strait and narrow path of neutrality, from
which they were not to depart till fourteen
months later.

But for Greece there was another and more immi-
nent danger than the possibility of an attack by
Bulgaria on Serbia. Turkey had not yet come in on
Germany's side : but her Navy had been reinforced
by the Goeben and the Breslau, and England
had not yet effected the seizure of the Sultan Selim,
a ship which was being constructed in the English
dockyards, and which was to be delivered to Turkey
in November. Against these, the Greek Navy
could only oppose two American battleships of doubt-
ful value, the purchase of which had been opposed
by Admiral Mark Kerr who had been sent out before
the war at the request of the Greek Government to
reorganize their Navy. Thus the balance of naval
power was, or rather would be shortly, turned
definitely against Greece. The danger was terrible ;
for at any moment Turkey and Bulgaria might
arrive at an understanding, and take advantage of
the European complications, to fall upon Greece
and divide her rich territories.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 31

For Venizelos there was only one solution : for
Greece to throw herself unreservedly on the side of
the Entente. But there were other, cogent reasons
which led him to take this step. First there was the
geographical position of Greece. As Venizelos himself
remarked, " One cannot kick against geography."
The extended seaboard of Greece, with all the
biggest towns situated on the coast, and the large
number of Greek islands, practically forced her on
to the side of the Entente. As Greece was to learn
later on, the Anglo-French control of the Mediter-
ranean made it possible for us, without firing a shot,
to bring Greece to her knees by the simple proclama-
tion of a blockade. There was, of course, no
question of doing so at that time ; but, as
already stated, Venizelos was not blind to the
significance of geography. Secondly, there was the
danger of Bulgarian expansion. In 1913 Bulgaria
had committed tremendous blunders ; and she had
paid the penalty. But would she be so foolish
again ? If she joined the Central Empires, and
they were victorious, she would receive an enormous
increase of territory. If she took arms on the
side of the Entente, and they were victorious, she
would be richly rewarded. Even if she remained
neutral, she could make sure of concessions from
Serbia, who had already offered her the left bank of
the Vardar as the price of her neutrality, and gains
at Turkey's expense in the event of an Entente
victory. What was Greece to do under these cir-

32 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

cumstances ? She had no objection to a small
expansion of Bulgaria; but she could not permit
the Balance of Power created at Bucharest to be
disturbed. Clearly then Greece's only chance was
to forestall Bulgaria and to intervene on the side of
the Entente. There was no question of inter-
vention on the side of Germany : and by remain-
ing neutral, she could have no voice in the Peace
Conference, whichever group gained the victory.
There was one, and only one combination of
events which could bring about the downfall of
Greece under these conditions — that is, if Bulgaria
sided with the Central Empires and the Entente
were defeated. But in that event Greece would
be little better situated, if she remained neutral.
Moreover, from the beginning of the War till the
very end, Venizelos never doubted the ultimate
victory of the Entente.

Accordingly, on the 28th of August, he asked for
and obtained the King's authorization to declare
that Greece understood that her place was at the
side of the Entente : that although owing to the
Bulgarian danger she was unable to reinforce Serbia,
much less to send an expeditionary force to France,
nevertheless she thought it her duty to declare
to the Entente that, if Turkey went to war against
them, she placed all her naval and military forces
at the disposal of the Entente, providing that she was
guaranteed against the Bulgarian danger.

It is worthy of note that this declaration was made

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 33

before the battle of the Marne, at a time when the
capture of Paris seemed imminent : and that Venizelos
made no bargain with the Entente as to the recom-
pense which Greece should receive for participation
in the war against Turkey. In this Venizelos showed
extraordinary astuteness ; and he did not have to
wait long for his recompense. The first reward
was the promise of the English Government, even
before Turkey had abandoned her neutrality, that
the British Navy would not permit the Turkish
Fleet to leave the Dardanelles even for the specific
object of attacking Greece ; the second the permission
granted to the Greek troops to re-occupy northern
Epirus without prejudice to the future settlement
of the Albanian question. Finally, England began
to think seriously of offering Cyprus to Greece —
an offer actually made a little later, and rejected by
the Zaimes Government.

A few days later Constantine changed his mind :
and proceeded to undo the work of Venizelos. He
had given his authorization to the Prime Minister's
declaration, and had at the time been fully persuaded
as to its wisdom. But later he had reopened the
question with General Dousmanes, the Chief of
Staff, and Streit, the Foreign Secretary, who both
questioned the wisdom of handing oneself over to
the Entente. Whether or not Constantine had
been deliberately fooling Venizelos I shall discuss
later when I come to estimate his character, but
provisionally we may accept the explanation that

3

34 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

he had changed his mind. It cannot be true,
however, that he had forgotten his previous
decision, as he had received a personal wire from
the King of England a few days later, expressing
his gratitude that Greece had not hesitated at
such a critical moment to take her stand by the
side of England. A week after the receipt of this
wire Admiral Mark Kerr received instructions from
the British Admiralty to get into touch with the
Greek General Staff, and to study the possibilities
of an attack on the Gallipoli peninsula. Our Admiral
went straight to the King, who received him with
great friendliness and placed at his disposal an ex-
ceedingly clever plan of attack drawn up by Colonel
Metaxas. "But," added the King, "although
I believe Mr. Venizelos feels very strongly about
this matter, I only agree with him to this
extent : that, if Turkey declares war against us,
and you want to help us, I will accept your help.*'
This was a flat contradiction of Greece's previous
declaration : and Admiral Mark Kerr asked the
King if he would allow him to communicate these
remarks to the British Government as definitive.
The King thereupon replied that he had to submit
the telegram to Venizelos for approval. Naturally,
when the latter read it, he was dismayed, and in a
letter addressed to the King placed his resignation
in his hands.1 In addition to arguments previously
advanced, Venizelos called attention to two facts :
1 See Jetter of September 7, 1014, White Book I, No. 6.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 35

the sinister and unconstitutional influence exercised
over the King's mind by M. Streit, and the open
declaration of Germany that, in the event of Bulgarian
participation in the conflict on her side, she would
support the creation of a " Greater Bulgaria " to
serve as a bulwark against Slavism. With regard
to M. Streit it may be mentioned (though this was
not discovered till later) that it was he who had
drafted the famous letter of August 7th to the
Kaiser ; and he had, moreover, been dismissed before
by Venizelos for a breach of faith in communicating
direct with the King without the knowledge of his
chief, and had only been reinstated at the King's
urgent personal request.

Fortunately the Premier's threat of resignation
was sufficient to bring the King to his senses. The
unfortunate telegram was destroyed ; and a short
time afterwards Streit left the Ministry owing to
a further breach of faith. But the incident left
behind two unpleasant consequences. Firstly, the
Entente began to grow suspicious of the King ;
and secondly, our Admiralty, by contemptuously
rejecting the plan of Metaxas, which — I have been
told by a first-rate authority — was far better than
the plan eventually adopted, created an im-
placable enemy. We shall hear more of Metaxas
later.

Not long after this the Entente again turned its
eyes towards the Balkans with a view to concerted
action against Turkey. Venizelos received with

36 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

joy the announcement of Sir Edward Grey that in
return for her co-operation she would receive " very
important concessions in Asia Minor." The offer
was a trifle vague : but it seemed clear that Greece
would receive the coveted town of Smyrna with its
huge population of Greeks and the hinterland which
goes with the town. When we consider the giant
strides made by Greece in the last few years and the
enormous possibilities opened up by this new offer,
we should hardly feel surprised if for a moment
Venizelos' head had been turned. But with char-
acteristic caution he insisted that Greece must be
protected from a Bulgarian assault.

First he endeavoured to secure the co-operation of
Roumania ; but Roumania would not take the plunge.
Then he turned to Bulgaria : but it was soon evident
that Bulgaria would not co-operate, unless Greece,
as well as Serbia, was prepared to make concessions
to her. At this point Venizelos found himself face
to face with an unpleasant necessity : but he did
not flinch. In a secret memorandum to the King,
which was afterwards published by Gounares in
order to throw discredit on him, he suggested that
the provinces of Drama and Kavalla should be
ceded to Bulgaria, as the price of her co-operation.
When we consider that by sacrificing this territory he
would obtain much greater compensation in Asia
Minor, the proposed concession does not appear
to have been unreasonable, though disadvantageous.
It must be remembered that the provinces of Drama

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 37

and Kavalla were contiguous to Bulgarian territory,
whereas Smyrna was a long way away. On the
whole Greece would have gained little, if anything
at all, by the bargain : but Venizelos foresaw that the
re-formation of the Balkan League would materially
shorten the war, and for that end he was prepared
to make sacrifices. Negotiations, however, for this
compromise were not even begun, inasmuch as the
news that Bulgaria had contracted a large loan in
the money markets of Berlin and Vienna, together
with certain other unmistakable indications, made
it clear to Venizelos that she had already definitely
made up her mind to side with the Central
Empires.

He therefore returned to his original policy of
neutrality, with the qualification, however, that
if ever the Entente should think fit to call upon
Greece in the war against Turkey he held himself
at their disposal, subject always to the stipulation
as to the neutralization of the Bulgarian menace.
Then early in the New Year came the tidings of the
proposed attempt against the Dardanelles. Immedi-
ately on receipt of the news Venizelos saw the
wonderful opportunity offered of following up the
" very considerable " expectations of territory in
Asia Minor ; and, moreover, in his opinion the
undertaking did not involve the same risks as
the previous ones had done. The attack on the
Dardanelles was to be undertaken by the Navy :
but a landing-force would be needed, and the

38 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Entente had none ready and on the spot. It was
then this very force, together with the Greek Navy,
which Venizelos determined that Greece should
provide.

When we reflect upon this offer, we are struck
not only by its amazing simplicity but also by the
extraordinary opportunities which it opened out for
Greece at a very trifling cost ; for Venizelos only
proposed to mobilize one Army Corps (about 50,000
men) for the expedition, and this would not seriously
weaken the strength of the Greek Army, which could
remain on the watch to checkmate Bulgarian
aggression, and further operations against Turkey
would be undertaken by the Great Powers them-
selves. But the Dardanelles being forced, as seemed
highly probable if the Greek landing force co-operated,
Bulgaria would almost certainly betray Germany
and Greece could come in with the rest of her Army.
If, on the other hand, the expedition proved a
failure, Greece, though only risking one Army Corps,
would have gone a very long way to substantiating
her claims in Asia Minor in the eyes of the Entente.
But not only was the offer beneficial to Greece :
it was also beneficial to the Entente. In a huge
war 50,000 men in themselves are not a very imposing
force : but if brought in just in the right place and
just at the right moment, at a time too when through
a variety of circumstances the Entente could not
collect an equal number for the expedition, it was
more than probable that they would turn the scales

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 39

in favour of the attacking force. In a word, this
daring offer seemed likely to please every one —
except the Turks.

Venizelos at once consulted the Greek General
Staff, who strongly opposed the expedition not only
on military but on political grounds. What was
the use of this wild-goose chase in Asia Minor ?
Greece was large enough as it was. Moreover, if
Greece extended her territory in Asia Minor, she
would be brought into touch with the Great Powers ;
Russia coming round the southern shores of the
Black Sea as far as Constantinople, the Italians
to the south ; and she would be crushed between
the two. In propounding these views Dousmanes,
Metaxas and the others were not only denying the
whole foundation of Greek existence, but were guilty
of a gross breach of duty : for the right of soldiers
to base their judgment on political consideration
cannot be admitted. Still the Prime Minister over-
looked the irregularity of their conduct, and proceeded
to clear away the other obstacle — the King's opposi-
tion. He went to see him, and placed before him
a third memorandum, which he begged to be allowed
to read to him. The exact contents of the memo-
randum can never be published : but in it the sugges-
tion was made that England would be by no means
dissatisfied to see a " bigger Greece " in Asia Minor
barring the way of Russian aggression. (It was this
suggestion which the King afterwards passed on to
the Czar, to discredit Venizelos in his eyes.) At

40 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

any rate the contents of the memorandum deeply
impressed the King, who finally said with great
emotion, " Very well, then, in God's name."

But when the Premier came out of the audience
chamber into the ante-room, he found Colonel
Metaxas, who handed him an envelope with the
remark : " Mr. President, here is my resignation. I
cannot remain Chief of the Staff if a policy of which
I do not personally approve is decided on." Venizelos
was startled by this announcement : not only because
Metaxas was a very brilliant soldier, but because
he feared that his defection might shake public
opinion and prejudice the future administration of
public affairs, and also that the knowledge of internal
dissensions in Greece might stimulate Bulgarian
activity. Accordingly he took the courageous and
unusual step of begging the King to summon a Crown
Council of former Prime Ministers on the morrow
(March 4th) " under your Presidency, in order to
hear their views on the subject." When we remem-
ber that nearly all the former Prime Ministers, such
as Ralles, Dragoumes and Theotokes, were his
political opponents, the boldness of this course
is apparent.

On the next day the Crown Council met. Ralles
and Dragoumes proclaimed themselves in favour of
the expedition : but Theotokes suggested that the
former Chief of Staff should be called and that his
views should be heard by the Council before they
came to a definite decision. To this Venizelos

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 41

assented, and it was decided to call a second Crown
Council on the following day. But in the meantime
Venizelos decided, with his usual moderation, to
reduce the proposed expeditionary force from one
Army Corps to one division, thus cutting the ground
from under the feet of his opponents. He also
obtained from the Chief of Staff a written statement
that this one division could be replaced by calling
up a division of the reserve, so that there would remain
available the whole original force of fifteen divisions
to meet any contingency. On the next day, then,
he laid the revised plans before the Crown Council.
Metaxas, being called, admitted that the absence of
one division would not impair the efficiency of the
Army. Again Dragoumes and Ralles urged the
King to take courage and go forward. Theotokes
said : " You know my opinions : but I am bound to
admit not only that my opinions may be out of date,
but also that they are not shared by the Greek people :
consequently Your Majesty must not depend on
the fact that if you choose to follow another policy
you might find me disposed to undertake its applica-
tion." Thus the one opponent of the expedition
admitted that his feelings were not shared by the
Greek people. The matter seemed at last to have
been settled : and Venizelos left the King's presence,
confident that Greece would abandon her neutrality
and take part in the attack with one division. But
the King, for reasons which I shall discuss later,
changed his mind ; and on the same afternoon

42 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

refused his consent. There was only one course open
to Venizelos : in spite of the entreaties of the Greek
people, and in opposition to the advice even of his
political adversaries, he withdrew from office in order
to facilitate the execution of the personal policy of
the Crown. In this he showed his wisdom : for
had he openly raised the standard of rebellion against
the King's unconstitutional methods at the time,
he would have placed himself in a false position.
Such action would have been premature : and so
he gave way with a good grace. Four days later
the crisis was ended : and on March 10th Gounares
formed his Ministry and took the oath.

It is impossible to conclude this chapter without
endeavouring to weigh in the light of subsequent
events the merits of the two policies of intervention
and abstention. I have carefully studied the chief
arguments advanced by what we may term the
" Court " ; and they appear to be as follows : First
the price of intervention had not been definitely
fixed, for the somewhat vague concessions in Asia
Minor had only been offered in the event of Greece
co-operating with all her Army and Navy. Later
the Entente could turn round on Greece and
say, ' We offered you nothing for the assistance of
your one division and we will give you nothing.'
Second : we know now that the Gallipoli expedition
was badly organized, and ended in a disastrous
failure. After losing 200,000 men the English
could boast of only one ' victory ' — they managed

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 43

to withdraw what was left of their Army. Is it likely
that a tiny force could have accomplished that
which twenty times their number failed to effect ?
The Greek force would have been simply thrown away
and sacrificed to no purpose. Third : Russia refused
categorically to allow us to take part in the expedition
for fear lest the arrival of Greek troops in Constan-
tinople should ' disturb ' the half a million Greek
inhabitants. What was the good of fighting for
Allies who did not desire your co-operation ? Fourth :
the French insisted that we should also declare war
against the Central Empires. Their policy was clear.
They wished us to commit ourselves irrevocably
to war by sending a few troops ; and then they
would apply irresistible pressure to make us throw
in all our Army and Navy. Had we sent even a
platoon of Greek soldiers, we should have been forced
to follow it up with our entire forces.

Such are the arguments of the " Court " : the
replies of Venizelos are worth noting. First : it is
true that Greece had not insisted on the breaking up
of the Turkish Empire, and had Turkey made peace
as a result of the forcing of the Dardanelles, it is
probable that Greece would not have received the
concessions in Asia Minor. But if Greece had helped
to solve the problem of the Straits by her initiative,
and her co-operation, she would have definitely
obtained reparation for, and a stoppage of, the
Turkish persecutions of the Greeks in Asia Minor,
besides gaining enormous prestige in Europe generally,

44 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

One could not expect too great a reward in return
for the assistance of one division. Later on, if she
had chosen, Greece could have undertaken further
operations arid could have insisted on further con-
cessions. Second : it is absurd to condemn a policy
on a consideration of the consequences which arose
from its non-application. Supposing Greece had
not sided with Bulgaria and Serbia against Turkey
in the First Balkan War, Turkey would have had
command of the sea, and would have been enabled
to transport her Army from Asia Minor to European
Turkey, with the probable result that Bulgaria
and Serbia would have been defeated. But would
it be fair on that account to say that Greece would
have been justified in remaining neutral ? As a
matter of fact the Dardanelles enquiry had established
the fact beyond doubt that the seizure of Gallipoli
at that time would not have been an operation of
great difficulty. For as yet the peninsula was unforti-
fied and had not more than 6,000 men, scattered and
isolated, for its defence. It was only later, after
the warning given by the preliminary attack, that
the Turks seriously undertook the task of rendering
it impregnable. Moreover, the very rumour of
Greek co-operation was sufficient to cause a panic
in Constantinople, where the decision was taken
to abandon the town. Third : it is true that Russian
public opinion viewed with no friendly eye Greek
co-operation in the Dardanelles expedition. None
the less there was never any declaration to the

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR 45

effect that assistance would not be acceptable.
On the contrary, on March llth Romanes, the Greek
Minister in Paris, wired that Delcasse* had informed
him that the Russian Government gave their un-
conditional consent to Greek participation.1 Fourth :
there had never been any suggestion on the part of
France that Greece should definitely commit herself
to declaring war on the Central Empires : the
decision rested solely with Greece.

Such are the arguments of both sides. My own
opinion is that the first three arguments of the " Court "
are definitely refuted by Venizelos : but I consider
his fourth reply rather weak, though it is technically
conclusive. If the Dardanelles were forced, as he
was justified in believing that they would be, all
would be well for Greece. But there was always
the chance that the expedition would be a failure :
in that event how far would Greece be committed ?
Technically it may be true that no pressure would
have been brought to bear on Greece to declare
war against the Central Empires. But almost
certainly the Central Empires would have declared
war on her : which amounts to the same thing.
The fact is, as Lloyd George once remarked, there
is no half-way house in war : if you are involved to
the extent of one division, you are involved to the
extent of all you possess. Still, if we weigh every
consideration for and against intervention, there
can be little doubt that the policy of Venizelos, the
* White Book II, No. 8.

40 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

policy of intervention, combined for Greece the
maximum of advantages with the minimum of risks.
It was the policy of a far-seeing man : whereas the
" Court " policy was, to say the least, unimaginative
and short-sighted.

CHAPTER III

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR

(March 5— August 23, 1915)

THE GOUNARES GOVERNMENT AND ENTENTE
DIPLOMACY

OUTWARDLY the policy of Gounares ap-
peared to be a continuation of the policy of
Venizelos : with this difference, that the
new Government had not approved of the ; hasty
action. ' of the late Premier. Roughly speaking,
the official messages l sent from Athens to the
Great Powers amounted to the following declara-
tions : —

" You need not be alarmed at the change of Govern-
ment. We thought Venizelos too hot-headed in
the matter of the Dardanelles. But in every other
respect we are determined to follow his policy.
Naturally we want Peace ; but if you are prepared
to make us a handsome offer — well, gentlemen, the
door is open, so pray step in. By the way, certain
unpleasant people have been spreading the rumour
that we are going to abandon Serbia. There is not

* See White Book I, Nos. 28, 29, and 31, dated March
10th, March 13th, and August 2nd respectively

47

48 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

a word of truth in this allegation. Whatever happens
we will stand by her, if Bulgaria attacks her. So step
in, gentlemen — the door is open."

But was the door really open ? It was beginning
to be plain, to all those who had eyes to see, that
there were really two Governments at Athens. There
was the actual Government in power, of whom by
far the most notable member, Zographos, the Foreign
Secretary, was honestly desirous of coming to an
understanding and co-operating with the Entente :
and there was a ' back-stairs party ' at Court,
who had not the slightest intention of taking sides
against Germany or even against Bulgaria. Later
on I will discuss who they were that formed the
" Court " party and how thoroughly they had the
King under their thumb at this period : for the
present it is enough to say that they formed a very
strong group and were indeed far more powerful
than the nominal Government, with which the
Entente were engaged in continuous negotiations
during the next few months.

These negotiations need not take up much of our
time : they were all abortive. But in order to make
clear what was happening, I will give one specimen
of these pourparlers. On the 1 1th of April the Entente
made a definite offer to Greece of the vilayet of
Smyrna in return for her co-operation against Turkey.
On the 13th the Greek Government, after repeated
Council meetings, sent a lengthy reply to the Entente.
In the first place they pointed out that this proposal

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 49

was different from former ones, in that Greece did
not ask for Bulgarian co-operation. Greece would
come in on two conditions : first, that the war should
have as its final object the breaking up of the Turkish
Empire ; second, that the sector of Greek military
action should not be outside European Turkey.
These conditions being accepted, a double bargain,
political and territorial, could be easily struck,
and the Staffs could draw up a second military
agreement giving all details as to the Greek sector.
As it stands, this offer appeared very advantageous
to the Entente : moreover, the strategic import-
ance of landing in Thrace, by placing the Turk
between two fires, could not be overestimated.
But although the scheme had been twice approved
by the Greek Staff, Dousmanes suddenly declared
three days later that he felt 6 uneasy ' about the
formulation of the proposal. He now made the
following further suggestions : The Entente must
place 450,000 men in the field in case Bulgaria
should join Turkey ; the Greek sector must be placed
" further West " ; and the landing between Mnos
and the Dardanelles must be undertaken by the
Entente. The object of this change of plan is apparent :
Greece would only march through Bulgaria against
Turkey. Thus either the Entente Armies would
be used for destroying Bulgaria, or — and this seemed
more probable — they would refuse to permit an
attack on a neutral country, and Greece could
continue her policy of non-intervention.

4

50 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

When he heard the new proposals, Zographos,
who really was anxious to co-operate, was furious ;
and there followed a very stormy scene, in the course
of which he said to Dousmanes, " Do you intend
to play us false again ? " Unhappily, Zographos
was not in a position to resist — the Court party was
too strong for him. He accordingly submitted to the
Entente on the 20th of April an explanatory docu-
ment of a military character, along the lines suggested
by Dousmanes, so that the Powers should ' under-
stand ' the offer that was being made. The Powers
showed their ' understanding ' by failing even to
reply.

Perhaps the easiest thing in the world is to criticize
our diplomatists, basing one's criticism on * what
happened after.' The Balkan diplomacy of the
Entente during the War has received more than
its fair share of criticism. There were certainly many
* regrettable incidents ' : and British diplomacy as
a whole followed in the East a patchy, makeshift,
harid-to-mouth policy, characterized (in so far as it
can be said to have any character) by lack of any
attempt at co-ordination or coherence. " What
looks like malignity " — if I may quote a distinguished
Irishman — " in British dealings in the Balkans is
really the result of stupidity — the inability of the
English governing class to see any point of view but
their own : and that not clearly." None the less
a great deal of the criticism which has been levelled
at them is as unfair as it is contradictory. We are

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 51

told almost in the same breath that they should have
made sure of buying Bulgaria, and that they should
have known that Bulgaria had already sold herself
to Germany ; that they should have known that
Greece was deceiving us, and that they ought never
to have driven Greece into the hands of Germany
by their distrust of her.

The fact is, the position of our diplomatists was
extraordinarily difficult. Their greatest difficulty
during the period of the Gounares Ministry, from March
till August 1915, was this : they were anxious to
secure the co-operation of Bulgaria and of Greece,
but they could trust neither. As long as Venizelos
was Prime Minister they treated Greece with the
greatest consideration ; for they knew that they
could trust him. But after his first resignation
the situation was radically altered. For behind
the friendly offers of the nominal Government there
stood the malevolence of the hidden one, eager to
undo secretly what had been openly effected. As
we have seen from the negotiations just related, behind
the amicable Zographos there lurked the shadow of
the hostile Dousmanes. Most of the criticism of our
diplomacy has arisen from an ignorance of this dual
control of the Government which was now taking
place at Athens. " Zographos," these critics said in
effect, " was willing and anxious to come in with
you. But you snubbed him ; you encouraged Bulgaro-
phile writers to abuse Greece in the English papers,
and you treated Greek territory as though it belonged

52 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

to you, and offered it as a bribe to Bulgaria without
mentioning the matter to Greece. You continued
your fruitless attempts to win over Bulgaria long
after it was known to every one that she had allied
herself with Germany. Then when Greece asked
that you should guarantee at least her integrity,
you replied that you couldn't do so for fear of ' dis-
couraging ' Bulgaria ! " These are the charges which
I have heard on many lips ; and indeed if the offers
of Zographos represented the true wishes of those
who governed Greece, the charges might have been
justified. But they did not : and it is certain that
our diplomatists knew the real state of affairs. The
fact is that the small but powerful clique which had
the ear of the King were playing an extraordinarily
clever game, which was bound to put us in the wrong.
Through the mouthpiece of a sincere Minister they
made us very reasonable offers ; but all the time they
schemed so that his plans should come to nought.
Then when negotiations eventually broke down, as
they were bound to do, they turned round to the
world and said, " How can we come in with the
Entente? We make them the most reasonable
offers, and they will not even listen to us." By
such means they sowed suspicion in our minds so
effectually that we turned to Bulgaria in despair.
This was precisely what the ' clique ' intended that
we should do. They now turned round again to
the world and said, " How can we trust the
Entente ? We offer to fight for them, and they will

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR 53

not even guarantee to us the integrity of our own
possessions ! "

But, it may be said, even granted that the real
Government of Greece was insincere, what good
purpose could be served by turning to Bulgaria,
whom you knew to be secretly allied to Germany ?
It was certainly a forlorn hope ; but the extraordinary
readiness of Bulgaria to betray her Allies, which is
characteristic of her policy, led us to hope that she
might still be won over, if she were heavily com-
pensated. We failed, because Bulgaria was con-
vinced that Germany would win ; but the attempt
was none the less worth making. Numerically the
Bulgarian Army was superior to that of Greece ;
and moreover, whereas the worst that could happen
to us in Greece was that she should remain
neutral, and that the Entente should be deprived
of the assistance of a quarter of a million
soldiers, in Bulgaria diplomatic success would have
been crowned by the addition of 350,000 men to
the forces of the Entente and the diminution of a
corresponding number from that of Germany. Thus
numerically Bulgaria was — as far as we were concerned
— nearly three times as valuable as Greece.

The unfortunate impasse in which we found
ourselves did much to discredit the Entente in the
eyes of many patriotic Greeks during this period,
and was largely responsible for the disasters to Greece
which were to follow. None the less, when the
elections, which for one reason or another had been

54 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

postponed for three months, took place on June 18th,
Venizelos and the Liberal party were returned by a
substantial majority. But on the pretext that the
King was still ill and that he might die if he were
obliged to send for the Liberal leader and undergo
the ordeal of discussing the political situation with
him, the Gounares Ministry lingered on in power for
another nine weeks after the elections ; and it was
not till August 23rd that Venizelos resumed the
reins of office. But in the meanwhile, on July 30th,
Constantine and Gounares had taken the decisive
step of assuring Bulgaria secretly that, in the event
of her attacking Serbia, Greece would not inter-
vene. Their assurances had far-reaching effects : for
Bulgaria felt herself at last free to espouse the cause
of Germany.

CHAPTER IV

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR

(August 23— November 6, 1915)

THE SECOND MINISTRY OF VENIZELOS AND
THE ZAIMES MINISTRY

K J^HE return to power of Venizelos was tragic
in its futility ; for, by the secret declaration
JL to Bulgaria of July 30th, the Court party
had effectively shorn our Samson's locks. But, all
unconscious of what had been done behind his back,
he set to work with renewed vigour to disperse the
doubts with which, thanks to the insincerity of his
predecessors, Greece was now regarded by the Great
Powers. Directly he had taken office he explained
his policy to the King. Naturally there was no longer
any possibility of taking part in the Dardanelles
Expedition : but Greece must return to her original
policy, and must abide by the principles laid down
at the beginning of the War, the chief of which was
the determination never to allow Bulgaria to crush
Serbia. Having obtained the King's approval, he
made a corresponding announcement in the Chamber,
and declared emphatically, not only to Serbia and
the Entente but also to the Central Empires, that

56 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

on no account would Greece suffer any Bulgarian
aggression against Serbia. How much impression
the declaration made on Bulgaria her subsequent
behaviour makes sufficiently clear.

But Venizelos was not blind to the storm-clouds
which were gathering in the Balkans. It was known
in Greece, who informed the Entente, that a ' dress-
rehearsal ' of the attack against Serbia had been
carried out along the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier :
and everything pointed to an imminent Bulgarian
attack. None the less the Entente, with more
perseverance than good sense, continued to the very
last to negotiate with her, on the basis of conceding
• her Serbian and Greek territory. As late as September
22nd Venizelos and Passitch, the Serbian Premier,
agreed, under pressure from the Entente, to hand
over a large portion of Macedonia to their neighbour.
There is little excuse for the Entente. Instead of
making preparations to help Serbia, they carried
on futile discussions until the very eve of the attack.

On September 23rd Venizelos received intelligence
that Bulgaria, having now satisfactorily completed
her arrangements, had decided on the partial mobiliza-
tion of her Army. He proceeded at once to the
Palace, and asked, if the news received confirmation,
that Greece should immediately mobilize her two
Macedonian Army Corps, as a measure of security.
The King consented. But early the next morning
the news arrived that Bulgaria had proclaimed a
general mobilization. Venizelos telephoned to the

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 57

King and asked for an immediate interview, that he
might communicate the news and submit to him
an order for the general mobilization of the Greek
Army. He was informed that the King could not
see him till five o'clock, the time being then 9.30.
In the meantime the Premier called a Ministerial
council, came to an agreement with his colleagues,
and instructed the Minister of War, General Dangles,
to summon the Chief of Staff and ask him to draw
up the order of mobilization. It was arranged that
Dangles should come to the Palace with the order
ready for signature at 6.30 that evening.

At five o'clock Venizelos presented himself at the
Palace, informed the King of the changed circum-
stances, and urged that as Bulgaria had now proclaimed
a general mobilization Greece must at once follow
suit. The King did not deny Greece's obligation to
assist Serbia, but said, " You know, I don't want
to help Serbia, because Germany will win, and 1 ;
don't want to be beaten." " But," said the Premier,
" Greece will not be beaten," and he proceeded to
make an exposition of the military possibilities,
which is well worth noting. The Bulgarian moral
after her recent defeats was poor, whereas that of
Greece was excellent. Moreover, Bulgaria was
seriously short of ammunition. If, therefore, Greece
attacked her, whilst the majority of her forces were
engaged against Serbia, the attack would probably
be successful, and she might even hope to reach
Sofia. But supposing the attack proved unsuccessful,

58 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Greece could at least keep in touch with the Serbian
Army, and together they could retreat to a position
along the general lines from the frontiers of Eastern
Macedonia through the Strumnitza valley to Krivolak
and Tetovo — positions of extraordinary natural
strength, from which the Austro-Germans, for
technical reasons, would never be able to dislodge
them. As he proceeded to point out, the enemy's
base of supply would have to be far-off Budapest ;
whereas the Greek base would be Salonica, which
was near at hand. Again the Austro-Germans had
only one railway of importance, that which runs
down the Vardar valley, and a subsidiary one from
Sofia to Philippopolis, whereas the Greeks had three.
A single line of railway is incapable of serving more
than 125,000 men. Therefore, however many troops
Germany had at her disposal, she could not employ
more than a limited number, and a number only
two-thirds of the strength of those of her opponents.
Later on the English and French forces would arrive
and could assume the offensive. Thus there was
absolutely no fear of Greece meeting the fate of
Belgium, with which the General Staff were trying
to influence public opinion. But the King was quite
unmoved by this extraordinarily brilliant apprecia-
tion of the military situation. He did not argue ; for
argument was impossible. But he repeated over
and over again, " I don't want to fight. We shall
be beaten by Germany. I don't want to fight."
To this Venizelos replied, " Your Majesty, having

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 59

failed to persuade you, I feel it is my duty, as repre-
senting the sovereignty of the people, to tell you
that this time you have no right to differ from
me. By the last elections the people have ap-
proved my policy and given me their confidence :
and the electorate knew that the foundation of
my policy was that we should not allow Bulgaria
to crush Serbia and expand overmuch, so as
to crush us to-morrow. At this point, therefore,
you cannot depart from this policy : unless, of
course, you are determined to set aside the con-
stitution, in which case you must say so clearly,
abrogating the constitution and assuming full
responsibility by a Royal Decree." The King
admitted that he was bound to obey the popular
verdict, when it was a question of the internal affairs
of the country : but in a question of foreign affairs,
a great international question, he felt he must act
as seemed right to him in his own mind, because
he was responsible before God. Directly Venizelos
heard for the first time this doctrine of monarchy
by divine prescription issuing from the King's
lips he knew that his case was hopeless. So, having
once more called his attention to the constitution,
he offered the King his resignation. But Constantine
besought him to remain in office and sign the decree
of mobilization. For a change of Government would
mean delay in signing it ; and although he did not
want to fight, he saw that Bulgarian mobilization
necessitated this step purely as a defensive measure.

60 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

He also pointed out that it was quite possible that
Bulgaria would maintain an ' armed neutrality ' ;
and in that case, no one need know of their difference
of opinion. With a heavy heart the Prime Minister
at length gave way, and the decree of mobilization
was signed.

But on the next day the Press, acting on a hint
from the General Staff, informed the general public
of the differences which had arisen between the
King and his Prime Minister, thus weakening and dis-
counting the effect of the mobilization abroad, and
creating alarm and uncertainty at home. Venizelos
went straight to the King and compelled him to sign
a communique to the effect that ' The Crown is in
agreement with its responsible Government not only
in the matter of the call for mobilization but also
as to its future policy.'

In the course of the discussion on the previous
evening the question had arisen, which had troubled
the General Staff, as to whether Serbia would be
able to put in the field the 150,000 soldiers for the war
against Bulgaria which they said she was obliged
to do by the military convention. Without enquiring
whether such an obligation really existed, Venizelos
suggested that an appeal should be made to the
Entente to send 150,000 troops. " Certainly," said
the King, " but they must send home troops, and not
colonials." On the strength of this, the Prime
Minister sent the same evening an urgent appeal to
the Entente Ministers to come and see him at once

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 61

at the Ministry. When they arrived he informed
them that the Greek mobilization had already been
ordered, and asked them if the Powers would be
disposed to supply the 150,000 bayonets, which
Serbia was called upon to furnish against Bulgaria.
A quarter of an hour after they had gone, Venizelos
received a message from the King asking him not
to make the suggested demarche with the Powers.
He replied that the demarche had already been made :
and he added that in any case " I should not have
been prevented from taking this step by the expres-
sion of the King's opinion, because as responsible
Minister it is necessary, in order to concert my
plans, for me to know whether the Powers are
disposed to furnish this assistance."

Late on the evening of the following day, September
24th, Serbia applied formally to Greece and to the
Entente. She told Greece that it was now an
absolute certainty that she would be attacked by
Bulgaria in a few days' time. Would Greece approve
of Serbia making an immediate assault, before Bulgaria
had completed her mobilization ? Venizelos asked
the King whether he would consent. The reply
is interesting ; for in it the King acknowledges that
the Greco-Serb treaty was binding. " I think it
better that the Serbs should not attack the Bulgarians,
because our alliance is defensive, and if the Serbians
should be the first to attack, it would be a question
whether we should in such a case be obliged to go to
their assistance." The reply of the Entente to a

62 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

similar request from Serbia was voiced by Sir Edward
Grey in his famous speech in the House of Commons.
Bulgaria had assured the Entente that her policy
was only one of armed neutrality. On no account,
therefore, must Serbia attack a neutral country.
Serbia abandoned the enterprise, believing that when
the attack at last materialized, Greece and the Entente
would be at her side.

On the 25th the Entente suddenly began to move.
They replied to Greece that they would furnish the
required fighting force of home troops ; and they
even fixed the time within which this force should
arrive. When the King had been informed of their
reply, he requested that the Entente should be told
that " So long as Bulgaria does not attack Serbia
and does not thereby create the situation which
obliges us to abandon our neutrality, these forces
must not be despatched : for their arrival on Greek
soil would constitute a breach of our neutrality." A
day or two later came the reply of the Entente : that
the departure of these troops had already been ordered,
and that they were now on their way to Greece from
Mudros and Marseilles. " Having once informed us,"
they added, " that your policy is to counter-attack
Bulgaria and take your place as our Ally in the event
of Bulgaria attacking Serbia, we do not see why the
arrival of these reinforcements should be delayed.
We take full responsibility for asserting that
Bulgaria is going to attack Serbia : and you will
then have reason to thank us, for you will have

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 63

your reinforcements ready, instead of having to
wait for them."

Venizelos admitted that this statement pleased
him very much : but as Greece would be nominally
neutral, until the attack took place, he would have
to make a protest against the disembarkation. But
having once made the protest, he would do every-
thing in his power to assist the friendly 'invaders.'
Constantine appeared satisfied with this, but insisted
that the protest should be couched in emphatic
language.

In such manner did the famous Salonica Expe-
ditionary Force originate. It should be noted that
the first disembarkation did not take place till the
afternoon of October 5th ; by which time Venizelos
had already resigned and the Zaimes Government
had been formed. Had the new Government desired
to do so, they could still have turned to the Entente
and said, " Things have changed : Venizelos is
gone ; we are not going to help Serbia ; please don't
land." It is not probable that the Entente would
have consented not to land : but the fact that instead
of doing so Zaimes promised to give the Anglo-
French troops every facility, proves the unfairness
of the subsequent charge made against Venizelos,
that he alone was responsible for bringing these
unwelcome guests to Greece.

On September 29th the Greek Chamber met :
and on October 4th Venizelos declared once again
Greece's unalterable determination to support Serbia :

64 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

and on a division his policy was approved of by a
a majority of 46. During the debate he was asked
by one of the opposition what he would do, if in
going to the assistance of Serbia he was met by German
troops, and *he answered boldly that in that case
the Greek troops would make no distinction between
German and Bulgarian enemies.

Immediately after the debate he was summoned
by the King, who informed him that he did not share
his views. The Prime Minister replied that he would
submit his resignation, as he did not think it was
possible for him to raise the constitutional issue at
the moment. At one o'clock on the next day,
October 5th, he was dismissed from office, and in
the afternoon Zaimes formed his new Ministry.

Venizelos has been much criticized for resigning
on this occasion, and he is considered by some to
have shared the responsibility for the violation of
the free institutions of the country. But if we
examine the matter carefully, it is difficult to see
how he could have acted differently. Had he made
a stand at this moment by refusing to resign, had he
continued in office as though the King no longer
existed, he would almost certainly have precipitated
a civil war. No doubt three-quarters of the country
would have sided with him : but the other quarter,
which included many ex-Ministers and the majority
of the Greek Staff, constituted a formidable opposi-
tion. Moreover, as we know from our own Civil
War, the traditional reverence for the Crown would

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 65

have drawn to its side a large number of the more
uneducated classes. The attitude of the Army, too,
was doubtful : for many of the soldiers loved their
King, and would have followed his lead, even had
they known him to be in the wrong. Supposing then
that civil war broke out, what would be the conse-
quences ? Bulgaria would brush aside the unpre-
pared expeditionary force now gathering in Salonica,
and would fall on a divided Greece, and crush her.
Venizelos weighed the matter carefully, and decided
that it was better for him to resign than to risk
the disastrous consequences of a civil war.

The Zaimes Ministry was formed for a definite
purpose, that of repudiating the Greco-Serb treaty ;
and having accomplished its work, it was dismissed.
The Prime Minister was a man universally respected
in Greece, for he had rendered great services to his
country. But on this occasion he consented to become
the tool of the King. We may gauge his attitude
by his reply, when the permanent officials at the
Ministry attempted to enlighten him by calling his
attention to the various points involved in the
treaty : " I do not want to waste my time in the
study of such details. For what is the use, when I
have taken office with the express purpose of not
carrying out the treaty ? " Such language is not
becoming to a Prime Minister in a country which
is supposed to be governed by a constitutional
monarchy : and Zaimes cannot be absolved from a
tremendous responsibility for adopting this attitude.

5

66 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

On October llth, the day of the Bulgarian invasion
of Serbia, the new Prime Minister met the Chamber,
and was promised the provisional support of the
Liberal party. On the same day he informed the
Serbian Government that for certain reasons, with
which I will deal later when I come to discuss the
treaty, Greece no longer felt herself bound to come
to her assistance.1

None the less, apart from this violation of a sacred
treaty, the new Government managed to keep on
friendly terms with the Entente, who not only sup-
plied them with money, but actually offered Cyprus
to Greece, if she would come in with them. But this
offer was not accepted, as all thought of intervention
had now been abandoned. Indeed, it was too late now
to save Serbia : for owing to the desertion of Greece,
the Entente troops, who would have been in time had
they played the part of reinforcing the Greek Army,
for which they were originally destined, were unable
to get into touch with the Serbs, and were compelled
a few weeks later to retreat towards Salonica. On
the 3rd of November the Chamber was deliberately
insulted by the Minister of War, General Giannakitsas ;
and when a protest was made, he was promptly
appointed A.D.C. to the King. In spite of this
provocation, Venizelos still promised to support the
Zaimes Ministry, provided Giannakitsas were not
reinstated. But the Court was resolved to do away
with Zaimes, whom it considered too scrupulous,
« See White Book I, No. 84.

THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR 67

and to dissolve the Chamber. As half of the voters
were still mobilized, it would be a perfectly simple
matter to cook the elections, and Venizelos and his
party could be wiped out. In spite of the declaration
of Venizelos that if the Government proceeded to a
second illegal dissolution of the Chamber the Liberal
party would abstain from the Elections, the Ministry
was dismissed and the Chamber dissolved on November
6th. On the same day Skouloudes formed his
new Ministry.

CHAPTER V

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR

(November 6, 1915— November 11, 1918.)

WITH the dismissal of Zaimes a definite
change in Greek politics took place.
As long as he remained in office there
was still a remote chance, not indeed of Greek
co-operation, but of at least a friendly under-
standing with the Entente. But with the advent
of Skouloudes Greek interests became definitely
sacrificed to Germany. It was not till later
that the possibility of open co-operation with Ger-
many presented itself to the Greek Court, though
already the policy of covert opposition to the
Entente and covert support of her enemies took
definite shape. Officially the Greek Government
appeared to be treating the Salonica forces with
every consideration, and played to admiration the
part of ' Injured Innocence,' long-suffering in spite
of a thousand provocations and encroachments :
actually they were endeavouring by every means to
thwart and to destroy us — a course in which, but
for geographical reasons, they would have succeeded.
Or, to state the position in another way, as long as
Zaimes was in office there were two definite and

.68

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR GO

conflicting parties : and although the ' Germanic '
party had won the day on the Dardanelles issue
and on the issue of assistance to Serbia, there was
always a possibility that the tide would turn, and
that the verdict of the people would prevail. But
with the second dissolution of the Chamber, and the
advent of Skouloudes, the ' Liberal ' party was
definitely crushed, and could only have regained
power by instigating a revolution. This course, as
we have seen, Venizelos was not as yet prepared to
adopt.

It is necessary to say a word concerning the new
Prime Minister : for he was to hold office for eight
months. Skouloudes was over eighty years of age
when he became Prime Minister for the first time —
surely an unparalleled record. Always a rather
fussy and pompous man, his faults had been accen-
tuated with years, and although extraordinarily
ignorant of the duties of a Prime Minister, he now
became obsessed with the idea of his own importance ;
for, like most incapable men, he had an unwarranted
confidence in his own abilities. He had amassed
a large fortune as a banker, and it was only late
in life that he turned to politics. A great admirer
of Venizelos, he had assisted him in London during
the negotiations after the First Balkan War. In
return for these services he had fully expected to
be rewarded with the Grand Cross of the Order of
the Saviour — a very rare distinction. But his
expectations had been disappointed ; and his admira-

70 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

tion for Venizelos turned to hatred. Petty jealousy
and ambition are not becoming to a man of his
years, and it would have been well for his reputation
had he retired from public life altogether in 1914.
But the bait was too enticing, and he undertook a
task which was beyond his power, and which was
to cover him with disgrace.

Directly he had taken office he hastened to declare
the policy that he intended to pursue. In a circular
telegram l to the Entente he informed them that
" his Government adopted the repeated declarations
of Zaimes concerning the friendly attitude of the
Royal Government towards the Allied forces in
Salonica, and that it is sufficiently conscious of its
true interests and of what it owes to the Powers
protecting Greece not to deviate on any consideration
from the policy which has been denned." He promised
further to maintain neutrality in the form of ' most
sincere benevolence ' towards the Entente. This
is sufficiently * gushing ' : for it was not necessary
to say more than * benevolence.' A fortnight later
he gave a startling proof of his interpretation of a
6 most sincerely benevolent ' attitude. Towards the
end of November the Entente forces were with-
drawing towards Greek territory ; and Skouloudes,
who was completely ignorant on the subject of
international law, was informed by the German
Minister that, if the armed forces of a belligerent
took refuge in a neutral country, according to the
' See White Book I} No. 37, dated November 8, 1915.

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 71

Hague Convention they must be disarmed and
interned. The old man, without saying a word to
his colleagues, trotted round to the French Ministry,
and informed Guillemin that he would have to intern
the Serbian troops if they retreated on to Greek
soil. The French Minister asked him if that was his
conception of 'most sincerely benevolent ' neutrality.
" I don't know anything about that," said the
irascible old gentleman, " and if it comes to that,
we shall intern your troops too." A panic ensued
in the Entente countries, as the news was circulated.
The Greek Minister in Petrograd was hauled out of
bed at two in the morning by Sazonoff, the Russian
Foreign Minister, and was asked for an explanation
of his Government's attitude. As this was the first
he had heard of the matter, the explanation was
difficult to give. A few hours later the rest of the
Greek Ministry were informed of their chief's gaffe
and they hastened to repair the damage, by informing
the Entente that what he had meant was not " We
are going to intern them " (nous devons), but
* We ought to intern them ' (nous devrions). The
panic subsided ; but the Prime Minister's indiscretion
left no doubt as to the real intentions of his colleagues.
He had blurted out the policy which at present they
did not dare to pursue openly.

On December 19th the elections were held ;
300,000 voters, half the electorate, were under arms,
and it was plain that the Government intended to
keep in 'barracks those who were likely to vote for

72 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

the Liberals. Consequently, in answer to an appeal
of Venizelos on November 21st, his party abstained
from taking part in the elections, and the Govern-
ment were assured of a submissive Chamber.

At the time of the elections the Government
promised to demobilize the Army so soon as the
elections were over. "That cut-throat Venizelos
has gone now, the man who wanted to force the people
to shed their blood ; now that we are rid of him,
we will dismiss you to your homes." But the
Elections were over, and the Army remained mobilized.
As we shall see, no military object could be gained
by this prolongation ; for the Government had
already decided to abandon national territory without
resistance. The object was political : to heap hatred
on Venizelos, but for whom the soldiers were told
that they need never have left their homes ; to bring
economic ruin on the country by the dislocation of
't£> ttu 'its normal life ; to bribe the officers by distributing
extra allowances among them ; to keep under
surveillance * suspected ' persons ; to organize among
the soldiers a deliberate propaganda ; to teach them
that bravery and honour counted for nothing com-
pared with the instinct of self-preservation — in a
word, " the policy of the Government and of the
Staff was to crush the Greek people physically and
morally, so as to make them incapable of ever
rising up to call their Government to account."
These words of Venizelos, which I have quoted,
form a terrible indictment against Skouloudes and

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 73

his Government of ' old men ' ; but the indictment
has never been answered, and the guilty ones must
be sentenced by default. The only palliation that
they might plead would be that they were convinced
that Germany would win, and that the means justi-
fied the end, which was to lead the people, in spite
of themselves, along the path best suited to their
interest. But this is a dangerous theory based on
an unwarrantable premise, as I hope to prove later,
when I come to discuss the conduct of the Crown.

Two other incidents distinguish and give the key
to the real policy of the Skouloudes Ministry : the
refusal to allow the Serbian troops to use the Greek
railways on April 12th, and the surrender of Rupel
on May 23rd, 1915. From a sentimental point of
view this first incident arouses stronger feelings of
disgust than perhaps any other action of the Greek
Government. Let us glance for a moment at the
conditions. The Serbian Army was betrayed at
the last moment by Greece, and, hemmed in on all
sides by its foes, was compelled to retreat through
the trackless, barren mountains of Albania to the
coast. Thence the Army was transported, after
terrible sufferings, to Corfu. In April once again
the Serbs were ready to fight ; and to avoid the long
journey by sea from Corfu to Salonica and the
submarine danger, they requested their former
Allies to allow them the use of the Greek railway
from Corinth to Salonica. But the Greek Govern-
ment, in spite of its repeated declarations of the

71 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

most sincerely benevolent neutrality, refused to
render even this small and unimportant service to
the nation which it had betrayed. No doubt it was
a small matter : but it was just because it was a small
matter that it aroused such hatred and bitterness
against the Greeks.

With the surrender of Rupel I will only deal
shortly, for it is not a matter on which one cares to
linger. The Skouloudes Government adopted the
usual course. The Germans informed them that it
would be necessary for them to occupy Rupel as a
defensive measure, to meet the advances of the
Entente troops in this sector. As a matter of fact,
by blowing up the bridge at Demir-Hissar we had
shown plainly that we did not propose to undertake
an offensive on this front. Clearly, therefore, the
German object was offensive and not defensive.
But the Greek Government approved the German
declaration ; though it is clear that, had they lodged
a protest beforehand, the Germans would have let
the matter drop. But they did not even stipulate
that Bulgaria, against which the fortifications of
Rupel had been designed, should be excluded there-
from, and that the occupation should be made by
Germany only. Accordingly, on May 23rd a Bulgarian
detachment, with a German officer in charge, crossed
the frontier and ordered the surrender of the fort,
which is the key to Eastern Macedonia. The Greek
troops holding the fort, in accordance with secret
instructions from Athens, retired without firing a

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 75

shot. On the very next day Skouloudes went down
to the Chamber, and, though no explanation had been
asked for, proceeded to give a graphic description of
how the Greek troops put up a gallant resistance,
but were gradually being overpowered ; when the
Government, seeing the determination of the invaders,
and fearing that a general engagement would ensue,
wired to the Commander of the Army Corps to cease
resistance. He also declared emphatically that the
attack on Rupel was a ' surprise ' attack ; and that
the " insidious rumours " of any previous ' under-
standing ' with Germany were " unworthy of con-
tradiction."

The impression created abroad by this humiliating
surrender led to two consequences disastrous for
Greece. In view of the danger to his right wing
arising from the surrender of Rupel, General Sarrail,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Salonica forces,
proclaimed Martial Law in the town ; the effect of
which was to abolish Greek sovereignty in Macedonia.
By this coup dtitat all the important points in the
city, the post and telegraph offices, the wireless
station, the Government building, the police stations
and the railway stations were occupied. A month
later the Greek occupation of Northern Epirus,
granted to Venizelos by the Entente in 1914, was
revoked, as Italy refused to entrust the security
of her forces in that sector to the tender care of
Greek officials. Thus by its action the Greek
Government had not only lost Rupel, but also two

76 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

large Greek Provinces. On June 21st the Entente
sent a Note to Greece demanding the immediate
demobilization of the Army, the formation of a
Government which made some pretence at governing,
and a dissolution of the Chamber and the holding of
new elections. Faced with this Note, the Greek
Government hesitated. The Staff advised the Crown
to resist, but eventually wiser counsels prevailed, and
the Note was accepted. Thus ended the disastrous
Government of the 4 old men.' On the 23rd Zaimes
again took office, and the demobilization of the
Army was begun. The Chamber, however, was not
dissolved, but adjourned.

The return of Zaimes opened up for a moment the
possibility of better days for Greece. We know
that the Germans were very anxious about the new
situation created by the Greek acceptance of the
Entente Note, though they admitted that resistance
would have been hopeless. What they feared most
was the holding of the elections, for they knew that
Venizelos would be returned by a large majority.

But the real Government remained the same,
and although the Army was demobilized, bands of
reservists were organized, destined later to operate
in Macedonia against the Entente, and at the
time designed to influence the coming elections.
None the less the * Court ' saw themselves faced with
a decisive defeat at the polls — when the Bulgarians,
by invading Eastern Macedonia, came to the rescue
by making impossible the holding of elections.

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 77

There is no proof that they were actually invited by
the Court, but the probabilities are in favour of this
assumption. At any rate they were certainly not
refused admission. For it was only after the Bulgars
had descended into Eastern Macedonia and had
commenced to exterminate the Greek population
that the Government turned to Germany and asked
her to prevent her Allies from entering Seres, Drama
and Kavalla. On August 9th Germany replied with
the assurance that the Bulgarians should not occupy
these towns. Relying on these promises, Zaimes
artlessly dissuaded the inhabitants of Kavalla from
removing their stocks of tobacco, which were worth
many millions. A few days later Bulgaria occupied
the towns ; and when Greece protested, Germany
replied r that " the situation has changed, by jeason
of the fact that the Greek troops have surrendered
of their own free will to the Bulgarians the forts and
batteries under discussion."

With the surrender of the Kavalla district, Greece
lost nearly all her heavy guns, a fifth of her mobiliza-
tion material, and an even larger proportion of light
artillery. It is difficult to see why all this material
was allowed to be left so near the frontier, after
the demobilization of the greater part of the Army ;
unless it was left there on purpose that it should fall
into the hands of Germany. There is also the matter
of Hadjopoulos' surrender to Germany with 8,000
troops, which requires an explanation. Unless the
* White Book I, No. 68.

78 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Greek Government did not wish the troops to be
returned to her, for fear lest they might one day
fight for the Entente, there is no apparent reason why
they should not have been demanded back from
Germany. One has heard of belligerent troops
being interned by a neutral State ; but for the
troops of a neutral country to be * interned ' by
a belligerent State is altogether novel !

With the entrance of Roumania into the War on
August 28th, Venizelos comes once again to the fore
after his long retirement, and becomes from then
onwards till to-day the central figure in Greek politics.
Directly he heard the news, he went to Zaimes and
informed him that after Roumania's declaration of
war, which removed the last argument of the General
Staff, above all after the invasion of Macedonia, after
Germany's disregard of her promise that the Bulgarians
would not enter Seres, Drama, and Kavalla, he
considered that the last obstacles were removed which
had hitherto prevented him from undertaking the
fight against autocracy. Either the King must
forthwith declare war on the Central Empires, or
Venizelos would divide the country by calling on
all those who were prepared to make the necessary
sacrifices, to follow him. The King was at once
informed, and appeared to be much impressed. In
view of the feverish excitement caused in Greece
by the last events, he deemed it advisable to gain a
little time ; and so he instructed Zaimes to open
negotiations with the Entente, and to keep Venizelos

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 79

informed of what was being done. But the popular
fever in Greece soon cooled down ; and when a few
officers in Macedonia attempted to start a revolution
in Salonica, in order to galvanize the Greek Govern-
ment into action, the whole of the Eleventh Division
stationed in the town refused to join it. The collapse
of this premature movement persuaded the King
that the perturbation of public opinion was only
transitory, and that he could with safety keep out
of the War. He therefore decided to repudiate the
promise given through Zaimes, and to return to his
former policy of malevolent neutrality. Zaimes
withdrew from office, and Venizelos at last decided
to become a rebel.

It was only after a long internal struggle that he
took this resolution. It was so easy for him to say
to himself : "I have done all that was possible within
the existing laws to save the State from disaster.
I have rendered extraordinary services to my country
in the past ; and my duty as a citizen is fully dis-
charged. I have done everything possible within
the law ; it is not my duty to proceed further, by
breaking down the existing laws, to create a new
condition by which I might hope to resist the
approaching disaster." Other reasons, too, made
him hesitate. He had had some experience of
rebellions in the past : he knew that they were
hazardous adventures, only to be undertaken when
all else had failed ; he knew, too, how easily a
revolution may degenerate into anarchy and chaos.

80 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Besides, one must be young to lead a revolution ;
and he was no longer a young man. Moreover, would
the Greek nation answer the call ? Or had the
virus of German propaganda poisoned all that was
best in the nation ?

In his famous speech in the Chamber on August
26, 1917, he told the world of the little incident
which decided him to take the plunge. As it gives
us a real understanding of his character, it is worth
recalling. One day a friend came to see him, and
told him of a conversation he had with his barber.
The barber had said, " We plain men are saying that,
besides the King, Venizelos himself has a great
responsibility." When the friend asked why, the
barber said, " Venizelos tells us we are making for
disaster. Well, then, if we are making for disaster,
why shouldn't we prevent all this ? " " Then why
don't you look about you," said the friend, " and
prevent it ? " " How can we ? " was the reply. " As
long as Venizelos is alive and well, we can't do such
a thing. Because every one thinks that when
Venizelos, who sees things better than we do, sits
quiet, it means that nothing can be done. But if
it wasn't for Venizelos, the rest of us, the people,
would be trying to see if we could save the place
from disaster."

Not seldom a stray conversation or an insignificant
incident has altered the whole course of history ;
and it was so in this case. Directly Venizelos put
away all selfish considerations and began to make

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 81

his plans. He found in Admiral Conduriotes (after-
wards one of the Salonica triumvirate) a willing and
eager assistant. The latter had been a member of
the last two Cabinets, as Commander-in-chief of the
land and sea forces ; and he affirmed positively that
Greece was being betrayed, that the guiding policy
was German, that it was a disgrace for the Greek
people to accept the situation without a protest.
On September 25th Venizelos left Phaleron ;
and in spite of the activities of a German submarine,
which had received special instructions to torpedo
the vessel, he landed in Crete, where the Revolution
was proclaimed on the 26th. He was, however, care-
ful not to give the movement the direct character of
civil war ; and although he knew he was injuring
his cause thereby, he restrained any anti-dynastic
tendency. Even now, at the eleventh hour, he gave
the King one more chance. Apparently Constantine
was rather perturbed at the revolutionary movement ;
for through an intermediary, Venizelos was asked
what his attitude would be in the event of a new
Government being formed, to enter the War at the
side of the Entente ? Would he expect to be made
Prime Minister ; or would he be content if some of
his friends were included in the Government ? The
reply of Venizelos is characteristic. If the King did
his duty, not only would Venizelos not claim the
Presidency, but he would not deem it advisable to
be represented by any of his friends in the Ministry.
But he would give his unconditional support to any

6

82 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Government whatever that might be formed to carry
out the National programme.

But if the King in a moment of panic had thought
of yielding, he quickly changed his mind, and reverted
to his old policy. This policy continued till January
16, 1917, when the Royalist Government were
compelled to accept the Entente ultimatum, which
practically rendered them powerless for evil. The
events which led up to this ultimatum — the assas-
sinations of December 1st, the outrages of December
2nd, the conspiracy against the Salonica Armies,
and the attempts of the reservists — are dealt with in
detail in the later part of this book. Beyond this,
from the day Venizelos left Athens until June 14,
1917, when Constantine departed from the country
which he had done his best to ruin, Athenian politics
are dull and uneventful. One puppet Prime Minister
after another took office, but the ' power behind the
throne ' remained unchanged. On May 3rd Zaimes
formed his third Ministry, and he was still in office
when the refuse was cleared away on June 14th.

But to return for a moment to Salonica, where
Venizelos had established the Greek Provisional
Government on October 5th. At first the Entente
looked with suspicion on the new Government ;
and at a Conference held at Boulogne on the 20th
it was decided not to recognize it officially. Indeed
it was not till late in December that Lloyd George,
who had just formed his new Government (and who
has always had the greatest admiration for Venizelos),

THE LAST PERIOD OF THE WAR 83

took the lead by appointing Lord Granville as re-
presentative of England accredited to the Provisional
Government. France followed our lead shortly
after, by appointing M. de Billy as the representative
of France. In the meanwhile Venizelos had declared
war on Germany and her Allies ; and had ensured the
success of the new movement by his wonderful and
inspiring enthusiasm. Many thousands of Greeks
answered the call ; many thousands more would have
joined him, had not the Entente agreed to form a
neutral zone between New and Old Greece, and thus
robbed the Provisional Government of many recruits,
who were eager, but unable to join the new movement.
After the events of December lst-2nd in Athens,
a definite change came over Venizelos' attitude. He
was now convinced beyond a doubt that it was
impossible for Const antine to remain in Greece any
longer. He accordingly begged the Entente to
remove the barrier of the neutral zone and to allow
him to march on Athens ; as he was convinced that
the presence of his Army in Old Greece would be
sufficient to reunite the country, and to expel the
King, without bloodshed. But the Entente, having
given the King their promise not to allow Venizelos
to cross the artificial barrier, refused their permission,
and would not even permit the extension of his autho-
rity to Thessaly, although the inhabitants of its
chief towns clamoured for him. At length at the
beginning of June, the question of the Thessalian
harvest brought matters to a head. If the Royalists

84 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

were allowed to keep it, they could defy the blockade
and continue their old policy during the coming winter.
Compelled at last to act, the Entente acted with
great promptitude. M. Jonnart, the Plenipotentiary
of England, France and Russia, arrived outside
Athens on June 10th ; and four days later Constantine,
his wife, and the Crown Prince were taken away
on a British destroyer, and the King's younger son
Alexander was proclaimed King.

On June 27, 1917, at the almost unanimous
request of the Greek nation, Veriizelos returned to
Athens, and became once again Prime Minister of
a united nation. The Chamber which had been
elected on June 13, 1915, and which had been
illegally dissolved, was reunited, and proceeded to
declare war on Germany and her Allies.

The subsequent history of Greece, which is the history
of Venizelos, is too well known and too recent to require
recording. Once the evil influence of the Crown and
of the Court had been removed, the country proved
its marvellous powers of recuperation. Thus Greece
was enabled to play an honourable part in the War ;
and after so much shame and humiliation, she has
at last vindicated the proudest possession of any
nation — her honour. No Greek to-day need feel
ashamed of his country.

PAET II

CHAPTER I

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN ATHENS AND BERLIN

SOPHIE, in the happy times when she was still
a Queen, was in the habit of declaring that she
took no interest in politics at all, and that her
only care in life was to minister to her conjugal and
maternal duties. On one occasion only she descended
into the political arena, and that was to declare her
love for England, and to express the pious wish that
she should be allowed after the War to live awhile
in Eastbourne. Unfortunately for this charming
picture of Martha-like domesticity, certain messages
have been deciphered by the Greek Government,
which passed to and fro between Athens and Berlin,
and which reveal another and rather less tender side
of the charming Sophie's character. This telegraphic
correspondence, which has lately been published in a
supplementary Greek White Book, was carried out
by three means : by wireless telegraph, by cable,
and by a telegraphic land-wire which worked for
some time by way of Monastir. Unfortunately, a
large part of the correspondence is missing, as is
evidenced by the special serial number of the tele-

88 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

grams of the Palace, which at the end of 1916 had
reached a number higher than three hundred. This
is almost as unfortunate as the unfinished ending of
4 Edwin Drood.' But we must not complain, for
the correspondence in our possession is sufficiently
entertaining. Before examining some of these
precious documents, I may mention that the actual
transmitting of messages was entrusted to the brothers
Theotoky : brother " N " being Greek Minister at
Berlin and brother " J " Master of Ceremonies at
the Court of Queen Sophie, Athens.

The first four documents (36-39 in the White
Book) of which the first is dated December 21.
1915, come from brother ' N ' at Berlin, and concern
' thirty pieces of silver ' — or to be more accurate,
the ' loan ' of 40 million francs made by Germany
to the King of Greece. There is some trouble about
the most convenient method of transmitting : but
we are relieved to learn that a satisfactory solution
of the trouble has been found. No doubt Constantine
will make good use of the money : we can almost
hear the Kaiser chuckling.

The next document (No. 40), dated December
29, 1915, concerns a bigger enterprise than the mere
bribery of a few politicians or soldiers. Brother
' N ' has taken certain ' proposals ' of Constantine
(unfortunately missing ) to Von Jagow. The ' pro-
posals,' one gathers, concern the co-operation of the
Greek Royalist troops with an offensive of the
Bulgaro-Germans against Sarrail's Salonica defences.

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 89

The Greek Government having invited the Entente
troops to Salonica, it is of course quite natural that
the King of Greece should endeavour to stab them
in the back. Moreover, in return for his co-operation,
the King had formulated certain ' demands,' which
brother ' N ' informs him Von Jagow has divided
into three groups : those that can at once be accepted,
those which may be made the object of discussion
and lastly those which are incapable of realization.
Among the latter, he continues, is included " our
proposition concerning Monastir." We cannot help
sympathizing with Constantine over this. After all,
it was his betrayal of Serbia which led to her down-
fall ; and now he is not even allowed (if I may be
permitted the expression) his " fair share of the
swag." If you take the trouble to murder your
friend, it is most unfair that a third person should
be allowed to come up and deprive you of your
friend's valuables. But this is not all : there is
yet more disagreeable news for the King. For
the German Staff are doubtful " whether it may not
be better to renounce for the presmt any actions
against the troops of the Entente in Salonica and to
limit themselves to a defensive action." Perhaps
after all it is better to let sleeping dogs lie. Still,
we cannot help feeling sorry for Tino, who finds his
services are not required.

In the next document of importance, dated March
28, 1916, Constantine accepts provisionally the
surrender of Rupel to Germany. It is rather difficult

90 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

to reconcile this with the subsequent statement,
after its surrender on May 28rd, that the attack
was a ' surprise ' attack. But no doubt Tino had
forgotten all about his wire in March.

In number 52, dated June 26th (after the accep-
tance by Greece of the Entente Note demanding the
dismissal of Skouloudes, the dissolution of the Chamber
and the demobilization of the Greek Army), Berlin
expresses its anxiety lest that horrid man Venizelos
" come out victorious at the elections, and this
might lead to very painful consequences both from
the internal and external points of view." Certainly
the " consequences " would be most " painful ! "
Berlin also regrets the departure of M. Skouloudes
" who had won their confidence and esteem."

In No. 54, dated July 19th, Berlin expresses
anxiety about the journeys of Prince Nicholas and
Prince Andrew of Greece to Petrograd and London.
Germany is relieved to hear that these journeys have
only a dynastic and not a political significance.
Surely the Kaiser will understand this : for has he
not in the past paid many such a visit to England,
to assure his dear grandmother, or his dear uncle,
of his peaceful intentions !

In No. 61, dated December 6th, Falkenhausen, the
German General, tells the Queen to advise Metaxas
to develop, as soon as possible, the question of the
irregular bands, who were to cut the Salonica-
Monastir railway and harass SarraiPs line of com-
munications in the event of a German attack.

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 91

We were distinctly informed by Constantine on
several occasions that he had never even heard of
the existence of these irregular bands. As we have
noted before, the poor King's memory was certainly
most defective.

In No. 62, of the same date, Sophie sends her
brother William a graphic account of the events of
December 1st and 2nd. " The page has been turned.
It was a great victory against four Great Powers.
(This apparently refers to the attack of 20,000
Greeks on 2,000 Anglo-French marines.) " The
Mayor has been imprisoned. Many arrests have
been made. The panic has subsided. The health
of all is good, great nervous tension." But the
note of jubiliation over the " great victory "
gives way at the end to a note of anxiety,
" Please inform us when the Army of Macedonia
will be sufficiently reinforced to undertake the
definite offensive."

In No. 66, dated December 16th, comes the
Kaiser's reply to his dear sister. He begins by
expressing his gratitude (as well he might), and
he concludes as follows : " There is no other course
open to Tino but to revolt openly against his execu-
tioners. The intervention of Tino with his principal
forces operating against the west wing of Sarrail
will bring the decision in Macedonia. Tho operations
in Roumania have been crowned with the capture
of Bucharest. Up to the present God has helped.
He will also be with you in the future and will help

92 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

you too. Hearty greetings and best wishes. I am
thinking constantly of you and Tino.

" WILLIAM."

One cannot help being struck with the Kaiser's
generosity. Let Tino come in with his Army and
pick the chestnuts out of the fire, and he, the Kaiser,
will allow Tino a share in his God !

In No. 60, dated December 23rd, Berlin sends
instructions to Sophie, and also a slight warning.
" One should not lose sight of the fact that even
the unofficial actions of (Greek) bands will powerfully
help Greece, during the peace negotiations, to advance
territorial claims. These claims, naturally, could
be more considerable in case of action than in case
of simple neutrality." Naturally.

No. 71, dated December 26th, contains a slight
disappointment for the Kaiser. Sophie is quite
willing to attack the Entente, but is rather nervous.
" The issue you advise would be the only one possible
if Sarrail, attacked by you, should be obliged to
retreat, in which case his left wing would penetrate
close to the parts of Greece occupied by us. As things
are now, since the distance separating the wing from
us is very great, the line of our communications would
be too much exposed and our stocks of food and
munitions would not be sufficient for the long struggle.
Under these circumstances a decisive and prompt
attack on your part, if it is possible, would give to
Greece, militarily, the opportunity to intervene,

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 93

and would mean for us the deliverance from the
horrible situation in which we are." We see the
difficulty. Brother and sister are both anxious that
the other should attack first. I am reminded (if
I may say so without impiety) of two small comedians
trying to knock down the villain. " You hit him
first." " No, you hit him." And unfortunately
in the end neither of them will take the plunge.

No. 73, dated December 31st, reveals the continued
anxiety of Sophie. " The blockade continues. . . .
It is absolutely necessary that we should know whether
or not the offensive action on the Macedonian front
will begin, and when, in order that we may arrange
our plans accordingly." Sophie is plainly becoming
a little impatient.

No. 74, dated January 1, 1917, contains a joint
appeal from Tino and Sophie to the Kaiser. " The
situation is very serious : there is bread for only
fourteen days. The (Entente) Note is impertinent :
they wish to starve us to death, and by continuing
the blockade to impose their demands. Without
food supplies, the situation is desperate." What
a piteous appeal ! Surely the Kaiser's heart will
bleed (as it did for Louvain) at the plight of his poor
sister and brother-in-law !

The next day (No. 75) the Queen wires to Falken-
hausen. " I consider the game as lost, if the attack
does not take place immediately ; it will be too late
afterwards."

The next message, dated January 6th, No. 76,

94 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

is from Tino to Hindenburg, who had apparently
sounded him on the strength of the Royalist Army.
We must confess the result is rather disappointing :
all Tino can spare for an attack on the Entente is
two and a half divisions ; and it is doubtful whether
even they will be able to reach the appointed place.
On the other hand Tino is most anxious for Hinden-
burg to begin. "It is desirable that we should be
informed at once whether a German attack on the
Macedonian front is in prospect and when it will
probably begin."

No. 77, of January 9th, I regard as the most tragic
of all : for it marks the final abandonment of the
joint enterprise of brother and sister. As I feared,
the comedians can't make up their minds, and the
villain gets away. However, I will give Sophie's
message to her brother in full.

" Thank you heartily for your telegram, but lacking
sufficient food supplies for the duration of such an
enterprise, as well as munitions and many other things,
we are unfortunately compelled to abstain from an
offensive. You can realize my situation ! How much
I suffer ! I thank you from my heart for your
loving words. MAY THE INFAMOUS PIGS RECEIVE
THE PUNISHMENT THEY DESERVE ! I embrace you
affectionately. Your isolated and afflicted sister,
who hopes for better times.

" SOPHIE."

1 have taken the liberty of printing one sentence

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 95

in large letters, because I feel it must have been
some consolation to William to learn from it that
his sister was a true Hohenzollern. ' Infamous
pigs ' has the true imperial ring about it. But,
as I say, the situation is none the less tragic, for the
brave family venture has been definitely abandoned ;
and in No. 79, dated January 10th, we get a further
explanation from Sophie to her brother of the reasons
for its abandonment. " Particularly the want of
heavy artillery in order to (capture) the fortified
and prepared positions of our enemies in the narrow
passes to the north of Thessaly . . . compelled us,
with regret, to renounce the project." At this point,
at the risk of intrusion, I fear I must be personal,
for quite unwittingly I'm afraid I contributed in
a small way to impede the family adventure. The
chief pass referred to was the Petra Pass, and the
brigade to which I was then attached advanced from
Salonica to hold it. I should like to take this oppor-
tunity of tendering my apologies to Sophie for my
unwarranted interference in her plans. But to
return after this digression — the Queen, although
impeded, is not powerless. " I hope you will not
lose sight of the fact that Greece, in pursuit of our
plans, if united by railway, could, on account of her
geographical position, become a useful and precious
aid to our beloved Fatherland. Among the people
we shall always continue to work in favour of Germany
against our enemies. You can be positively sure of
this and I am proud that the indescribable sufferings

96 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

and anxieties we have undergone and continue to
undergo for the maintenance of neutrality have
enabled us to render important services. Affection-
ately, " SOPHIE."

Surely Sophie-has struck the true note of patriotism,
for she has made it clear that she is fully prepared
to sacrifice Greece, the country over which she reigns,
to the interests of the Fatherland. And yet evilly
disposed persons like the traitor Venizelos have
dared to cast doubts on her patriotism !

The next message, No. 80, dated January 12th,
I hesitate to print, for it has a nasty treacherous
flavour, and I feel sure that Queen Sophie never
read it. It is from brother ' N ' in Berlin to brother
' J ' in Athens, and runs as follows : "I have seen
M. Zimmermann and have insisted that the attack
should begin as soon as possible, telling him we
desire finally to know clearly whether this offensive
will take place. He replied that personally he was
in favour of this offensive, but that all depended
on Field-Marshal Von Hindenburg, to whom he had
referred the matter. If the reply is dilatory, I think
that we ought to act according to our own interests,
without taking into account any other considerations,
in view of the fact that we have already made
sacrifices enough and cannot ruin the dynasty and
the country for the beautiful eyes (illegible words)."
Oh ! brother ' N,J how could you ! You dare to
suggest that you have sacrificed enough and that you

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 97

carinot ruin the country and the dynasty for the
Queen's beautiful eyes ! This is rank treachery ;
for what does it matter if Greece is ruined, so long as
Sophie can help her brother ? ' You have said that
you should be sorry for.'

Clearly there is disillusionment in Athens : even
the Queen is angry. No. 82, dated January 13th,
from Sophie to Falkenhausen, is very petulant :
" Had the reply of Field-Marshal Von Hindenburg
been more favourable and categorical, the Crown
Council would have decided for the attack. I am
broken-hearted ! It is too, too bad ! They have
blundered ! " I confess this comes rather as a shock
to me. I was well aware that the miserable English-
men had ' blundered ' often enough : the Daily
Mail told me so nearly every day. But I had always
imagined that ' blunder ' was a word unknown in
the German vocabulary. But here we have the
assurance of a Hohenzollern that the Germans too
have 'blundered' — and surely a Hohenzollern must
know ! I agree with the Queen that it is " too, too
bad ! " Really it is a thing like this which makes
one almost despair of the human race.

No. 85, dated January 19th, from the Queen to
Falkenhausen, contains a hint which the latter acted
upon with exemplary promptitude. The Entente
were very short of aeroplanes — many machines had
been broken. Here was an opportunity for the
Germans to molest those ' infamous pigs ' ! Here again
I must intrude a personal note. On the strength

7

98 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

of the Queen's secret information, Falkenhausen
sent for the famous German bombing squadron,
known as the ' Circus,' which for two months gave us
no peace. I remember on one occasion — but this
isn't a 'War' book. Still, anyway, I feel that
Sophie and I are about ' square.' I, unwittingly,
blocked her way in the Petra Pass : and she unwit-
tingly too, I have no doubt, gave me many a mauvais
quart d'heure.

No. 86, dated January 20th, contains the accep-
tance by Tino of Hindenburg's proposition that,
on the assurance that Germany will compensate him
after the War, Tino shall destroy all the Greek
war material in the Peloponnesus, to prevent it falling
into the hands of the Entente. I wonder if any
demand has been made by ex-King Constantine
(in Switzerland) to ex-Kaiser WTilhelm (in Holland)
for the promised ' compensation ' : and what form,
if any, it will take. Perhaps the ex-Kaiser will send
the ex-King a few logs of wood from the trees which
he has cut down in Amerongen. I'm told that it is
very cold in Switzerland ; and I'm sure Tino will
be glad of them, especially now that the fi infamous
pigs ' have stopped his allowance.

No. 87, dated January 26th, conveys the King
and Queen's birthday message to the Kaiser. From
the ending, we gather that the sensitive Queen has
been somewhat upset. Were she a lesser woman,
we might almost say she was in one of her tantrums !
?' May God give you a glorious victory over all

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 99

your infamous enemies ! They have honoured us
by the landing of forty Senegalese soldiers, in order
to guard the Legation of France. A charming picture
of civilization ! Affectionate greetings.

" TINO. SOPHIE."

I should like to make just two comments on this.
First, the repetition of the word ' infamous ' argues
a certain lack of originality about the Queen's
vocabulary, or possibly it merely indicates, as I have
hinted, that she is in one of her * tantrums.' It is
certainly a charming peculiarity of the Hohenzollern's
family correspondence that, when things are not
going exactly ' according to plan,' they are inclined
to vilify their enemies. My second observation
concerns the Queen's remark, " A charming picture
of civilization ! " I don't know much about irony,
but I feel almost certain that this remark is meant
to be ironical. Yes, I feel sure that what the Queen
really meant was that the 'picture* was not 'charming'
— was, in fact, quite the reverse.

Here, unfortunately, so far as the brother and
sister are concerned, ends the correspondence. But
there are just four more documents (90-93) on which
I should like to comment. The first from brother
* N ', dated January 21, 1916, mentions that " the
Kaiser has brought away from an interview with the
King of Bulgaria the certainty that both the King
of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Government are
animated by really sincere intentions as to the regula-

100 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

tion of the relations between Greece and Bulgaria."
This communication is addressed to M. Gryparis,
Minister of Greece at Vienna. The second from brother
* N,' dated April 3, 1916, to M. Skouloudes, Prime
Minister at Athens, vehemently denies certain baseless
allegations which have recently emanated from the
Greek Legation at Vienna, to the effect that Germany
has consented to cede certain Greek territory to
Bulgaria. On the contrary, " The Central Empires
have always made it a principle to declare to
Bulgaria, even before she became their Ally,
that they would never consent to discuss the
possibility of compensations made at the expense
of Greece."

The third and fourth, dated April llth and Sep-
tember 24th, come from M. Gryparis at Vienna to
the Greek Government at Athens. In both Gryparis
expresses his firm conviction that he is right in alleging,
and the Greek Legation at Berlin wrong in denying,
the promises made by Germany to Bulgaria of
compensation at the expense of Greece. It is not for
me to express an opinion ; my readers who have
followed the general trend of German and Bulgarian
politics must decide for themselves whether M.
Gryparis or M. * N ' Theotokes is likely to have
been the better informed.

At this point I must reluctantly leave this delightful
family correspondence, as the rest has been unfor-
tunately lost. As I mentioned at the beginning of
the chapter, Sophie expressed a desire, after the War,

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 101

to visit Eastbourne. If this should chance to meet
the eye of any lodging-house keeper in that beautiful
spot who is anxious to entertain the Ex-Queen, I
shall be delighted to transmit the offer to Sophie
" through the usual channels."

CHAPTER II

CONSTANTINE'S VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION

IT has always been contended by the Royalists
even to this day that on no occasion did the
ex-King violate the Greek constitution : and
although constitutional questions are necessarily
somewhat tedious, it is essential for a fuller
understanding of Greek politics that we should
examine in detail this contention, which is pro-
pounded clearly in the speech of M. Stratos to the
Greek Chamber of August 23, 1917, and which
was refuted equally clearly by M. Kafantares on
the following day and by other speakers in this
memorable debate.1

The strong democratic feeling that has always
existed in Greece is revealed by the history of the
country in the last century : that is, since it has
obtained its emancipation from Turkish rule. The
Constituent Assembly of 1844 decided unanimously
on a liberal constitution, having as its prototype that
which existed in England, and which may be termed
monarchical democracy. Its characteristic, as we
know, is one and fundamental : that the King is.

1 See " Vindication of Greek National Policy," passim.

102

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 103

a mere transmitter of the public will, and that all
political authority is centred in the hands of the
people and of the House and Government emanating
from it. The Greek Chamber and the Council of
Ministers headed by the President of the Council
correspond exactly with the British House of
Commons and the Cabinet headed by the Prime
Minister.

Twenty-one years of bitter experience of the
Bavarian dynasty, which had been thrust upon them,
showed the Greek people how the Constitution could
be circumvented by the interference of an irrespon-
sible ruler in the management of common affairs ;
and they did not hesitate for a moment in 1863
to proceed to a new Revolution, and, by removing
from Greece the dynasty which had defrauded them
of their liberty, to consolidate their Government on
a sure democratic foundation. So jealous indeed
were they of their freedom that they rejected the
institution of the Second Chamber, or House of
Lords, lest it should weaken the people's authority ;
for they preferred to face the danger of a " parlia-
mentary oligarchy," which the supporters of the
Second Chamber threatened, rather than to see
the people's sovereign authority checked by any
extraneous and uncontrolled body. Thus Greece
cemented her political liberties in 1863, as England
had done in 1649 : and it is not necessary to define
further in detail a Constitution which, with the
exception just recorded, is exactly like our own. But

104 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

it is worth mentioning that the Greek nation, to
show their appreciation of England, ' the cradle of
parliamentary institutions,' and to show further on
what lines they wished to be governed, unanimously
elected as their King in 1863 a son of Queen Victoria.
The jealousy of the other Powers, however, vetoed
the free choice of the nation, and forced upon it the
Danish Prince George.

So much is admitted even by the Royalists : and
we may take for granted that if any act is admittedly
a violation of the British, it is also a violation of
the Greek, Constitution. If we bear this in mind,
we can go on to enquire into certain specific acts
of the King, and to examine their legality by the
test ; whether or not such acts would be considered
legal if they had been done by the King of
England.

The first test-case is the action of Constantine
in dismissing Venizelos in March 1915 and dissolving
the Chamber, although the Prime Minister enjoyed
the confidence of the country, as expressed in a large
parliamentary majority. It may be accepted as a
general principle that if the people, from whom all
authority flows, elect certain representatives to carry
out their will, and that if these representatives
support in turn a Ministry from among their number,
then the Ministry cannot be ejected from office
as long as it enjoys a parliamentary majority, and
that the House cannot be dissolved until the natural
termination of its life. But are there any peculiar

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 105

exceptions to this general rule ? Let us hear first
what Stratos has to say, in defence of the King's
action.

Stratos informs us that the King has the right to
dissolve the Chamber in five different cases : which
are —

(1) The natural termination of the life of the House ;

(2) The inability of the House to form a viable

Government ;

(3) The necessity for renewing the House for the

better sanction of its work ;

(4) The lack of harmony presumed between

public opinion and the majority in the
House ;

(5) The dissension of the Crown from the Govern-

ment supported by the House.

Of these the first two may be termed automatic
dissolutions, and are inevitable. The third is common
enough in England, and is employed by the Govern-
ment in power, either because they think it a favourable
opportunity to hold a General Election, or because
they wish to ' renew their mandate ' before embarking
on unusual legislation. The fourth case differs from
the third, in that the impulse to dissolve a Govern-
ment supported by a majority comes, not from the
Government itself, but from the King. (Clearly
Kaf ant ares, by bracketing the two together, is in
error.) We must examine this case rather carefully,
and quote precedents, because it brings us to the

106 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

border-line between legality and illegality, and
because this right of the King has been rarely exer-
cised and fiercely questioned. Professor Dicey, who
is acknowledged to be our greatest authority on the
subject, divides " The law of the Constitution "
into two parts : the first, constitutional law, which
is written law, or judge-made law ; the second, the
Conventions of the Constitution, as established by
custom and precedent, and which, although less
clearly defined than written law, are none the less
binding. Among these * conventions ' (which chiefly
concern the * prerogative ' of the King and of the
House of Lords) he discusses this very right of the
King : the right of Dissolution, if the King has reason
to believe that lack of harmony exists between public
opinion and the majority in the House. He points
out that this right has only been exercised twice in
the course of English history : by George III in 1784
and by William IV in 1834. In the first instance
George III was proved by the Elections which followed
the Dissolution to have been correct in his surmise,
that the country no longer extended their support
to the majority in Parliament : in the second instance
William IV was proved by the same test to have been
mistaken. Thus, Professor Dicey, although admitting
this exercise of the royal prerogative, considers that
it should only be used under the most exceptional
and abnormal circumstances ; and that even then
it can only be justified, if it is a correct interpretation
of the will of the people. Finally with regard to

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 107

Greek history, we may note that this right of dissolu-
tion has been exercised twice, in 1892 and in 1895.
On both occasions Greece was in the throes of a
terrible crisis, and King George decided — correctly,
as the subsequent elections proved — that the majority
in the House did not enjoy popular support.

The fifth case, the right of the King to dissolve the
House, because he personally disapproves of the
policy of the Government supported by a majority
in the House, is altogether unknown and without
precedent either in Greece or in any other country
governed on similar lines. The King is entitled to
use persuasion if he thinks that the Government are
pursuing a dangerous course of action : but that he
should be allowed to dismiss a Ministry, simply because
of his personal dislike of their policy, is at variance
with, and indeed directly opposed to, the fundamental
basis of the Constitution : the sovereign authority
of the electorate.

Under which of these headings does the dissolution
of March 1915 come ? If it came under the fourth
heading, there would still be a case for Constantine.
He could say, " I dismissed Venizelos from office
because I honestly believed that the majority of
the country was opposed to his policy of taking part
in the Dardanelles Expedition. It is true that the
subsequent elections prove that I was wrong : and
that the majority were in favour of intervention.
But we are none of us infallible ; and I only made
the same mistake as William IV of England." But

108 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

the fact is, neither Constantine nor any of his apologists
have ever made this defence of his action in dismissing
Venizelos : for they realize the absurdity of the
pretence that the people were not behind their
Prime Minister. Never had Venizelos enjoyed greater
popularity than at this time : throughout the whole
of the country there were enthusiastic demonstrations
of support, to give the lie to this pretence. Moreover,
Constantine had not only to guide him the will of
the majority, but also the will of the minority,
which was in agreement with the rest of the nation.
For at the two Crown Councils of March 4th arid 5th
not only were there present the leaders of the Liberal
Party, but also the leaders of the other minority
parties represented in the House, who unanimously
sanctioned the policy which the Prime Minister had
brought in. No, it is clear that the King's excusers
can only justify his action under the fifth heading,
by inventing a new and unheard-of ' convention,'
whereby the arbitrary will of the King can prevail
against the united will of the nation. If this ' con-
vention ' is admitted, one might as well tear up the
Constitution at once, and throw it into the waste-
paper basket, for the sovereignty of the people has
ceased to exist.

We come next to the second question — the delay
in recalling the chosen representative of the people.
Venizelos was dismissed on March 5th : and he was
not summoned to power again till August 23rd.
Thus for nearly six months the sovereignty of the

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 109

people was inoperative. What excuse have the
King's apologists for this breach of the Constitution ?

First, we are told, the Government of Venizelos
had not any electoral lists printed, and had not
provided any apparatus for the new Provinces. On
that account the ' interim ' Government of Gounares,
although it undertook the task of repairing these
omissions " with all haste," could not have everything
ready before June 13th, the day the elections were
held. But even if we accept this rather flimsy
pretext, and are prepared to believe that the work
was undertaken " with all haste," yet we have only
a partial answer to our question. The elections were
held on June 13th, but Venizelos was not recalled
to power till August 23rd. Thus for two months
and more, notwithstanding the clear results of the
elections, the Government, which had been rejected
by the people, directed the fate of the nation : and
the Liberal Party, which had been returned to
power, were excluded from office. What explanation
can be given of this violation of the Constitution ?

The King was ill, we are told, and the shock of
an interview with Venizelos and of the discussion of
a new policy, would have killed him. But this
excuse is absurd, for the possible illness of the King
was an emergency against which the Constitution
had provided, by laying down that in such a case the
heir to the throne must become Regent. Moreover,
when the Liberal Party called the Government's
attention to this article of the Constitution, they were

110 THE VICTORY OF VEXIZELOS

denounced as regicides, and their proceeding was
labelled " impious, unholy, unseemly, and unmanly 1 "
But surely no one imagined that it was possible to
postpone the legal functions of the State, and that
the Government of the country should be paralysed,
just because the King was ill ! No argument or
counter-accusation of impiety can hide the fact
that the King, by rendering inoperative for nearly
six months the sovereignty of the people, was guilty
of a second gross violation of the Constitution.

We come now to the third question — the second
dismissal of Venizelos in October 1915 and the
dissolution of the recently elected Chamber in
December. If the first dissolution of the Chamber
was illegal, what of the second ? I am reminded of
Lady BracknelPs remark in " The Importance of
Being Earnest " : " To lose one parent, Mr. Worthing,
may be regarded as a misfortune ; to lose both looks
like carelessness." Even if there were some possible
excuse for the first dissolution, on the grounds that
the King was not quite certain of the wishes of his
people, what possible excuse could there.be for the
second dissolution, when the wishes of the people
had been so clearly and so recently expressed ?
Let us examine the reasons given us by the King's
apologists.

Firstly we are told that Venizelos' majority had
been considerably reduced at the last elections ;
and that " Wars cannot be decided on by small
majorities." (The actual returns were : Venizelists

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 111

184 ; all other parties 126.) If we overlook the
fact that Venizelos' majority had been reduced by
the simple method of * cooking ' the Macedonian
elections, and by degrading the King to the position
of Party-leader of the Opposition ; even so we cannot
for a moment admit that " Wars cannot be decided
on by small majorities." -For where are we to draw
the line in that case ? At what precise point can
it be said " The majority is now sufficient. Let us
go to war ! " This argument is absurd. It is
universally admitted that Parliamentary Government
means Government by the majority : and, indeed,
unless this were admitted, it would be impossible
for the Government to govern.

Next, we are told, although the majority of the
country supported the Liberals at the June elections,
and had shown their approval of intervention in the
Dardanelles, they had not been consulted and they
had not expressed themselves in the new and special
circumstances which had arisen in October concerning
the validity of the Serbian treaty, as to whether
Greece was bound to go to the assistance of Serbia
when she was attacked by Bulgaria ; not in a local
war, but in alliance with other great countries not
Balkan. But this defence is a mere quibble founded
on a flat contradiction of the truth. As can
be seen in the speeches delivered at the elections by
Venizelos' followers, the issue raised by the Liberals
was not whether or not Greece should now intervene
in the Dardanelles ; for it was recognized that owing

112 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

to the King's action, the opportunity had been lost.
The issue raised was clear enough : " It is no longer
possible for Greece to take part in the Dardanelles
Expedition, but if another suitable opportunity offers
itself to the country to fight by the side of the Entente,
do you wish us to take it ? Above all, do you wish
us to assist Serbia, if Bulgaria attacks her ? " And
the answer to both these questions was ' Yes.' In
denying that this issue was made clear, the Royalists
are guilty of a falsehood : in pretending that even
if the people accepted the validity of the Serbian
treaty in principle, yet the circumstances were peculiar,
in that Bulgaria was acting in co-operation with
Germany, they are making use of an absurd quibble.
For who could have supposed for a moment that if
Bulgaria were to invade Serbia, she would act inde-
pendently of the Austro-German Armies also invading
her ? Surely this quibble scarcely needs refuting.

And again, if it can remotely be supposed that in
the spirit of the Greek Constitution there really
existed the necessity that the people should be asked
on every special occasion, on every detail in critical
circumstances, to give their vote, the Constitution
would be reduced to an absurdity. For the people
would vote only, and the King would govern !

Lastly, we are told that the King wanted to know
for certain whether the people were in favour of
assisting Serbia. But he was perfectly well aware
that if Greece broke her treaty, Serbia would be dead
and buried long before the elections were over.

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 113

Such was the case : the newly elected House which
was to decide whether or not Serbia should be assisted,
met on the 20th January, and at the end of the
previous October Serbia had ceased to exist !

Thus on three important occasions Constantine
tore the Constitution to shreds. If he did not
openly violate it after 1915, it was because by the
illegal elections of December, from which the Liberal
Party was compelled to abstain, both as a protest
and because of the impossibility of securing a fair
verdict, he was enabled, through a servile Chamber,
to legalize outwardly the illegality of his actions.
But in truth, if the spirit of the Constitution means
that the will of the majority must prevail, then Con-
stantine violated it a thousand times during those
eighteen months of bitter shame.

But the King's apologists, acting on the assump-
tion that two blacks make a white, have * defended '
him, if we can call it a defence, as follows : "It
is all very well," they say, " for Venizelos and the
Entente to talk about violating the Constitution —
why they have done it themselves ! The Entente
violated it by interfering in the internal affairs of
Greece, and deposing the King. Venizelos violated
it by reassembling on June 27th the Chamber which
had been dissolved in November 1915. So at least
we can cry ' quits ' ! " Although, even if it were
true, this would be a poor sort of apology, I should
like, before concluding the chapter, to say a word
on the subject of these two charges.

8

114 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

The intervention of the Entente in June 1917
is a question of international relations : and it is
impossible to deal fully with it in so short a space.
I think, however, that as the country which suffered,
or benefited, by our interference was Greece, the
opinion of Greece's greatest statesman is worth
recording.1 " The Powers who founded the Greek
State established it, indeed, as an independent state ;
but though they declared in the first instrument at
the time of Otho's election that they established it
as an independent and monarchical State, in the
second instrument at the time of the election of
King George, they took care to add that they guaran-
teed it as monarchical, independent, and CONSTITU-
TIONAL. This guarantee of the Powers has furnished
Greece with protection for a whole century. But
never except in these circumstances has an occasion
been presented for general exercise of the rights,
which the three Powers derive from that guarantee.
And even if the texts of these treaties had never
existed, and if these Powers had not been the bene-
factors and guarantors and protectors of Greece,
but had only been responsible for the conduct of this
Great War with the aims which they had in view,
and, finding themselves on our territory, had seen
a King exercising authority based on a democratic
constitution, turning tyrant and persecuting and
enslaving a large part of his people, pursuing a policy
which revolted the conscience of the public, refusing

1 Vindication of Greek National Policy, pp. 140-141

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 115

to respect the manifestation of popular sovereignty
and the verdict of the elections, and affirming his
own responsibility before God ; do you think that
these Powers, even if the texts of the treaties had
not existed, would not have sought to exert their
beneficent influence on behalf of those who were
struggling for liberty ? " If this is the answer of the
great Greek patriot, we need not surely trouble
to frame an answer for ourselves.

As to the second point, the reassembling of the
Chamber which had been dissolved, it is certainly
without precedent in the annals of Greek parliamentary
jurisprudence. But no other course was possible ;
for the Chamber which had been elected in December
1915 was illegal ; and at the time of Venizelos'
return it was impossible to hold new elections.
Consequently his Government were faced with the
dilemma, either of appropriating to itself temporarily
all political authority, or of recalling the Chamber
elected in June 1915. A somewhat analogous
dilemma has arisen in other countries governed by
parliamentary representation, such as England :
because the life of parliament came to an end, and
owing to the war it was impossible to hold the elections.
Instead of dissolving the House, it was considered
preferable to extend the duration of its life. In
Greece the anomalies, thanks to despotic rule, were
greater ; and the necessity was consequently more
imperative. But for the suppression of the Constitu-
tion, the Chamber of June 1915 would have been

116 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

legally maintained till 1919 ; so that the question
of its restoration was simply a matter of form.

Venizelos himself had stronger views still on this
matter : and his concluding remarks on the subject
may be recorded.1 " Nevertheless," he says, " it
is my duty to inform the House that even if I had
thought it possible to hold a General Election imme-
diately, I should still have refused to take office
without this condition : I should still have insisted
that the Chamber of June 13th must be recalled, in
order to continue its labours ; in order to continue,
I should have said, the sitting of the 13th November
1915. I should have insisted on the recall of this
House to work for some time at least ; if only to
furnish the political history of Greece with one
clear precedent, which may serve as a lesson to
future generations."

1 Vindication of Greek National Policy, p. 156.

CHAPTER III

THE VALIDITY OF THE GRECO-
SERBIAN TREATY

IT is necessary to consider very carefully the
validity of the Greco-Serbian treaty, and to
analyse in detail the various interpretations of
it, because it has been, and is still, represented by
the Royalists that the Treaty was not binding on
Greece ; and that in refusing to help Serbia, they
were not guilty of tearing up a ' scrap of paper.'
If this were true, then many of the accusations made
against the Royalists would fall to the ground.
It is, of course, true that even had no Treaty existed,
it was in the interests of Greece to help Serbia ;
and, that by failing to do so, the Royalists betrayed
Greece. But in this chapter I am not concerned with
that side of the question : I only desire to prove that
the Treaty itself was valid, and that it was violated
by the Zaimes Government. Those who are further
interested in the matter, will find the text of the
Treaty, and the Military Convention which accom-
panied it, together with the various interpretations
of it, in the First Greek White Book (Documents
1-44).

The Treaty, which was signed on June 1, 1913,

117

118 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

between Greece and Serbia, with the object of
" preserving a lasting peace in the Balkan peninsula,"
is described as " a Treaty of friendship and defensive
alliance." Its nature is sufficiently indicated by
the opening paragraph of the Convention : "In
the event of war between one of the two Allied
States and a Third Power taking place in the cir-
cumstances foreseen in the Treaty of Alliance between
Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack by
considerable forces — at least two divisions — of the
Bulgarian Army against the Greek or Serbian Army,
the two States of Greece and Serbia promise one
another mutual military aid, Greece with all her
military forces by land and sea, and Serbia with all
her forces by land."

With the various interpretations of it from June
1913 till September 1915 I need not deal again.
Its validity, in the case of a Bulgarian attack on
Serbia was never questioned ; and on at least ten
occasions declarations to that effect were made,
not only by Venizelos who had drawn up the Treaty,
and might be expected to know whether or not it
was valid, but also by the Gounares Ministry, which
held office from March till August 1915. As late
as September 1915 the King himself admitted its
validity by telling Venizelos to inform Serbia that it
would be better for her not to attack Bulgaria first,
as the Treaty was defensive, and if the Serbians
should be the first to attack, it would be a question
whether Greece in such a case would be obliged to

VALIDITY OF THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY 119

go to their assistance. But, as we know, Venizelos
was dismissed on October 5th, and on October 12th,
in response to a request from Serbia to put the
Treaty into operation as the casus foederis had
now arisen, M. Zaimes in a telegram x to the Greek
Minister in Serbia, expressed his * deep regret ' that
the Greek Government could not accede to this
request. Let us analyse and dispose of, one by one,
his reasons for considering that the casus foederis
had not arisen, and that Greece was not bound by
the Treaty to come to Serbia's assistance.

(1) The Alliance had a purely Balkan character ;
and " is invalid in the vicissitudes of a general
conflagration." The untruth of this statement is
so manifest that we are tempted to believe that
it would never have been advanced, had it been
known that the Treaty, which was then secret, would
one day be published. The opening clause, mentioned
above, expressly stipulates against a " Third Power."
We know now that in the first convention " against
Bulgaria" was the phrase used. But Serbia in
anticipation of what had actually occurred — an
Austrian attack — had insisted that " a third Power "
should be substituted for this : and in the second
draft of the Convention Venizelos, seeing that an
Austrian attack would inevitably lead to a European
war, in which Greece would have Russia and France
as allies, had agreed to this.

(2) " Nowhere in the Treaty is there any question

« White Book I, No. 34.

120 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

of a combined attack by two or several powers,"
consequently, as it was not a question of an attack
by Bulgaria singly, but by Bulgaria in co-operation
with Germany and Austria, the Treaty is not binding.
This is an absurd quibble and is sufficiently answered
in the Serbian reply : x " The spirit of the Treaty
of Alliance which guaranteed the integrity of the
territory of each of the contracting States in case
of attack, no less than its text, in which there is no
mention of the Treaty ceasing to have any obligatory
force if Bulgaria is in alliance with any other Power,
proves, in a clear and logical manner, that Greece
is bound to come to the assistance of Serbia if she is,
without provocation on her part, attacked either by
Bulgaria or any other Power."

(3) " The Serbian Government has already recog-
nized that it has the character of merely an episode
in the European War, by breaking off diplomatic
relations with Bulgaria in imitation of the Entente
Powers, their European Allies, without having pre-
viously come to an agreement with Greece, their
Balkan Ally. It is thus clear that we shall not find
ourselves to be within either the provisions or the
spirit of our Alliance." This argument is disposed
of by the reply of the Serbian Government that
" she did not come to an understanding with Greece
with regard to the rupture of diplomatic relations
with Bulgaria for the simple reason that she had no
choice in the matter, and it did not rest with her
' White Book I, No. 38. i

VALIDITY OF THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY 121

either to break off or maintain the relations. The
rupture was rendered inevitable by the aggressive
attitude of Bulgaria."

(4) But, apart from these " textual considerations,' -
Greece does not think that by sending assistance now
to Serbia, she would be serving " their common
interests." It was for this reason that she had
hitherto remained neutral, " believing that the best
service she could render Serbia was to keep Bulgaria
in check, by preserving, in view of an eventual
attack, the integrity of her forces and the liberty of
her communications. Greece has always held herself
ready to face the Bulgarian danger, even if it took
place during the European War, in spite of the fact
that Serbia was already engaged with two Great
Powers. That is why she responded to the Bulgarian
mobilization, by mobilizing her own army. But
she has always had in view a Bulgarian attack taking
place separately, even if in connection with other
hostile enterprises against Serbia. The hypothesis
of a concerted attack between Bulgaria and the other
Powers has been and must remain outside her calcula-
tions. For, by intervening under such circumstances,
Greece would destroy herself without any hope of
saving Serbia. . . . The common interest therefore
demands that the Greek forces should be kept in
reserve with a view to making better use of them
later."

In this monstrous rigmarole there are three sugges-
tions which engage our attention. Firstly there is

122 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

the broad hint that Venizelos himself had been
guided by the theory of ' practicability ' in August
1914 ; and that, in failing to render assistance to
Serbia against Austria, he had virtually torn up the
Treaty, Consequently in still remaining neutral
Greece is only following out the policy of Venizelos
to its logical conclusion. But this disgraceful sug-
gestion does not take into consideration that in
August 1914 Venizelos, WITH THE APPROVAL
OF SERBIA, decided that the common interest and
the execution of the Treaty demanded a certain
policy : viz. that Greece should remain neutral for
the present, and should only intervene, if Bulgaria
attacked Serbia. Thus he was not violating the
Treaty but actually consulting his Ally on the best
method of carrying it out.

Secondly, we find perhaps the most amazing
' distinction without a difference ' that has ever
appeared in any official document. Greece was
quite ready, we are told, to intervene, if Bulgaria
attacked Serbia " in connection with " the Austro-
Germans ; but it had never occurred to her that if
they attacked ' in connection with ' each other, they
would make a " concerted " attack ; and under those
circumstances Greece couldn't possibly intervene!
What, in God's name, is the difference between a
* connected ' and a * concerted ' attack ? What
person in their senses even imagined that if Bulgaria
decided to attack Serbia at the same time as the
Austro-Germans attacked her, she could possibly

VALIDITY OF THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY 123

avoid ' concerting ' her attack ? And yet the poor
Greek Government never thought that this could
possibly happen !

Lastly, we are told that it would not serve the
" common interests " for Greece to be destroyed,
in a hopeless attempt to save Serbia ; but that she
had much better keep her Army for a better occasion.
But what * better occasion ' could offer itself, as far
as their * common interests ' were concerned, once
Serbia had been destroyed, as she assuredly would
be, if Greece did not help her ? This is really too
much — it is as if Henry VIII had said to Anne Boleyn:
" You ask me to stay your execution ? Well no,
I really don't think that it would serve our * common
interests * for me to do so. But later, after your
execution, I'm sure that I shall be able to find a more
suitable opportunity to help you ! " There was
absolutely no reason to believe, as I have shown in
another place, that Greece would destroy herself by
coming to the rescue, or that there was no hope of
saving Serbia. On the contrary all the military
probabilities pointed that the exact opposite would
be the result of her intervention. But even if
Greece did run risks by intervening, was that a
reason for breaking the Treaty ? We are beginning
to see what exactly is meant by " common interests "
— its only meaning is " the interests of ourselves,"
and we get the theory of treaty obligations which
was advanced even more boldly by Stratos in his
defence of the Royalist action, which he made in the

124 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Chamber on August 23, 1917. Put bluntly, it comes
to this : " We can repudiate our Treaty obligations,
if it is not in our interests to fulfil them ! "

But there is just one further remark which attracts
our attention : the admission that Greece was
bound by the treaty to keep Bulgaria ' in check.'
The following conversation which took place between
Passaroff and Const antine in September 1915, gives
us the King of Greece's idea of keeping Bulgaria
' in check.' This conversation, I may add, was
sent to Sofia by Passaroff, then Bulgarian Minister
at Athens, in a telegram, which was discovered at
the Athens telegraphic office, and has recently been
deciphered by means of the Bulgarian cipher, which
fell into the hands of the Entente when they con-
fiscated the archives of the Bulgarian Consulate at
Salonica in 1916.1

" The King asked me for what reasons Bulgarian
divisions had been mobilized.

" I replied that the mobilization had been carried
out as a rejoinder to the concentration of Serbian
troops on the Bulgarian frontier.

" The King said — ' I was told yesterday of perse-
cutions against Greeks in Serbian Macedonia. The
Serbians are incorrigible, with their cruelties. M.
Venizelos thinks that you mean by your mobilization
to occupy Macedonia, Nish, Pirot, and the Morava
Valley. The occupation of Macedonia would con-
stitute a casus foederis according to the Treaty
1 Vindication of Greek National Policy, p. 62.

VALIDITY OF THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY 125

between Greece and Serbia. The occupation of
Nish, Pirot, and the Morava Valley would destroy
the equilibrium of the Balkans.'

" To this I replied — c The occupation of Serbian
Macedonia does not constitute a casus foederis for
Greece. The Greco-Serbian Alliance against Bulgaria
can no longer exist, for one of the parties is no longer
in a condition to fulfil the obligations of Alliance.
If the Bulgarians attack you Serbia will not be able
to send you a single soldier. As for Pirot, Nish,
and the Morava Valley, it is a question of Serbian
intrigues. The policy of M. Venizelos in regard
to the equilibrium of the Balkans is negative and
sterile. It is impossible to arrest the progress of
the Bulgarian people, young, industrious, full of
life, and capable. Its neighbours must not impede
its progress. While the British were occupying
themselves with sport, the French with the theatre,
and the Russians with vodka, Germans were working,
and we see them accomplishing miracles.5

" The King said — ' I am in full agreement with
you, and I hold that when you go to occupy Serbian
Macedonia, we shall have no reasons to intervene,
since the casus foederis cannot apply after what you
have heard. We cannot oppose such a course, for
we should have to declare war for foreign territory.
You are going to act now with Austria and Germany.
It would therefore be suicide if in opposing you,
we were to declare war against two great Powers.
I did not agree to the proposal of M. Venizelos that

126 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

we should oppose you with our troops and with those
of the Entente, for if the Entente has plenty of
troops it will send them against the Dardanelles
and not against Bulgaria. I beg you to declare to
His Majesty your Tsar that in your action against
Serbia you will have no opposition from our side.
We shall not shed our blood against you and against
Germany to save Serbia. Please assure your Sove-
reign and your Government that I have summoned
you in order to make this declaration to you, and
to ask you the following service — M. Venizelos
is endeavouring to prepare difficulties and even
disagreeable coups de theatre for me. I want to
deprive him of the possibility of making a show with
the casus foederis regarding Serbia. I, therefore,
request you to declare to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs here on behalf of your Government that you
have nothing against peace, and to declare that you
will occupy Serbian Macedonia acting in conjunction
with Germany. M. Venizelos demands from me
the mobilization of two Army Corps on your frontier.
I shall not consent.'

" Finally, the King asked me to help him in his
struggle to get rid of M. Venizelos quietly. The
King asks that his declaration shall remain an absolute
secret."

Such, then, were Constantine's real views on the
validity of the Treaty, and on the part he should
play in ' checking s Bulgaria ! Zaimes himself, who
actually drafted the note to Serbia, refusing assist-

VALIDITY OF THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY 127

a nee, would not even take the trouble to examine
the Treaty, as he had only come into power to fall
in with the King's wishes and to repudiate it. There
is absolutely no excuse for the Royalists, for neither
the spirit nor the text of the Treaty gave them a
reason for repudiating that which none of them had
ever dared to question till the very last moment.
In conclusion, I should like to cite the noble words
of Polites x on the subject of Treaty obligations.

" The repudiation of a treaty, Gentlemen, is a
heavy blow, struck by the Government of a country,
whoever they may be, against the honour, the dignity,
the prestige of a State. The blow is heavy for any one.
If the Power is a great one, it will endure the conse-
quences. But a small Power must care more for its
honour, must have greater reverence for the obliga-
tions it undertakes. Because the Great Powers
have material possessions, they have force. But
in the case of Small Powers, the only indestructible
capital they possess, the only thing that permits
them to live in the community of nations, to pro-
gress, to vindicate their national rights, to realize
their national dreams, is honour."

1 Vindication of Greek National Policy, p. 62.

CHAPTER IV

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS

RECENTLY, through the kindness of a friend,
I have been allowed to read two pamphlets
which were published towards the end of
the War by * L'Union Hellenique de Suisse.' They
are written in French and they emanate from Geneva.
The first, Le depart du roi Constantin, is an account
of the events from June 10-14, 1917 ; which may
be described as the almost simultaneous arrival in
Athens of M. Jonnart, the Allied High Commis-
sioner, and departure from the same town of King
Constantine. Unfortunately, I have not got a copy
before me ; but I made a few notes at the time, and
I will endeavour to give my readers the substance
of this pamphlet. I do not know whether this
little work is procurable in England ; but if any of
my readers understands French, and is interested in
humorous fiction, I recommend him to endeavour
at once to obtain a copy.

First of all, we are given a pretty little picture of
the absolute concord and tender love which existed
in Athens between King Constantine and the Entente,
before the arrival of that wretched fellow M. Jonnart.

128

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS 129

The prophet Isaiah has given us in one of his pro-
phecies a vision of an age of perfect peace when
4 the cow and the bear shall feed ; their young ones
shall lie down together ; and the lion shall eat straw
like the ox, and the sucking child shall play on the
hole of the asp, and the wearied child shall put his
hand on the cockatrice' den.' But this is pande-
monium compared with the blessed age of peace
which now ruled over Athens. As to the question
of the Thessalian crop, there was no truth in the
slanderous allegation of the newspapers that Con-
stantine desired to keep it all, so as to be in a position
to snap his fingers at the blockade. On the contrary
a " complete agreement " on this question had been
reached between the Entente Ministers and the King.
M. Guillemin had been to see the King and had
stated that he was in full agreement with the Greek
point of view not only in this matter but in respect
of the whole policy of Constantine during the War.
This millennium of bliss was suddenly disturbed on
June 10th by the arrival of a certain gentleman,
a M. Jonnart, at the Piraeus, who had apparently
been taking a trip for his health in the Mediterranean
on board the French battleship Justice, and had just
visited Salonica — a town of which Constantine had
vaguely heard mention. But no one knew anything
about him ; neither the King, nor M. Guillemin.
It was, therefore, with great surprise that M.
Zaimes, the Prime Minister, learnt that this M.
Jonnart desired the pleasure of his company forth-

9

130 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

with on the French battleship. Still with that
unfailing courtesy which the King and his Ministers
have always extended to strangers visiting Greece,
he proceeded without delay to the battleship. M.
Jonnart informed him that he had been sent to
Greece with unlimited authority as High Commis-
sioner of the three Protecting Powers, who had
guaranteed the Greek Constitution of 1863 ; to wit,
France, England and Russia. He emphasized the
fact that he had no desire to interfere with the Greek
Constitution or to upset the Danish dynasty ; but
that he was only animated by a sincere desire for
Greece's welfare, and that his object was to unite
her once again. M. Zaimes was naturally thunder-
struck. How could it be suggested that Greece
was not united at present ? The whole country was
behind the King, with the exception of a few madmen
under the leadership of a pernicious rebel, whose
name — here he consulted a few notes — he believed
to be Venizelos. If the High Commissioner wished
the unity of Greece to be absolutely complete, he
had only to throw Venizelos and his handful of
followers into prison ; and the job would be done.
But M. Jonnart was not persuaded by this perfectly
reasonable statement : instead of replying, he made
the suggestion that Gounares, Dousmanes, Metaxas,
and a few others should be exiled from Greece.
M. Zaimes, who seemed destined, directly he had
recovered from one blow, to be sent reeling under
another, pointed out that this was quite impossible.

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS 131

There might be some machinery in existence in Athens
for exiling Venizelos, but he was quite certain that
none existed for ostracising such worthy gentlemen
as the Ex-Chief of Staff. So the matter was dropped
for the time being, but M. Jonnart insisted on
obtaining written permission from the Premier for
the Entente troops to occupy certain towns in
Thessaly, pending the settlement of the question of
the Thessalian harvest. M. Zaimes (the writer's
stock of verbs expressing sorrowful amazement
approached exhaustion) was dumbfounded. Had
not this matter already been settled ? But being
a man of extraordinary moderation, he consented to
the request. M. Jonnart then concluded the inter-
view with the promise that he would communicate
with him on the morrow, by which time he would
have received certain definite instructions from Paris.

That night there was consternation in Athens
alike in the royal palace and in the humblest cottage.
The fears, however, of his faithful people were
allayed by the King's proclamation, assuring them
that, like Mrs. Micawber, he would never desert
them.

On the morrow the Prime Minister was again sent
for and at 9 a.m. he was presented with an ultimatum
from the Entente, demanding the abdication of
King Constantine within twenty-four hours. His
successor was to be designed by the King from among
his heirs ; but the Crown Prince wras expressly excluded
from the succession. The Powers claimed their

132 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

authority for the demand from article three of the
Treaty of London, dated July 1865, which reads as
follows : " Greece under the sovereignty of Prince
William of Denmark " (known afterwards as King
George, the father of Constantine), " and under the
guarantee of the three Courts of England, France
and Russia, forms a monarchical, independent, and
constitutional State." The special significance of
the word ' constitutional ' was apparent, in that it
had not been included in the first Greek Constitution
of 1844, which had only been described as ' monarchical
and independent.' Constantine, having on several
occasions broken the constitution guaranteed by
him to them, the Three Powers were compelled to
intervene and to demand his abdication. Later
on, however, if the Greek people desired it, there
would be no objection to the return of the King.
M. Zaimes, who was by this time, if I may use the
expression, completely ' bowled over,' left the ship
as in a trance, and directed his footsteps almost
unconsciously to the Royal Palace, where (still
in a trance — the same trance) he presented the
ultimatum to the King. Never was the King more
kingly, never was his simplicity more simple, never
was his dignity more dignified, than when he received
this terrible blow. A Crown Council was at once
summoned, and the King laid before them the
ultimatum, and asked their advice. The Crown
Council deliberated for two hours. Some of them,
recalling the thousand insults heaped on Greece

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS 133

by the infamous Entente — the landing at Salonica,
the almost weekly ultimata, the bottling up of the
Greek Army in the Peloponnese, and the blockade —
advised him to summon to his side the Greek nation,
who would answer the call to a man. Others
again, perhaps because they feared that there might
be one or two replies of ' Number engaged ' in answer
to the call, advised less heroic measures. Let the
King follow the example of his rather less famous
prototype Napoleon, and hand himself over a prisoner
to the Entente. The Justice was every whit as good
a ship as the Bellcrophon ; and by refusing to accept
the ultimatum, he would throw on the Entente the
onus of enforcing it. The King listened with that
dignity, which I have mentioned before, and which
I am afraid I shall have to mention again, to the
advice of his faithful councillors; and finally announced
his decision to accept the ultimatum. He had, he
remarked modestly, performed certain services to
Greece in the past ; he had nearly doubled his country
by his brilliant leadership and staff- work during the
two Balkan Wars, and he had personally saved
her from the disaster of intervention in the present
conflict. But his past services were as nothing
compared with those which he was now prepared
to render. He named no names, and invited no
comparison : but he was determined to go to his
Calvary, to make the supreme sacrifice of tearing
himself away from the bosom of his loving people.
He would consent to die (metaphorically speaking,

134 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

of course) — nay, he was determined to die, that
Greece might live. With these words the royal
martyr signed his death-warrant.

My own opinion is that the unknown writer of
the pamphlet (who signs himself * X }) should have
ended it there. The subsequent details of the
embarkation of the royal luggage savours rather of
anti-climax. But the duty of an historian is to
record the true facts ; he must not kill Napoleon
on the glorious field of Waterloo, but he must tell
also of the shame of St. Helena. Moreover, there
is one picture from which the writer extracts a certain
pathos : the High Commissioner, in the guise of a
twentieth- century Hudson Lowe, brutally curtailing
the last sleep of the royal martyrs in their native
land by ordering them to embark before 11 a.m.
Perhaps ' native ' is not strictly accurate, seeing that
the Ex-King was Danish, and the Ex-Queen German.
Still, if that picture doesn't make you cry, you ought
to consult a doctor.

There is also an extraordinarily moving descrip-
tion of the grief of the populace, when the terrible
news became known to them. As I said, unfortun-
ately I haven't got a copy by me as I write : but
I remember distinctly one passage, in which the
writer positively lashed himself into poetic frenzy.
I can't remember the words, but there was a wonder-
ful simile of the " leaden dawn breaking," and the
" leaden " feet of the populace (also " breaking,"
I suppose) " as they wended their way on the last

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS 135

pilgrimage to the royal palace at Tatoi." But,
frankly, I was rather disappointed that the author
failed to record the incident which I read of in the
papers at the time ; of a famous actor, the George
Robey of Athens, swimming out after the royal
yacht Sphacteria, and trying to bring it back to
shore. Still I suppose one mustn't be greedy.

But if Le depart de roi Constantine appeals to senti-
ment, and would indeed form an excellent libretto
for a Lyceum melodrama, the second pamphlet,
entitled Le guet-apens du er Decembre 1916 a Athenes,
is of sterner stuff, and makes an appeal, not to the
senses, but to reason. It is full of facts and docu-
ments (the authenticity of which I have unfortu-
nately been unable to verify) destined to correct
certain misapprehensions existing in our miuds
concerning the ' trap ' of December 1st, and the
4 persecutions ' of Venizelists which are alleged to
have taken place on the following day. I will try
to summarize the conclusions as briefly as possible.

(1) The original demand of the Entente that a
certain quantity of Greek war material should be
handed over to them in compensation for the cor-
responding quantity which had fallen into German
hands as a result of the capture of Kavalla, Rupel,
etc., was made in the autumn of 1916.

(2) The Greek Government replied that although
they were not responsible for the material falling
into the hands of Germany, they were prepared
out of kindness to accede to the principle of ' ship-

136 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

for-ship ' compensation. But, by an elaborate table,
comparing the material, etc., which had already
fallen into the hands of the Entente from the
Salonica defences, etc., with the material which had
been captured by their enemies, it was found that
the Entente had already in their possession more
Greek guns, more rifles, and more machine-guns
than the Germans. So far therefore from being
entitled to take more Greek material, the Entente
should really give back the balance. On this, however,
the Greek Government, to prove the sincere bene-
volence of its neutrality, would not insist. It is
worth noting that in its calculation of the Greek
armament in German hands, the Greek Govern-
ment do not include the material of the ' interned ~
Greek Corps at Goerlitz. Naturally the Germans
would allow their ' guests ' to keep their arms.

(3) The Entente would not accept these calcula-
tions ; and informed the Greek Government that
unless the arms were delivered by a certain date,
they would be compelled to make a demonstration
at Athens and to seize them, if necessary, by force.

(4) The Greek Government replied that they would
consider such a demonstration as an ' act of hostility ' ;
and they issued a vehement protest in anticipation.

(5) In spite of this, Admiral Dartige de Fournet
landed a large force of Anglo-French marines on the
Piraeus on December 1st, with clear orders to use
force, if necessary, and to seize all the important
positions commanding the town of Athens. The

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS 137

Greek troops were given orders on no account to
fire unless they were fired upon first. Unfortunately
on meeting with the Greek troops, some of the Entente
marines opened fire ; and a skirmish followed in
which both sides suffered about 150 casualties.
Meanwhile the Entente warships opened fire on the
town of Athens, having as their principal objective
the Royal Palace. Shortly after an armistice was
concluded, and the marines were escorted back to
the Piraeus, where they re-embarked. It was
therefore absurd to talk of any ' trap.'

(6) A number of Venizelists, armed with rifles,
had fired from their houses on the loyal Greek troops,
at the time when the skirmish was going on. Accor-
dingly on the following day, the 2nd, a raid was made
on the house of Venizelos and other ' suspect ' houses.
A large quantity of arms and grenades were found
there, and in consequence the Greek Government
arrested a few of the leading Venizelists.

(7) The pamphlet concludes with a list of about
150 Anglo-French 6 police ' in Athens, who, in viola-
tion of the Greek neutrality, were openly employed
by the Entente for nefarious purposes. Against
each name — all the names are Greek — there is a
description of the man's character, certified by the
Chief of the Athenian Police. Among the milder
descriptions we may note the recurrence of ' Thief,'
' White slave trafficker,' ' murderer ' and ' sentenced
to imprisonment on such-and-such a date.' Altogether,
one would gather, as unsavoury a collection of

138 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

ragamuffins as have ever gathered together in one
town.

I was so impressed with this manly and straight-
forward account of events, that I proceeded at once
to lay it before official Venizelist circles, and asked
them what they had to say about it. The replies,
given under the same seven headings, are as follows :

(1) The actual suggestion that the Greeks should
compensate us for the material lost to Germany came,
not from the Entente, but from Constantine himself,
who made the proposal to the French Deputy,
Benazet, on October 21st.

(2) The statistics are incorrect, because the
material of the ' interned ' Greek Corps is not included
in the list of material in German possession. Apart
from other minor inaccuracies, it is pointed out that
much of the material already in the possession of
the Entente was obsolete and useless.

(3) and (4) What actually occurred was this :
Although the King himself had suggested the con-
cession, he was afterwards persuaded that he should
not have done so. He therefore privately informed
the Entente that it would be better for them to
make a ' demonstration ' at Athens, in order that
there should be no suspicion of his connivance. His
real object was this : directly the demonstration
began, the Greek troops would think that the surren-
der of the material was involuntary, and would be
certain to prepare for resistance. The King could
then tell the Entente that it would be almost certain

TWO ROYALIST PAMPHLETS 139

to provoke a conflict, if the material were surrendered.
Thus he hoped to preserve both his honour and his
batteries.

(5) In accordance with this plan, Admiral
Dartige de Fournet, never suspecting that there
would be any resistance, landed 2,000 marines at
the Piraeus on December 1st. These marines had
been served out with blank cartridges, and had only
a small number of rounds of ' live ' ammunition.
On the very morning the Crown Prince had gone
round the barracks and had informed the Greek
troops that it was intended to rob them of their
guns and rifles, and had exhorted them to destroy
their enemies utterly ' so that no trace even of their
nostrils remained.' Accordingly the marines were
surrounded on their way to Athens by over 20,000
Greek troops, who fired on them. After suffering
heavy casualties, the Anglo-French force, including
Dartige de Fournet, was compelled to surrender to
the Greeks. In view of the fire of the fleet which was
directed not against the town itself, but against the
barracks and fortifications surrounding it, the Greeks
agreed to an armistice ; and the Anglo-French
marines rejoined their fleet. With regard to the
allegation that the marines fired first, it is pointed
out that not only were their rifles loaded with blank
cartridges, but that 'it would have been sheer folly
for a small force to attack a force more than ten
times stronger, by which it was surrounded.

(6) This encounter was made an excuse to imprison

140 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

or exterminate all the political enemies of the Crown.
In addition to a number of Venizelists who were
butchered in cold blood, many hundreds were im-
prisoned on the flimsiest pretexts, and were kept
in solitary confinement under conditions of indescrib-
able barbarity. They were only released 45 days
later on account of the categorical demand of the
Entente ultimatum, which was accepted on January
16th.

(7) If it is true that the Anglo-French c police '
were such disreputable persons, that is because the
Germans had secured the rest.

My readers are now in possession of the two con-
flicting statements, and they must decide for them-
selves which they are to believe. I should like to add
just one thing more, which may possibly enlighten
them. I have recently seen a copy of a Greek paper
which is being published in America by the Royalists.
On the front page there is a large portrait of Con-
stantine, and underneath, in huge print, the date
" December 1, 1916," which is proclaimed as the
date of Greece's regeneration, and of her " greatest
victory." Now this seems to me very strange. For
if the Royalists were honestly anxious to avoid a
conflict, and if, as they have given us to suppose,
they sincerely regretted this incident which had been
forced upon them, and if they were really our friends,
how can they describe the events of December 1, 1916,
as " Greece's greatest victory " ? I confess that
I can find no answer to my question.

CHAPTER V

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS

CONTINUAL reference has been made in the
first part of the book to a certain powerful
section of Constantine's advisers, whom I
have referred to as, the ' Court ' party, the ' secret
advisers,' ' the power behind the throne,' the ' back-
stairs party,' ' the Royalists,' etc. These names do
not necessarily mean that the influence of this party
was wholly bad and at variance with the true interests
of Greece (though I hope to prove that such indeed
was the effect of their influence). I meant rather
that their advice was unconstitutional : for the
constitutional adviser of the Crown can only be the
Prime Minister and his Cabinet, who are the true
and only representatives of the will of the people.
They only are entitled to influence and direct the
policy of the King. It remains for us to discuss
who were these secret advisers, what were their
motives in acting as they did ; and finally to determine
whether or not the policy which they advocated,
and succeeded for a long time in enforcing, was in
the best interests of Greece. Of these three objectives,
the first and third are easily attainable : for we

141

142 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

know who they were ; and we know what they
succeeded in bringing about, and we are therefore
entitled to condemn or to praise their policy, according
as it appears to us to be at variance with, or to have
served, the true interests of the country to which
they belonged. That is the only true test by which
they can be judged ; and it is a test which any man,
who knows how to draw conclusions, can apply.
When Venizelos left office for the second time,
he made this memorable remark, " You see the
Greece I am handing over to you ; be mindful of
the Greece you hand on." Were the King's advisers
mindful of this warning, or were they not ? That is
the question to which we must find an answer.

But our second objective, to discover the different
motives by which each separate adviser was influenced,
is, I admit, more difficult. At best it can only be a
matter for conjecture : since even if we had spoken
to each man, and he had told us the influences
at work in his mind, we could never be certain of
the truth. For often a man acts, without knowing
himself why he acts : and among Greeks especially
reason is often displaced by emotion. At the present
time the leading advisers of the Crown are awaiting
trial in Greece on various charges : and no doubt
many things, which are at present hidden, will come
to light. I must therefore warn my readers that
although I have spoken to many persons who are
intimately acquainted with the men under discussion,
my estimate of the reasons which led them to act

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 143

as they did, is largely conjectural, and therefore may
be, and probably is, full of inaccuracies. None the
less, if the details are incorrect, we may be fairly
certain of the broad outlines. I must apologize
for this prelude : but I am anxious that the reader
shall be able to distinguish what he may take for
granted from what he is at liberty to reject.

The chief unconstitutional advisers of the Crown
were the Queen, Streit, Dousmanes, and Metaxas.
There were also a number of politicians of whom by
far the most prominent was Gounares. Among others
may be mentioned Zaimes, Ralles and Skouloudes,
who, although they did not try to influence the King
whilst Venizelos was still Prime Minister, consented
afterwards to hold office and to advise him, although
they knew that Venizelos had been illegally dismissed.
They cannot therefore be excluded from a share
in the responsibility of having directed Greek policy
into a certain path which was at variance with the
wishes of the people, as expressed in their support
of Venizelos at the elections. Finally there were
the brothers Theotokes ; the one, Greek Minister
at Berlin, the other, Master of Ceremonies at the
Court of Queen Sophie. These eight names (the
last two are not important) fall naturally into three
groups : those who advocated a certain policy
opposed to that of Venizelos from the very beginning
of the War : those who for various reasons, which
I will discuss, adopted the policy later : and those
who, although they never approved of it, consented

144 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

to carry it out. Let us examine each group in
turn.

In the first group there are three names : the Queen,
Streit, and Dousmanes. Concerning the Queen I
need say little ; her correspondence with her brother
is dealt with elsewhere, and in it, with the readiness
of her sex, she speaks for herself. By a double
misfortune of birth, she was born a German and a
Hohenzollern. Concerning her motives and her
policy there cannot be a shadow of doubt. She
utterly despised the Greeks, and cared not a jot for
the welfare of Greece. She regarded it only as a
pawn in the game to be thrown in and sacrificed
without hesitation or compunction, if its sacrifice
would help Germany. Her policy was quite straight-
forward : Greece must remain neutral and help
Germany secretly by every means in her power,
until an opportunity offered itself for open inter-
vention. When Germany had won the war, Greece
would enter the great German confederation of
States.

The policy of Streit is similar, though his motives
are slightly different. His grandfather, a Bavarian
gentleman, had come to Greece in 1844 with King
Otto, who had reigned in Greece before the worthless
Bavarian dynasty was ejected and George of Denmark
came to the throne in 1863. But although both his
grandmother and his mother were Greek, the Foreign
Minister of Venizelos spoke Greek with a strong-
guttural accent ; and in his appearance and his

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 145

dress he was frankly, one might say ostentatiously,
German. A man of considerable experience as a
diplomatist, he enjoyed the complete confidence
of M. Venizelos. But even before the War he had
on several occasions abused this confidence : and
had been employed by Constantine to ' watch ' the
movements of his chief, and to report secretly on all
that was done and said.

An informer is not generally a man whose judgment
is of much weight, for directly he has performed
certain services, he% is discarded as a worthless tool.
But Streit had become acquainted with the Queen
during his frequent visits to the Palace : and that
lady, delighted at last to find a German oasis in the
desert of surrounding Greeks, had become firmly
attached to him. Thanks to the Queen's friendship,
his influence was enormous over the King as well.
As we have seen it was he who, without the know-
ledge of the Prime Minister, drafted the famous wire
of the King to the Kaiser on August 7, 1914. From
that date onwards he worked ceaselessly to further
German interests. His policy was thus exactly
the same as the Queen : but his motives were slightly
different, in that he was not working solely in the
cause of Germany, without any reference at all to
the interests of Greece. He was devoted to the
German Queen and to everything German : but he
was also to this extent patriotic, that, unlike her,
he would have hesitated deliberately to ruin Greece.
He was, however, convinced from the very beginning

10

146 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

that Germany would win : and on that account he
was prepared to go to any lengths to win her goodwill.
His personal character arouses our contempt : for
like most informers, he was a coward. Whenever
the Entente sent threatening notes to the King,
Streit, unlike the fire-eating General Staff, always
counselled acceptance and non-resistance.

General Dousmanes was a man of quite a different
stamp. He had never been to Germany, he could
not speak a word of German : but none the less he
idolized the purely German conception of militarism
and autocracy. For him the Kaiser was God, and the
Prussian militarists his prophets. For the Entente,
with the exception of England, he had the greatest
contempt : to the English he only extended his
admiration because of the Machiavellian qualities
of our foreign politics ! Venizelos he detested for a
personal and a general reason ; because he had once
been rebuked by him for insubordination, and because
Venizelos stood for the cause of democracy which he
despised. His one ambition was to convert Greece,
which in a peculiar way of his own he loved, into a
small edition of Germany ; and to make Constantirie
a full-blooded autocrat and a worthy brother-in-law
of the Kaiser. Never for a moment did he doubt
that Germany would be victorious : for he had the
greatest contempt for the military capabilities of
the Entente : as it simply did not occur to him as
possible that democracy and efficiency in war could
go hand in hand. We get some idea of his attitude

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 147

from his sneering jibe at the Salon ica Force : " The
only two men who will remain neutral during the
War are King Constantine and General Sarrail ! "
With such views, but from different motives the
Chief of Staff found himself in the same camp as the
Queen and Streit, and from the beginning, he stuck
at nothing which might help Germany.

The second group — those who adopted a pro-
German policy after the beginning of the War-
included Gounares, Skouloudes, Ralles, and Metaxas.
Of these Gounares was inspired chiefly by a deep-
seated jealousy of Venizelos. At first he had no
bias in favour of Germany : indeed he was altogether
in favour of Greece siding with the Entente. But
when the Dardanelles crisis arose, he saw his political
opportunity to oust his hated rival from power :
and he did not hesitate to take it. By doing so he
inevitably joined the Queen's party : but he did so
not out of love for Germany, so much as hatred of
Venizelos. It is not certain whether he knew of the
message sent to Germany on July 30, 1915, inform-
ing her that Greece would stand aside in the event
of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia. But he was Prime
Minister at the time : and it is fair to assume that
he had a fairly shrewd knowledge of what was taking
place. In any case this bland, Pecksniffian lawyer
was a faithful adherent, if not a strenuous instigator,
of the Court policy.

The case of Ralles is somewhat different. At the
time of the Dardanelles crisis he was a firm supporter

148 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

of Venizelos. It was he who said to the King at
the Crown Council, " Courage, your Majesty, courage,"
and to the Prime Minister, " Sir, it is your duty to go
forward." But after the crisis he changed his mind,
and decided that the King had been right, and
Venizelos wrong. The diplomatic errors of the
Entente and the military victories of Germany over-
came his infirm purpose. Moreover, he was always
secretly jealous of Venizelos, whom he despised for
his humble birth. Those who desire to do so may
read the speech * which he made in the Chamber
on August 25, 1917, defending his policy. His
defence, which is not very convincing, seems to
be that he was fond of the King, and that, since
Venizelos had been dismissed, he might as well
take office as any one else. Clearly this rather
light-minded snob was only cast for secondary
parts in the royal entourage.

The character and motives of Skouloudes do not
require much explanation : he was a man of eighty-
two, fired with the ambitions of twenty-one. He
was a follower and not a leader of the Court party :
in order to satisfy his ambitions, he was prepared
to do anything that he was told. In so far as he
had any personal feelings in the matter, he heartily
disliked the Entente and Venizelos with the impotent
hatred of a doddering old man.

Colonel Metaxas was probably the ablest by far
of all the Court Party. He had been brought up in
1 Vindication of Greek National Policy, pp. 183-220.

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 149

Germany, where he was known as the " little Moltke ";
and was, moreover, a personal friend of the Kaiser,
who is said to have remarked, " If I had five men like
Metaxas, I could conquer the world." But in spite
of this, he believed at the beginning that Germany
would be beaten (perhaps for the very reason that it
did not possess " five Metaxas " ) and he set to work
to draw up plans for the capture of the Dardanelles.
I have never seen them : but a very high authority
has told me that they were extraordinarily brilliant,
and that they displayed an unrivalled appreciation
of the strategic position. However that may be, they
were, as we know, contemptuously rejected by the
British authorities. (Rumour has it that Winston
Churchill is responsible for this.) From that day
onwards implacable animosity against the Entente
drove him into the German camp. Thus his better
judgment was warped by personal considerations :
and he became obsessed with the one idea. " The
Entente despise me. Very well, whatever happens,
I will teach them how dangerous I can be."

We come last to Zaimes. How came it that this
man, who, after Venizelos, was undoubtedly the
best politician in Greece, and who had rendered his
country many distinguished services, how came it
that he is found in the German camp ? I do not
believe that he ever approved of the policy
of the Court. Even if he had believed that
the end justified the means, and that Germany
was bound to win, a man of his integrity could

150 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

never have approved of all the dirty tricks
and the mean lying which this policy necessi-
tated. But the fact is, that he was devoted
to the King ; and he was too lazy or too weak to
oppose what he believed to be wrong. " What
is the use of reading all these documents about the
Serbian treaty, seeing that I have come into office
on purpose to repudiate it ? " That is the answer
to the question why an upright man found himself
among such strange companions : " There is no use
in my resisting." He forgot, when he became the
Minister of the Crown, that he was still the servant
of the people.

These then are the King's advisers, and these are
their motives. But without a certain amount of
popular support, a mere handful of men could never
have succeeded in accomplishing as much as they did.
Behind them, however, there were a number of
supporters, growing constantly as the War went on,
and we must pause for a moment to enquire what
manner of men they were. Those who loved their
King more than anything else ; those who feared for
their skins, and were prepared to go to any length to
avoid war ; those who had received German money,
or had been won over by German threats ; those who
were disgusted with the Entente ; those who were
jealous of Venizelos ; those who were convinced
of German invincibility ; and those who cared more
for their purses than for their honour — such were
the men who supported the policy of the Court,

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 151

and but for whom that policy could never have been
carried out.

It is not difficult to see what this policy was :
the answer is written plainly in the pages of Greek
war history. At all costs we must keep out of the
war. If necessary (and it was necessary) we must
break our treaties ; we must lie and dissimulate
constantly : we must hand over Greek territory to
our bitterest enemy : we must grovel before Germany :
we must submit to every humiliation imposed on
us by either group of belligerents : we must crush
the people physically and morally : but nothing
else matters so long as we can keep out of the War,
and help Germany. What justification was there
for following a policy which necessitated such shame
and humiliation ? Let us even put aside the moral
question, whether they were justified in sacrificing
the nation's honour : let us put aside the legal
question, whether they were justified in overruling
the \vill of the people in a country governed by a
constitutional monarchy : let us accept the theory
that if they considered that the object for which
they were striving was in the interests of their
country, it matters not by what means they attain
it ; and then what justification is there for their
policy ? These men boasted that at least they had
prevented Greece from engaging in an unsuccessful
war. But let us consider what was the result of
their policy : ten months mobilization, the Bulgarian
invasion of Eastern Macedonia, the laying waste

152 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

of Greek Macedonia, the imprisonment of an Army
Corps, the annihilation of Hellenism in Asia Minor,
the svippression of every noble sentiment, the pro-
pagation of fear and cowardice — are not these the
very results which would have followed an unsuccess-
ful war ? At least if they had followed a German
policy, they might have asked for Greece from
their taskmasters not indeed an accession of territory
and wealth, but at any rate the preservation of what
she already had. Again, they boasted that they had
prevented a war with Bulgaria : but even this cannot
be admitted. They had only postponed it to a
later date, when Bulgaria, laden with the spoils of
this war, would have fallen on Greece, weakened,
divided and without a single ally.

It is not a sufficient answer for the Court Party
to say now : " We are very sorry : we put our
money on the wrong horse. That is the only error
that we have committed." It is not a sufficient
answer, because even if Germany had won, the
position of Greece would have been intolerable.
Germany had promised them nothing for their
assistance : and she would have given them nothing.
The fact is that the policy which they pursued, and
the object which they strove to obtain, was not the
furtherance of Greek aims, but the furtherance of
German aims, and German aims only. For this
reason these men stand openly revealed as traitors
to their country.

4 Traitor ' is perhaps a hard word : and it is pro-

CONSTAXTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 153

bablc that all these men, with the possible exception
of Streit, had they been able to gaze into the future,
not indeed so as to see the defeat of Germany, but so
as to sec the inevitable consequences of their policy,
the shameful disasters of 1915 and 1916 — it is probable
I say, that they would have acted differently at
the beginning. But it is unfortunately true — and
nowhere is the truth more plainly revealed than here
— that the descent to Avernus is easy. The betrayal
of Greece was the inevitable corollary of the betrayal
of Serbia : and those who had set foot on the down-
ward path, could no longer withdraw, but were
carried down into the abyss.

And what of the King, the central figure around
whom all these persons revolved ? In a former
work l I attempted to trace his evolution, and I
compared him with the central figure in an old Greek
tragedy : a man with many good qualities but with
certain fatal streaks in his character, who is pursued
by a ' curse ' which plays upon his weaknesses,
and eventually leads him to disaster : and I quoted
Macaulay's epitaph on Clive : " Fortune placed him
in a situation in which his weaknesses covered him
with disgrace, and in which his accomplishments
brought him no honour." Since I wrote this, 1
have learnt a great deal more about him, but nothing
to shake my belief that at the beginning of the War
he meant honestly to do his duty, and to rule as a

1 The Salonica Side-show: Chapter on 'The Tragedy of
Constantine.'

154 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

constitutional king. There are however one or two
additions I should like to make to my former estimate
of his character.

Much has been made of his telegram to the Kaiser,
sent three days after the beginning of the War, to
which I have already referred on several occasions ;
and it has been accepted by many as a conclusive
proof that already at this early period he belonged
to Germany, body and soul. But it is my opinion
that too much importance should not be attached
to this message : for we know that it did not originate
with Constantine, but was drafted by Streit. At
that time Europe was in a ferment : and it was not
known from one moment to another what would
happen next. The Kaiser had wired to him that
Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey were coming in at
once on his side ; and if this were true, it behoved
Greece to walk with great circumspection. In the
circumstances it was not unnatural that the King
should approve of, and sign, a wire, which, under
more normal circumstances, he would have condemned
as far too gushing. But a snatch of conversation
has been repeated to me by an English lady who was
herself present at the time, which convinces me that
the King's sympathies were not with Germany till
much later.

The incident, to which 1 refer, took place on the
King's yacht as late as the beginning of 1915. The
King and Queen were on deck, when his younger
son Alexander, the present King, dashed up to his

CONSTANTINE AND HIS ADVISERS 155

father and informed him joyously that " Three more
damned German boats had been sunk ! " A broad
smile lit up the King's face : but, noticing his wife's
indignation, he signalled to his son to keep quiet.
Now even if we admit that the King's smile may
have been for the benefit of the English lady, and
concealed his real feelings ; yet the very fact that
Alexander, who was only a boy and could not possibly
have ' acted a part,' thought it natural to come to
his father and to ' crow ' over a German defeat,
seems to me conclusive evidence of Constantine's
attitude at that time towards Germany.

In truth the King was an extraordinarily weak
man. We learn from Venizelos himself that on
several occasions Constantine was profoundly moved
by his words, and was definitely persuaded to fight
for the Entente. But unfortunately the moment
that Venizelos had left, Streit, who was the King's
evil genius, or Dousmanes, would talk to him, and
destroy all the seeds that the Prime Minister had
sown. The contest was unequal, because Venizelos
was always honest and spoke the truth, however
unpalatable it might be : whereas his opponents
did not hesitate to lie to the King, to flatter him,
and to play, on his weaknesses with exquisite skill.
None the less they were anxious about him for a
long time : and it was found necessary, whenever
Venizelos came to see him, to keep some one secreted
behind the door, to listen to everything that was
said. In the end, of course, they landed their fish :

156 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

and after that he never ceased to struggle. Although
he began to be attracted by the bait as early as
March, the actual date on which he was 4 landed '
is uncertain. Possibly it was on July 30, 1915,
when he made his secret declaration of neutrality :
but personally I am inclined to think it was a little
later, and that, even during Venizelos' second
Ministry, there was still a tiny hope that he would
turn round on his secret advisers. However that
may be, with the dismissal of Venizelos on October 5th
all hope of saner counsels prevailing disappeared.
From that day onwards till the end of his reign
Constantine clung to the fatal policy on which he
had at length decided, with that peculiar tenacity
and determination, which only a really weak man
can display.

The bitterest opponents of the King do not deny
the charm of the man. Unfortunately a pleasant
disposition and charming manners, though admirable
in a private individual, are a totally inadequate
equipment for a King : and it is for this reason that
the return of Constantine to-day would be nothing
short of a national disaster for the country, which
he so very nearly brought to ruin.

CHAPTER VI

THE GREEK PEOPLE

MR. CHESTERTON, in his brilliant history
of England, complains that in all the so-
called 'Histories of the English People'
there is no mention of the English people. This
little book does not profess to be a study of
the Greek people during the War ; it is only a
slight sketch of the protagonists in Greek War
Politics. None the less it would not be complete
without an attempt to appreciate the part
played by the Greek people : and, if it is found
that we have hitherto done them an injustice,
to offer an apology. Perhaps the most per-
nicious and disquieting legacy of the War has been
a continual feeling of irritation, of suspicion, and of
bitterness between nation and nation. This mutual
antagonism needs no illustration : one can see it
and hear it every day. During the War it was more
or less suppressed : for every sane man felt that he
must support his Allies, even if he did not see eye
to eye with them in every matter, because they were
his Allies, and oppose his enemies, even if in certain

1ST

158 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

respects he had a bond of sympathy with them,
because they were his enemies. It was only against
neutrals that he expressed his feelings violently and
openly. Then the War came to an end, and the
torrent of mutual resentment, bottled up so long, was
let loose. I think the press, though actuated by
the best motives, have done an immense amount of
harm in this respect. It was considered rightly that
differences should not be concealed, and that they
would admit of easier settlement, if brought out into
the light of day. But unfortunately this theory
was carried to an extreme : and to-day every little
difference of opinion between two nations is magnified
into the proportions, if I may be permitted the
expression, of a 4 first-class row.' The average man
is peaceable enough : but when he opens his paper
and discovers that some nation has done his country
an intolerable wrong, he begins to labour under a
grievance : and all the trouble and misunderstandings
begin. If I may take just one example, that of
Italy, I think it is fair to say that the present unfortu-
nate position has arisen very largely through the
excessive candour of the press, not only in Italy,
but in England, France and America as well. What-
ever opinion one may hold concerning the Fiume
question, it is monstrous that a comparatively small
matter should be allowed to develop to such enormous
proportions, that it is in danger of bringing about
an international crisis of the gravest nature. At
the beginning the difference of opinion was small

THE GREEK PEOPLE 159

and capable of settlement : but it grew and grew
like a snowball with the masses of newspaper sheets
applied to it and encircling it ; till the small snow-
ball, no bigger than a man's hand, is now large enough
to knock over the Entente, and smash its very
foundations. Thousands of persons, who, but for
the Press, would never have heard of Fiume, have
been spurred on by the newspapers till they are
prepared to go to war over a question, concerning
the justice or injustice of which they have only the
vaguest conception.

The Army, too, have been partly responsible for
this exacerbation of international relations. It is
an almost universal practice to disparage our Allies
both as soldiers and as men. The unconscious
argument of the soldier who has returned to England
from abroad seems to be this. " After what I've
seen abroad, I've come to the conclusion that England
is the best place, and the Englishman the best man
and the best fighter in the world." This is true,
and there is no harm in saying so. But the soldier
won't say it openly : he hates the idea of boasting.
So he says instead, " I think so-and-so (whatever
country he has soldiered in) is a rotten country.
The people are rotten, and they can't fight for little
apples." No doubt this comes to the same in the
end : but it creates rather a bitter feeling of resent-
ment that other countries haven't done their fair
share in the War. I have only singled out the English
soldier, because I was one myself, and because I

160 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

share the responsibility. But it is clearly the same
in other countries as well.

The Greek people have been more abused, probably,
than any other race for their conduct during the
War. I was in Marseilles in December 1916 on my
way out to Salonica, when the news came through
of the massacre of the Anglo-French marines at
Athens. I shall never forget the indignation aroused
by the news. So bitter was the feeling that the large
Greek colony in Marseilles, though they had publicly
disavowed and condemned Constantine's actions,
scarcely dared to show themselves in the street. So
far from being prejudiced in their favour, I remem-
ber cursing the Fate which was sending me to such
a vile country and to such a vile people. Since then
I have had to revise my opinion of the Greek people
(though not of the Greek province of Macedonia).
The reasons for my recantation are two -fold : I
have met and liked many Greeks in the Greek Army,
and I have become acquainted with a few facts
concerning the part they played during the War.
My own personal views are valueless, but the facts,
which I will give, speak for themselves.

It is a difficult thing to define public opinion. But
there can be no doubt that from the outbreak of war
till the dismissal of Venizelos in March 1915 the
public opinion of the vast majority of Greeks was
altogether in favour of coming into the War on the
side of the Entente. Not all of them, of course,
understood why they ought to come in. I don't

THE GREEK PEOPLE 161

pretend for a moment that they all understood the
high ideals of the Entente or the vile behaviour
of Germany. Of course they didn't : but they were
ready to follow their King and Venizelos wherever
they were led. The ' moral ' of the country was
excellent. They had emerged victorious from two
wars, and they were ready and eager to attack
Bulgaria or Turkey again, if they were given the
chance. Except for a few Staff Officers and perhaps
half-a-dozen politicians, there was hardly a pro-
German in Greece. They knew that England and
France had always supported, and that Germany
had always opposed, their aspirations, and so they
had no love for Germany.

But the eagerly awaited call to arms did not come.
In the beginning of March the Greek nation learnt
with consternation that Venizelos had disagreed with
the King and had resigned. What had happened ?
It was easy enough to follow the King whom they
loved, and Venizelos whom they loved, when they
were together. But now a break had occurred,
and they were worried and anxious. At the same
time Baron Schenk arrived in Athens and began his
pro-German and anti-national propaganda. He
started in a small way, buying up a few Greek
papers and bribing a few unimportant officials at
Court.

For the next three months, until the elections,
the ' interim ' Prime Minister, supported by the
King and by Baron Schenk, did all in his power to

11

162 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

undermine the confidence of the country in Venizelos.
His secret memorandum to the King in which he
suggested ceding the newly acquired provinces of
Drama-Kavalla to Bulgaria in return for concessions
in Asia Minor, was published. The Entente failure
in the Dardanelles was loudly proclaimed, with
the obvious moral. " See what your King has saved
you from I That madman Venizelos wished to drag
us into the expedition — only your wise and noble
King saved you from sharing in the ruin of the expedi-
tion." The bad faith of the Entente was loudly
advertised. " All the time they are flirting with
our enemies, the Bulgarians. They will not even
guarantee the integrity of Greece, for fear of dis-
couraging Bulgaria." Much too was made of the
German victories, and a belief in the invincibility
of Germany began to take root among the more
timorous Greeks. Then the King fell ill : and Gounares
made this an excuse to postpone the elections.
Venizelos replied that if the King was really so ill, the
Constitution had provided for a Regent, so that the
business of the country should not be paralyzed.
" Hark to this impious man ! " shrieked Gounares
to the people. " He wishes to kill your King !
I tell you that every vote cast for Venizelos is a bullet
directed at the heart of your King ! "

On June 13th the elections took place. Constant ine
had openly abandoned the impartiality of a con-
stitutional monarch, and had become a party leader.
It was not a question of ' Gounares or Venizelos ? !

THE GREEK PEOPLE 163

It was a clear-cut issue, * Venizelos or the King ? '
The Liberal Party did not shrink from the issue.
They proclaimed frankly that they had been justified
in desiring to join the Entente. The opportunity
of joining in the attack on the Dardanelles had been
thrown away. But so soon as another opportunity
presented itself they would come in. They did not
conceal for a moment their intention, if Serbia was
attacked by Bulgaria, of coming to her assistance
and counter-attacking Bulgaria.

Such was the issue : and the result of the elections
is amazing. In old Greece the Venizelists won an
overwhelming majority of seats. In the newly
acquired provinces of Macedonia they only saved
4 seats out of 73 ! In the latter provinces Admiral
Goudas had succeeded in ' cooking ' most of the
elections : a large number of the voters moreover
had seen their country fought over twice in the last
four years, and were naturally disinclined for another
War. Still, in spite of the Macedonian debacle,
the Venizelists had on the whole a large majority,
having won 184 seats against 126 seats won by all
the parties in opposition. No clearer proof of the
real sentiments of the Greek people can be needed
than this.

Having clearly shown their determination, the
Greek people sat down to await their opportunity
to intervene. On September 22nd the opportunity
came. The Bulgarians mobilized, and the following
day Greece followed suit. It was not yet generally

164 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

known that Venizelos and the King were once again
in disagreement : and the order to mobilize was
joyfully received, and obeyed with remarkable
rapidity. But the poison of pro-Germanism had
already begun to work in the Army, especially among
the officers. On October 5th Venizelos was dismissed
for a second time : and Serbia was left to her fate.
The Anglo-French troops arrived in Salonica : and
instead of finding the Greek Army ready and eager
to co-operate with them, they were met, for the most
part, with sullen looks. Many of the Greek officers,
instead of welcoming us as guests, treated us as
intruders, and wilfully obstructed our every move-
ment. Others, it is true, were more friendly and
hospitable. But unfortunately one remembers an
injury, where one forgets a kindness : and it was
during these first few weeks of the Entente landing
that there sprung up that hostility to Greece, of
which the traces still linger.

October 5th was a black-letter day in the history
of the Greek people : yet it is difficult to see how
they could have avoided this disgrace which their
alien King has thrust on them. I have discussed
elsewhere the reasons why Venizelos did not openly
lead a revolution and call on the Greek people to
abandon their King. Had he done so, it is certain
that three-quarters of the Army and the people would
have answered the call. Some, a mere handful,
through fear of Germany : others for love of their
King : others through mistrust of the Entente :

THE GREEK PEOPLE 165

others who loved money more than they loved their
country : others again who hated or feared to take
the final plunge — these formed but a fraction of
the country. All that the others needed was a
leader. But there was no leader save Venizelos,
and he could not take the risk. For if it is true that
the Greek people are easily led, it is equally true
unfortunately that they have no other leaders but
Venizelos. In discussing the responsibility of Zaimes,
Venizelos himself remarked in the Greek Chamber,
" I do not wish to depreciate his great gifts and
attainments in a country which unfortunately, if
I may say so without offence, is suffering from a
temporary lack of leading men."

So the opportunity passed, and for a whole year
the Greek people were unable to make their voice
heard. Only once at the end of August 1916 when
the Greek Corps was ' taken prisoner ' at Kavalla,
the spirit of the country was shown in the refusal
of 2,000 men under Colonel Christodoulos to surrender.
Thus in the Army, the stronghold of Royalism,
almost a quarter of the men concerned revolted
against their infamous leaders and betook themselves,
thanks to the British Navy, to Salonica, where they
were destined to form the nucleus of Venizelos'
Greek Army of National Defence. This year, from
October 1915 till October 1916, when Venizelos
landed at Salonica, was a year of unrelieved gloom
for the Greek people. For nine months, until in
June the Entente enforced demobilization, the Greek

166 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Army was kept mobilized — and inactive. The object
of this prolongation was purely political ; for,
having given guarantees to Germany that Greece
would never intervene even if her territory should
be invaded, the Royalist Government could not
pretend that any military reason necessitated the
prolongation of mobilization. The object was plain :
to crush the Greek people physically and morally.
The Greek Army was taught to hate Venizelos,
who had called them up, and but for whom they
would have been happy at home, enjoying all the
benefits of neutrality in a Great War. Those officers
and men whom the Government feared for their
uprightness were transferred at will from one end
of Greece to another. (In peace time the right
to transfer officers belongs only to a Council of
Lieutenant-Generals. But under ' war ' conditions
such as now existed a transfer could be effected
by the General Staff.) A regular propaganda was
carried on in the barracks. The soldiers were
taught not the spirit of self-sacrifice, not the spirit
of honour ; but they were taught by their own General
Staff to regard every noble act with aversion, they
were taught to be afraid of war.

Thus it was hoped by the Crown that this monstrous
propaganda of panic would be spread by the Army
among the whole of the people, so that, even in
the event of its enforced abdication, the spirit of
the people should be utterly broken. For the greater
part of the year, too, the blockade had told heavily

THE GREEK PEOPLE 167

on the health of the Greek nation, who could not
understand that the Entente were really their friends.
The blockade, although absolutely necessary, won
over many Greeks to the side of the King : and the
military incapacity of the Entente convinced more
and more Greeks that Germany was invincible.

Yet, in spite of all, the heart of the Greek Nation
remained sound. In October 1916 Venizelos landed
in Salonica and issued his appeal to the Greek people.
One is forcibly reminded of another appeal, the
appeal to the Roman troops made by Garibaldi
after the capture of Rome in 1849. " I am going
out from Rome. Let those who wish to continue
the war against the stranger come with me. I offer
neither pay, nor quarters, nor provisions : I offer
hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles and death.
Let him who loves his country in his heart and not
with his lips only, follow me." Yet many answered
the call, and many more were actually prevented
by the Entente's proclamation a short time later
establishing a neutral zone between new and old
Greece, and guaranteeing the King that the followers
of Venizelos should not be allowed to penetrate
beyond it. In all the Army of National Defence
numbered, eight months later, when Greece was
reunited, nearly 80,000 men. If we remember that
the total strength of the Greek Army is under 300,000,
this seems to me to be a very fair proportion — especi-
ally when we consider those who were debarred by
the Neutral Zone from coming to Salonica. It was

168 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

not until December that Venizelos was even c recog-
nized ' : and his followers had to put up with many
snubs. And all the time they were wondering
what would become of their relations in old Greece,
for they knew that the Royalists would do all in
their power to molest them.

Then at last, on June 12, 1917, the King was
forcibly deposed, and Greece was once more reunited.
The Royalists confidently believed that, even if the
King were removed, e the evil ' that he had done would
c live after him ' ; but they were disappointed. A
number of officers remained loyal to him ; but some
of them even consented to fight against Germany,
whilst retaining their allegiance to their fallen King.
Others resigned their commissions, or were dismissed
from the service. But an incontestable proof of
the general soundness of the Army is the part the
Greek Regular Army was destined to play in the
War. Once the evil influence of the Court was re-
moved, they shook off the poisonous fumes of German
propaganda, and regained their former ' moral.'
I do not propose here to estimate the importance of
the contribution which the Greek Army made to the
final victory ; it is enough to say that they fought
excellently and did all that was required of them.
But for the 200,000 Greeks who were actually on
the Macedonian Front in the autumn of 1918, the
great offensive, which crushed Bulgaria, could never
have been delivered.

What is true of the Greek Army is also true of

THE GREEK PEOPLE 169

the Greek people. Even in Athens, the stronghold
of Royalism, though some may have grieved at the
abdication of their King, many more rejoiced at
the return of Venizelos fifteen days later. Even if
the Great Powers had not intervened, Venizelos
is confident that by crossing the Neutral Zone with
his Army he could have won over the whole of Greece,
almost without bloodshed.

I have stated the facts which concern the Greek
people : from them I think we may make some clear
deductions. The vast majority of the people were
not in favour of betraying their ally Serbia, but
popular opinion in Greece was an extraordinarily
weak force. The possession of Athens, the one big
town in a country where communications are scanty,
and where therefore co-operation between other
towns is almost impossible, is the key to the situation.
As long as the King was firmly established there,
nothing short of a revolution headed by Venizelos
could have dislodged him. Thousands resented his
tyranny, but they could not combine together to
enforce their will. Were a King of England to
disregard the wishes of his people, as Const antine
did, they would rise up at once and dethrone him.
But then England possesses extraordinary facilities of
inter-communication for an exchange of plans and
ideas, which is denied to Greece, and without which
resistance is hazardous, if not impossible.

But more than any thing else Greece lacks leadership.
Oliver Cromwell defeated Charles I, but it was John

170 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Hampden who paved the way for Oliver Cromwell.
Even if we were to compare Venizelos to Cromwell,
yet we should be compelled to admit that there are
no John Hampdens in Greece — ordinary, simple
men who are prepared to stand up for their rights
against the might and maj es ty of the Crown. Without
a John Hampden a revolution is an impossibility.
Finally, we must take into consideration the
admiration as a man and the reverence as a King
with which the Greek people regarded Constantine.
If we weigh all these factors carefully and then con-
sider the part which the people actually played,
none of us, I think, need despair for the future of
the Greek Nation. The famous line of Horace :

" Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi,"

is as true to-day as it was two thousand years ago.
" The Greek people " (if I may be permitted a
4 free ' translation) " are not responsible for the
folly of their King." It is well that we should
bear this in mind.

CHAPTER VII

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS

WE have now studied in detail the policy
of Venizelos, and we have seen how
eventually, after a hard struggle with
the forces of evil, he won the victory ; and it is
natural for us to ask ourselves what qualities we
have found in him to place him head and
shoulders above, riot only all Greek and Balkan
statesmen, but probably even all European states-
men as well. I think there are two things which
assure his pre-eminence : his possession of opposite
qualities, which do not generally go together, and
his ' many-sidedness.' Let me illustrate what I
mean.

There are many practical men of affairs in the
world, and there are a certain number of idealists.
But Venizelos is the only practical idealist. The
truth of this is abundantly illustrated by the accusa-
tions of his opponents. Sonnino has been accused
of being too hard-headed and grasping ; President
Wilson has been called by many a hopeless idealist,

who will not see things as they are, but only as he

in

172 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

wishes them to be. But no one would think of
suggesting that Sonnino was an idealist, or that
President Wilson was too grasping. It is only
Venizelos who almost in the same breath is accused of
having sacrificed Greece for an idea, and of having
been too grasping in the concessions which he extorted,
in return for her co-operation. Thus he may be said
to see with the eyes of Sonnino through the rose-
tinted glasses of President Wilson.

Take again his transparent honesty and his amazing
shrewdness. There are a number of shrewd politicians
in Europe, but they are generally not too scrupulous.
And there are a number of transparently honest
politicians, but they are, as a rule, transparently
stupid as well. (One has not to look abroad to find
examples of this.) But Venizelos is as honest as he
is shrewd. He did not rush blindly to our side,
but he weighed carefully every consideration and
every factor in the European situation ; and finally
he came to the long-sighted conclusion that the
Entente were bound to win, and that Greece must
in her own interests come to our assistance. Having
once made the decision, he never looked back, but
remained consistently true to the promise which he
had made. Had he been less scrupulous, had he
been an opportunist, he would have given himself
a loophole, by which he might escape in the event
of disaster. But loopholes were alien to his nature,
and during the many vicissitudes of fortune, during
those terrible days when the best of us had doubts

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS 173

of the issue, he never doubted for an instant, but
remained our steadfast friend and ally.

His other claim to pre-eminence among the men
of his time is what I have called his ' many-sided-
ness.' I think I can best illustrate my meaning by
comparing him with Alfred the Great. A favourite
question in the ' Honours ' School of History at
Oxford is: " Did Alfred deserve the title of * Great'? "
The answer which one is expected to give is this :
that it is not because Alfred excelled his contemporaries
in any one particular branch of kingship, but because
he was proficient in so many, and because his charac-
ter arid accomplishments were so many-sided, that
he deserves this title. Alfred designed a new model
for English ships, but he was not the founder of
the English Navy ; and, indeed, he admits himself
that his ships had a habit of * lying aground most
uncomfortably.' He also reorganized the English
Army and defeated the Danes, but the Danes had
been defeated before, and they had to be defeated
again after his death. He wrote Latin fluently,
but any sixth-form public-school boy could detect
grevious ' howlers ' in his translations. He made
many inventions, but he cannot be included among the
47,000 inventors of the Tanks. Thus in everything
that he did we can detect shortcomings, and there is
no particular action on which we can lay a finger and
say : " Alfred did this, and therefore deserves the
title of ' Great.' " Rather we should say : " Because
he was and did and wrote so many things, because

174 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

Alfred was Alfred, he deserves this title." It is
for this very same reason that Venizelos deserves
to be called ' Great.5 There is no single quality of
his on which we can lay a finger and say c Venizelos
is great, because he is more honest, or more far-
sighted, or more patriotic than any other European
statesman," for this would not be true. It is in his
ability to combine all these qualities, which, though
admirable in themselves, are not sufficient singly to
complete the equipment of a statesman, that his
true greatness lies.

Let us turn now for a moment to his treatment of
the man who wronged him so cruelly, for in his
dealings with Constantine his strength and his weak-
ness are clearly revealed. From the very first we see
his absolute loyalty and the absence of any personal
ambitions. Before his accession to the throne
Constantine had been extraordinarily unpopular
in Greece, and was actually compelled to leave the
country and live abroad for a while. But Venizelos
does everything in his power to restore the love of
the people to their Prince. He turns the limelight
on to Constantine : he gives him, as the Chief of
Staff, every credit for the triumphs of the Army ; after
each success, whether in the field or in politics, he
encourages the people to award the palm to their
King. For himself, he is content to remain in the
background, to hide in the shadow ; he only asks
that he may be allowed to guide his countrymen's
footsteps in the right direction. It is true that he

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS 175

is ambitious for Greece ; but how impersonal is his
ambition we see clearly from his hatred of any
personal demonstration from his supporters. Let
him only sow the seeds of victory, and the King
may reap the rich harvest of glory.

Then comes the Greater War, and before long
it becomes plain that the King and he do not see
eye to eye. But it never occurs to him for a moment
that the King is animated by any other desire than
that of Greece's welfare. It never occurs to him that
the King may be pursuing a selfish, dynastic policy.
It never occurs to him that the King is consulting
all the time with a traitor in the Ministry. The
King flatly contradicts his policy at the time of the
Mark Kerr incident. But still his loyalty and belief
in the King remain unshaken : and it is only later
that, after repeated proofs of his treachery, he insists
on dismissing Streit.

We see clearly his great weakness : a certain
childlike credulity in the good motives of others.
This weakness is the defect of his quality of honesty :
for, being honest himself, he cannot bring himself
to believe in the dishonesty of others, until he has
the clearest and most irrefutable proofs. This is no
doubt an amiable weakness, but it is a dangerous
weakness. For unfortunately murderers do not
walk abroad with a label on their backs, " I am a
murderer," and unless a man takes the necessary
precautions, he will be stabbed in the back before
he has time to look round. If only Venizelos had

176 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

been a little more a ' man-of-the-\vorld,' if only he
had been a little less credulous, he might have removed
the King's evil advisers at the very beginning, and
Greece would have been spared all the shame which
was afterwards heaped on her. But he was too slow
to detect the treason ; and when at last he acted,
the King had been definitely won over, and it was
too late.

The Dardanelles crisis brought Greece to the parting
of the ways ; but still Venizelos, although he knew
the King to be in the wrong, persisted obstinately
in the belief that he was only mistaken and misguided.
He tried by every argument, by every means in
his power, to persuade him ; and when at last he
realized that he had failed, he gave way without
a protest. For his faith was still unshaken, and he
viewed the King's conduct in the most favourable
light. " Of course the King is mistaken. But it
is natural that he should be frightened of taking the
plunge. We have lost a great opportunity by not
intervening at once. But later the King may
change his mind, and it may not be too late."

During the six months of his retirement his con-
fidence in the King was rudely shaken. His most
secret memoranda were published ; he was actually
forbidden to land at the Piraeus ; and everything
was done which could discredit him in the eyes of
the people. But when he returned to office in August
1915 he still never doubted that, in spite of the
King's growing personal animosity towards him,

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS 177

there would be any question of disputing the validity
of the Serbian Treaty.

But the extraordinary difficulties of the task
before him soon became apparent to Venizelos.
Thanks to the kindness of an exalted personage
(whose name it is not desirable for me to give) I
have been allowed to publish the words in which
Venizelos described the situation in a conversation
with one of the Entente Ministers in Athens in
September 1, 1915. I quote from the wire after-
wards sent by this Minister to his Government
reporting the conversation.

" I HAVE BEEN TO SEE M. VENIZELOS, AND I AM

REPORTING HIS WORDS AS FAITHFULLY AS POSSIBLE.
MY RELATIONS WITH MY KlNG," SAID THE PRIME
MINISTER, "ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT.
HE PUTS UP WITH ME, BUT HE IS TRYING TO GET RID
OF ME. HlS FRIENDS ARE MY BITTEREST ENEMIES.

HE BELIEVES IN THE EVENTUAL TRIUMPH OF GERMANY.

YESTERDAY AT TATOI I HAD A VERY STORMY CONVER-
SATION WITH HIM. I TOLD HIM THAT HE JUDGED
THE SITUATION EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE MILITARY AND
STRICTLY TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, WHEREAS I
TOOK A MORE LOFTY VIEW, AND I WAS CONVINCED
THAT THE WORLD WOULD NEVER ENDURE THE WILL
OF A SINGLE NATION AND A SINGLE MAN. I THOUGHT
OF WITHDRAWING, THOUGH I KNEW THAT THE KlNG,
WHO CANNOT ENDURE CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS,
WOULD SOON BECOME A KAISER. IT IS REALLY
DIFFICULT AND DISCOURAGING TO STRUGGLE AGAINST

12

178 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

AN ADVERSARY WHO HAS ON HIS SIDE THE PRESTIGE
OF THE CROWN AND THE POWER OF THE ROYAL

PREROGATIVE. BUT I HAVE DECIDED TO REMAIN

IN ORDER TO FIGHT GERMANY."

It seems to me that this short conversation illus-
trates admirably the chief characteristics of Venizelos'
policy : his invincible belief in the eventual defeat
of Germany ; his unceasing endeavours, in spite
of the King's open hostility, to persuade him to take
a broader and higher view ; his diffidence in openly
fighting the Crown ; and finally his determination,
in spite of his personal disinclination, to remain at
his post as long as possible in order to defeat the
German intrigues.

But the struggle was hopeless. Oh the 5th of
October, only four weeks later, he was dismissed from
office. The actual pretext for his dismissal was his
reply in the House to the question of the pro-German
Theotokes on the previous day : " What if you find
German troops barring the way ? " he was asked
during the debate on the question of assisting Serbia.
" I shall fight them," came the unhesitating reply.
It appears that the Entente Ministers had begged
him not to take part in the debate that day. and
not to fall into the trap set for him by the King.
But he replied that such an evasion was unworthy
of him. Indeed, it would have been as useless as it
was unworthy, for the King was now determined
to get rid of him, and some other pretext would
have been found without difficulty.

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS ' 179

After his dismissal, he knew that he had done all
that was possible, and that for the present he could
do no more. For reasons which it is unnecessary
to go into again, he would not and could not lead a
revolution yet. So he sat down quietly and waited
for better times.

On May 6, 1916, he decided to offer himself for
election at Mitylene, where a vacancy had occurred ;
but he was careful to say that, in contesting a by-
election, he did not thereby admit the legality of the
newly elected Chamber. The result of the election
proved that the vast majority of the country was still
with him, for he obtained 14,768 votes out of a total
of 15,253 ! But in spite of this he could do nothing,
and things, instead of getting better, got worse.

At length he decided that the only course open to
him was to break with the King. But though he
broke with him, he did not wish at first to break him.
It was not till after the events of December 1st
and 2nd that the last ties of loyalty to, and con-
fidence in, his unworthy master were snapped, and
that he at length decided that, whatever happened,
the King must go. But even then he was faithful
to the dynasty. It is an open secret ' that when at
last the Entente decided to enforce Constantine's
abdication, they were anxious to remove the dynasty
as well, and to proclaim Venizelos ' First President
of the Greek Republic ' ; and there can be no doubt
that the vast majority of the Greek nation would

xjrhis " open secret " lacks official confirmation.

180 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

have preferred this course. But Venizelos absolutely
refused to listen to this, and he rebuked the Entente
and his too enthusiastic, admirers alike. " Constantine
must go, for he has betrayed Greece. But why
should his son suffer for the folly of his father ?
The Crown Prince shares his father's guilt, but his
younger sons are only boys, and they can be trained
to become worthy Kings of Greece. It is only on
condition that you preserve the dynasty that I
shall consent to return to Athens."

It is tempting to peep into the future. Will Alex-
ander repay Venizelos for his loyalty and devotion,
as his father did ? I think we are entitled to hope
that he will not. The young King has not displayed
any exceptional abilities, but, as the following
conversation shows, he has learnt the first lesson of
constitutional kingship. Someone asked him recently
why he always signed State papers without even
looking at them. His reply is striking : " My grand-
father never looked at the papers he was signing,
and he reigned for fifty years. My father always
looked at them — and he only reigned for four ! "

If we turn to Venizelos5 foreign policy, we see
again that curious combination of opposite qualities
which is so rare ; his determination which goes hand
in hand with conciliation. In the Balkans, particu-
larly during the last few years, a strong tendency
has shown itself to put forward extreme claims,
based on ' ethnographical ' or other grounds, on the
principle that, if you ask for much, you will probably

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS 181

get a little ; but if you only ask for the little to
which you are justly entitled, you won't get anything
at all. We have all heard the phrase, ' the realiza-
tion of our national aspirations,' until we have grown
sick to death of it. " There once lived a Bulgarian
King who reigned over all Greece, Serbia and Rou-
mania. Therefore Bulgaria is entitled to all his
territory, which has since been stolen from her by
Greek, Serbian and Roumanian robbers. However,
we aren't greedy, and we are prepared to accept a
slice of Macedonia and a slice of the Dobrudja in
compensation." To this someone else replies : " Ah !
but your Bulgarian King stole all this territory from
our Serbian King, who ruled over practically the
whole of Europe. Anyway, your King wasn't
a Bulgarian at all " — and so on, and so on. With
these preposterous fairy-tales Venizelos has never
concerned himself; he is far too practical and too
honest to confuse imaginary with real claims. I
am not going into the vexed question of what claims
are real and just : it is a matter on which only experts
can decide, and (we hope) are deciding at this very
moment. But the attitude of Venizelos towards
the question is quite straightforward. ' You, the
Great Powers, have decided that the test shall be
the self-determination of the small nations. Very
well, I only ask that you should apply this test.
Hold a plebiscite in Asia Minor, in Constantinople,
in Epirus, and in the Islands. If you find that the
majority of the inhabitants prefer to join themselves

182 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

to Greece, then let them do so. That is the general
principle which should guide you. But please note
that if other considerations lead you to suppose
that, in spite of the will of the majority, it would be
inadvisable in the general interests for certain dis-
tricts to become attached to Greece, you will find me
very reasonable. If, for instance, you say that, in
spite of its 400,000 Greeks, Constantinople cannot
be handed over to Greece, I am quite prepared to
give way. All that I ask is that the Greeks in the
town shall not be ill-treated, as they have been
under the rule of the Turks."

In the negotiations which preceded and followed
the Balkan Wars we see the same spirit of conciliation.
He never wished to fight against Turkey, unless it
proved absolutely necessary : and eventually, after
Greece had more or less settled her difficulties with
Turkey, he only fought because Serbia and Bulgaria
were determined to go to war. Again, after the first
war, he did all he could to prevent a reopening of
hostilities. But although he was always conciliatory,
he acted on the principal that, " If you want peace,
you must prepare for war " ; and when Bulgaria
proved unreconcilable, he was ready to meet the
emergency. At the Treaty of Bucharest he showed
that although he was willing to compromise on
comparatively unimportant matters, he was deter-
mined not to sacrifice any vital interest of Greece.
The question of Kavalla is a case in point. He
argued firmly that although he had been willing before

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS 183

the second war to hand over Kavalla to Bulgaria, it
was no longer possible to do so, since Bulgaria had
shown by her action how voracious she was. " If
we give it to her now," he said, " it will not satisfy,
but it will encourage, her voracity, and we shall
have to fight her again." Subsequent events proved
that he was right, and that the sop of Kavalla
would never have satisfied the greed of that ambitious
and restless country.

It is perhaps inevitable that a giant, dwelling
among pigmies, should be rather inclined to take too
much on himself : and in this respect, like a great
English soldier and administrator, perhaps Venizelos
is a little inclined to overtax his strength, by attempt-
ing to do all the work himself, and leaving nothing
to his subordinates. To give but one example of
this, it is known that, at the beginning of the war,
he was in the habit of attending to the minutest
matters of routine at the Greek Admiralty, and would
not allow a single promotion or transfer to take
place unless it had received his personal sanction I
Too much centralization of authority is bound to
impair the general efficiency of any service ; and,
moreover, by attempting to do too much himself,
and by concentrating too much authority in his own
hands, Venizelos made it very difficult to give his
subordinates that proper training to the management
of public affairs which can only be acquired by the
delegation of full responsibility and authority.

In the same way, and for the same reason that he

184 THE VICTORY OF VENIZELOS

towers above all those who surround him, he is a
little too disinclined to follow c expert ' advice, even
if it is the advice of a real expert. For instance,
when, before the war, the question arose of purchasing
two American battleships for Greece, in order to
secure for her the naval supremacy against Turkey,
Venizelos consulted Admiral Mark Kerr on the
advisability of acquiring them. The latter informed
him that these battleships were obsolete and quite
worthless. He would do much better not to waste
money on the purchase of these expensive and useless
* adornments,' but to secure instead several fast
destroyers. Venizelos appeared to be convinced, but
shortly afterwards he was visited by a deputation
of officers from the Fleet, whom he informed of the
Admiral's opinion. With one accord they told him
that the Greek sailors would never be brought to
understand that a small destroyer could put up a
fight against a great battleship, and that for the
4 moral ' of the Fleet the purchase of the American
battleships, however useless, was essential. Venizelos,
rightly or wrongly, gave way ; and a short time
afterwards Admiral Mark Kerr, who had heard no
more about the matter, was surprised to learn that
the sale to Greece of the two American battleships
had been effected !

I have tried to give a true picture of the man
as he really is, neither concealing his defects nor
exaggerating his virtues. But if anyone thinks
that I am guilty of hero-worship, let him consider

THE STATESMANSHIP OF VENIZELOS 185

for a moment what would have been the position of
Greece to-day had it not been for him ! The services
which he has rendered to his country, and which he
is still rendering, are beyond count, and the future
of Greece is in his hands. For in a country which, as
far as public men are concerned, has a good many
liabilities, and indeed may almost be said to be
bankrupt, Venizelos is the one great national asset.

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"He has the gift of writing amusingly and vividly." — Athencvnm.
" He has a decided sen.se of humour." — Field.

"Real cleverness . . . clearness of thought that clothes itself in
picturesque forms, and no little shrewdness of analytical insight."—
Evening Standard.

The Salonica Side-show

DemySvo. Illustrated. los.6d.net.

" A delightful book by an officer who contrives, without boring his
readers, to give a series of lifelike pictures of the War in Macedonia, and
conceals under the show of a humorous story of life in a. transport camp
an uncommonly clear account of the decisive campaign."— Prof. SPENSER
WILKINSON in Sunday Times.

"Those who enjoy 'Macedonian Musings' . . . will certainly take
pleasure in ' A Salonika Side-show "... a story of courage and hardship,
failure and success ... all told with a lively humour and made more
vivid by excellent photographs."— Times.

" Mr. Seligman understands the business of writing ... a rich sense of
humour is always playing over the surface. His pictures of warfare are
unaffected, manly and direct. Good writing, good humour and keen
observation are not such common qualities that they are likely to be
overlooked. " — Daily Telegraph .

"This most instructive and withal exceedingly amusing book." — Punch.

" His second book is even more amusing and more instructive than his
first was." — Spectator.

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LIMITED

NEW & RECENT PUBLICATIONS

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Nile to Aleppo

A Record of Travel with the Australian Light Horse

in the Middle East
BY HECTOR W. DINNING

Captain Australian Army
Author of " By- Ways on Service "

ILLUSTRATED WITH ETCHINGS, COLOUR PLATES AND DRAWINGS
Cr. 4/0. BY JAMES McBEY zis. net.

This is not primarily a war book. It is a description of things seen and
done in the wake of the Light- Horse Force — with special reference to the
spectacular dash from Jerusalem to Aleppo. The daily life of that soldier
of fortune, the mounted trooper, in the noisome Valley of the Jordan, on
the Plain of Armageddon, in the old-time, newly-won cities of Damascus
and Aleppo, by the Levantine Sea is described ; and the atmosphere of life
in Palestine and Syria — a Front which offers greater scope than any other
theatre in the late war in romance, in historical associations, in pictures-
queness — is vividly presented.

There is a considerable section of the book which presents an inimitable
picture of the Cairo the soldier knew on leave.

A prominent feature of the book will be the illustrations by Mr. TAMES
McBEY, who had already gained international fame as an Etcher before
he went to Palestine as official artist to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
The illustrations, which have bet n specially selected for the book by
Mr. McBey from those in the collection of the Imperial War Museum,
will comprise reproductions of four etchings (including the "Desert of
Sinai "), five colour plates and fout drawings reproduced in collotype.

With the Mad i yth to Italy

BY MAJOR E. H. HODY, R.A.S.C.

Demy %vo. WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS lot. 64. net.

•' Full of fun and sunshine." — Daily Mail.

" A dashing narrative." — Globe.

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Bolshevism : an International

BY PROFESSOR PAUL MILIUKOV
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With the collapse of the Russian national centres of resistance to the
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book is divided into three parts : The International Doctrine of Bol-
shevism (1905-1914) ; The Progress of Bolshevism through War and
Revolution (1914-1919) ; Bolshevism out for a World's Revolution (1918-?).

The Spirit of Russia

Studies in History, Literature, and Philosophy
BY THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK

First President of Czecho-Slovak Republic
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY EDEN AND CEDAR PAUL

Demy Svo. 2 vols. of about 500 pages each. $2s. net.

" A standard work . . . the most authoritative on its subject existing in
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The German Empire: 1867-1914

and the German Unity Movement

BY WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON

Demy Svo. In 2 vols. each of about 500 pages. i6s. each. net.

Volume I covering the period 1806 to the middle period of

Bismarck's Chancellorship, and Volume II dealing in consider-

able detail with the twenty-five years preceding the present war.

"This book is particularly valuable because it is written with the

practical and definite object of supplying an introduction to the btudy of

German politics. Of Mr. Dawson's competence and learning we cannot

speak too highly. . . . His reading has been guided by a sound critical

instinct." — Manchester Guardian.

History of Germany in the
Nineteenth Century

BY HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE

TRANSLATED BY E. & C. PAUL

INTRODUCTIONS BY WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON
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Japan's Foreign Policies

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"Japan at the Cross Roads" was prohibited in Japan, though every
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too true to be popular in bureaucratic Japan, though its facts were
proved by a "battery of statistics and references." It was a microscopic
examination of the internal conditions in Japan. "Japan's Foreign
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which the policies inaugurated by the late Count Hayashi have ripened
into making Japan the Germany of the East. Mr. Pooley examines fully,
but fairly, Japan's activities in China, and summarizes the results of the
war in regard to the problem of the Pacific.

Democracy and the Eastern

Question BY THOMAS F- MILLARD

^^ Author of " Our Eastern Question," etc.

Demy Svo. izs. 64. net.

Mr. Millard is perhaps the best equipped writer to inform us on the
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He is an experienced observer, a forceful and otherwise accomplished
writer, and he is, best of all, a man who understands both the East and
the West.

The following chapter headings indicate the scope and nature of
" Democracy and the Eastern Question " : The Real Character of Japan ;
Japan's Policy in the Great War ; China and the War ; The Corruption
of a Nation ; China and Economic Imperialism ; The Open-Door Policy ;
The Siberian Question ; The Solution.

Empire and Commerce in

Afrirs BY LEONARD WOOLF

X~V>l.i Ivxd Author of "International Government," etc.
Demy 8vo. 20;. net.

"A penetrating study which no student of politics or history can afford
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" Full of most valuable material, accompanied by some of the best tables
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The Republic of Liberia

BY R. C. F. MAUGHAM

Demy 8vo. ILLUSTRATED i8/. net.

A general description of the Negro Republic, with its History, Commerce,
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Dalmatia

BY COUNT LOUIS VOINOVITCH

TRANSLATED BY F. S. COPELAND
La. Cr. Svo. 8s. 64. net.

A very complete book upon Dalmatia, past and present, historical and
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The history of the last fifty years is told in great detail, and much inter-
esting light is thrown upon the real nature and development of the
much-discussed Italianita of the province. The author, who belongs to
one of the oldest and best-known families of Dalmatia, a well-known
Jugoslav diplomatist and politician, is specially well qualified to deal
with the task he has undertaken, and the book owes much of its value
to his inside knowledge of the conditions and problems he discusses.

Above all, the book is instinct with the author's profound, even
passionate love for his people and country, and should therefore appeal
also to readers not interested in the supremely important political aspect
of the subject.

Serbia and Europe, 1914-1918

PREFACE BY DR. L. MARCOVITCH

Professor in the University of Belgrade

'Demy Svo. About 12s. 64. net.

This book attempts to give a complete record of the policy of Serbia
during the war. It consists of articles — published in La Serbe between 1916
and 1919— written by twenty-nine of the most notable Serbian politicians
and publicists, among whom may be cited MM. Stovan Protitch, Bogamil
Vosniak and Lazare Marcovitch, of whom the latter also contributes the
preface.

Balkan Problems and
European Peace

BY NOEL BUXTON AND C. LEONARD LEESE

Cr. Svo. 4;. 64. net.

" Is all to the point ... the authors are experts, and practical experts,
in their subject." — London Mercury.

"An able and courageous study of a dismal situation. Its middle
chapters make a fresh and valuable contribution to the diplomatic
history of the War." — Labour Leader.

Mineral Resources of Georgia

and Caucasia BY D. GHAMBASHIDZE

Demy Svo. Ss. 64. net.

11 A very complete summary of material of interest to the geologist and

the investor . . . provides in a compact form what is probably attainable

from other sources only with considerable trouble."— Westminster Gazette.

The League of Nations

The Principle and the Practice

EDITED BY STEPHEN PIERCE DUGGAN
Demy 8vo. i $/. net.

What is the philosophy underlying the League of Nations ? How shall
the League be organized ? What are the actual duties it will be called
upon to perform ? This book attempts to answer these questions—-
and others — in the form of articles by various contributors (American),
authorities on their particular subjects. It is intended to appeal to
intelligent laymen seeking a general exposition of the subject, and to
students in need of a text-book. Appendices contain the text of the
League of Nations covenant and cognate instruments of historical
significance in connection therewith.

An Essay on the
Missing Policeman

BY ALFRED OLLIVANT

Cr. Svo. 4/. 6d. net and 3/. 6</. net.

" Mr. Ollivant has never done anything better worth doing than this

noble attempt. ... A book this to be read by thoughtful persons of

all classes — and for the clergy a storehouse of vital sermons." — Challenge.

Behind the Scenes at the
Peace Conference

Cr. 8vo. Cloth, 5/. net ; Limp Cloth, 3;. 6</. net.

" Mr. Bartlett is a young journalist with the gift of close observation
and keen enjoyment of the humours of public life. His book is full
of them." — Daily Mail.

The Political Scene

Cr. 8vo. BY WALTER LIPPMANN y.net.

" He has proved himself one of the sanest and most intelligent of Ameri-
can Liberal writers on international affairs." — International Review.

The Business Man's Guide
to the Peace Treaty

BY HON. HUGH FLETCHER MOULTON

(Barrister-at-Law)
Demy Svo. Paper, $/. 6J. net.

"He will earn the gratitude of all business men for his lucid
exposition." — Sunday Times.

" Intended primarily for business men, this book will be found of value
by all professional men."— Chamber of Commerce Journal,

Causes of the War

An Examination into the Causes of the European War,

with special reference to Russia and Serbia

BY M. BOGITSHEVICH, LL.D.

Former Charge d'Affaires of Serbia in Germany

Demy Svo. Cloth. 5*. net.

This book purposes to contribute towards clearing up the history of
events immediately preceding the War, and shows that it is not possible
to draw convincing conclusions from the officially published documents
without knowledge of the unpublished secret documents of the actions of
individual statesmen.

The Austrian Red Book

Official Files Pertaining to Pre-War History
Demy Svo. Paper. IN 3 PARTS 3*. 6d. each net.

Part I. — 28 June-23 July 1914.
Parts II and III. — 23 July 1914-27 August 1914

Wars and Treaties, 1815-1914

iBv ARTHUR PONSONBY

Demy Svo. Paper Covers. THIRD EDITION 2s. net.

" One of the most useful little books of history I have seen for some
time." — Daily News. " Clear and concise summaries." — Nation.

Documents and Statements

relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims
(Dec. 1916—1918) G.

Demy Svo. 8/. 6d. net.

" An absolutely invaluable collection." — Common Sense.

Across the Blockade

BY HENRY NOEL BRAILSFORD

Cr. 8vo. Limp Cloth. 2/. 6d. net.

" Mr. Brailsford cannot write anything without Art, for he is probably
the best living English journalist. His book is intensely moving and
interesting." — International Review.

Democracy After the War

BY J. A. HOBSON

Cr. SPO. THIRD EDITION 5/. net.

"An original criticism of society as well as a summons to democracy
to save itself. It is important that so valiant a missionary of freedom
should be attentively listened to in these days." — Daily News.

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DF Seligman, Vincent Julian

838 The victory of Venizelos

Sk